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“Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more 
precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the 
art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the 
equality of conditions is increased.”
Alexis de Tocqueville – Democracy in America (1998 [1835-1840], p. 219)
Prologue
When I started this PhD project on the promotion of civil society and democracy in 
developing countries, one author kept reappearing in the texts I read, namely the 
French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville. Often his thoughts are linked to the idea 
that civic associations serve as a ‘school of democracy’ where citizens learn about 
the norms, values and practices of democracy. Intrigued by this thought I wanted to 
see for myself what Tocqueville had to say about the link between civic association 
and the development of a democratic society. I purchased a copy of his seminal work 
Democracy in America, which I read during my stay in Ghana. First, I was surprised 
to find that only a few chapters explicitly tackle the importance of civic associations 
in the American democratic system. The chapter titled “Relation of civil to political 
associations” seems to be central to Tocqueville’s ideas on the importance of civic 
associations for democracy. Although I did indeed find the idea that “civil associations 
[…] facilitate political association”, I was further surprised that this sentence, and 
actually the whole chapter, also contained the idea that “on the other hand, political 
association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes.” 
Reading on, I found that according to Tocqueville civic association is not so much the 
school of democracy, but the other way around: “Political associations may therefore 
be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to 
learn the general theory of association.” 
 Having made this discovery, I realised that I would probably not be the first one 
to have noticed this oddity. After a short search, I encountered a study by Michael W. 
Foley and Bob Edwards (1996), titled The Paradox of Civil Society. They basically 
make the same observation and link it to the work of the neo-Tocquevillian Putnam. 
Putnam’s influential studies Making Democracy Work (1994) and Bowling Alone (2000) 
describe the importance of social capital and civic association for the functioning of 
a democratic society. According to Putnam, “networks of civic engagement foster 
sturdy norms of generalised reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. 
Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and 
thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved.” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Foley 
and Edwards (1996, p. 40) propose that Putnam puts too much emphasis on civic 
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association and underestimates “the ability of newer organisations, and of specifically 
political associations such as social movements and political parties, to foster aspects 
of civil community and to advance democracy.” In sum, the discrepancy was noticed 
more than 15 years ago, and it had been published in a renowned journal. So why 
then does the debate still revolve around neo-Tocquevillian interpretations rather than 
those of Tocqueville himself? With this question at the back of my mind, I pursued this 
research on the promotion of civil society and democracy in developing countries, 
only to find many more questions and anomalies.


Chapter 1
General introduction
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1.1 Introduction
This thesis tackles the subject of civil society and democracy promotion in developing 
countries. It looks at how policy assumptions in this field turn out in practice and aims 
at explaining the discrepancies between both. This is an important matter for several 
reasons. First, theoretically, civil society and democracy are highly contested concepts. 
No univocal idea has evolved on the meaning of either civil society or democracy, let 
alone about how one influences the other. Nevertheless, many donor policies are 
based on these contested ideas and beliefs. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been hailed as the panacea for democracy 
and development. They are believed to have many positive qualities which stimulate 
the process of democratisation. One of the reasons why there is such a strong belief 
in the positive force of civil society is that it is a field where science and activism have 
often interacted, producing a strong normative component to the debate (Opoku- 
Mensah, 2007). Many have noted that literature on civil society and democratisation 
has the tendency of mixing ideals with reality (Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; Mitlin, Hickey, 
& Bebbington, 2007; Robins, Cornwall, & von Lieres, 2008; Tvedt, 2007). 
 Second, the scientific debate offers donor-agencies wishing to support civil 
society and democratisation little concrete starting points to improve their strategies. 
This is probably a result of the combination of both the problems with defining the 
subject and with its normative treatment. Many of the theoretical propositions about 
how civil society contributes to democracy remain very abstract, meaning everything 
and nothing at the same time. NGOs are the ‘seedbeds of democracy’, they are close 
to the people and act as ‘antenna’s’. They are also supposed to be ‘in tune’ with their 
social, political and economic environment. Many studies remain at this high level of 
abstraction, not making concrete what these metaphors mean for actual democracy 
promoting NGOs. Hence, Cornwall and Brock (2005, p. 1043) argue that ‘civil society’, 
‘voices of the poor’ and similar buzzwords which “once spoke of politics and power 
have come to be reconfigured in the service of today’s one-size-fits-all development 
recipes, spun into an apoliticised form that everyone can agree with.” As such they 
have been rendered meaningless. 
 This thesis tackles both problems identified within the debate. First, it deals with 
the normative component of the debate by explicating the central beliefs on which 
donor-policies in the field of civil society and democratisation are based, and then by 
scrutinising how these ideals turn out in practice. So, although international donor 
agencies are not the object of study, the thoughts and ideas underpinning their 
policies in the field of civil society and democracy promotion are. Second, it offers 
studies which aim to be very concrete, i.e. having a low level of abstraction, to make 
the matter tangible instead of it remaining ‘up in the air’. For instance, when looking 
at civil society, it looks at donor-sponsored NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia. And when 
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looking at these NGOs, it breaks them down to their organisational components (i.e. 
mission, structure, strategy, resources), and analyses how these combined aspects 
influence the way NGOs operate. As all of the chapters of this book relate to the 
actual promotion of civil society and democracy in developing countries, each of the 
studies delivers policy recommendations for international donors wishing to improve 
their work.
 Four of the central policy assumptions on which civil society and democracy aid 
is based are drawn from the debate and are put to the test by using various theoretical 
and methodological approaches. Chapter two will start by looking at the assumption 
that an enabling environment is important for a civil society to flourish. Chapter three 
looks at the belief that NGOs are conducive to promoting context-specific democracy 
by examining to what extent they actually are context-specific. Chapter four looks at 
the idea that donor-funding to NGOs is a good strategy to promote this context- 
specific democracy. Finally, chapter five looks at the idea that NGOs stimulate 
democratisation by performing a range of democratic roles. 
 The main underlying idea connecting these four policy assumptions is that to be 
able to make a meaningful contribution to democracy, civil society needs to be locally 
owned and embedded in its national context. This idea stems from many critical 
studies over the years which have pointed out that the external manufacturing of civil 
society and democracy has often been counterproductive (Blaug, 2002; Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). This puts donor agencies in a difficult position. By definition, 
development aid represents an external intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
country. Given this situation, however, they now have to make their aid as contextually 
sensitive as possible. This assignment almost implies a ‘contradictio in terminis’. The 
four policy assumptions relate to ways of overcoming this tension. The assumption in 
chapter two represents an indirect way of supporting civil society development. 
Instead of directly interfering, it focuses on bringing about the preconditions for civil 
society development. If these conditions are in place, then civil society can develop 
locally. The other chapters look at the assumptions behind the more hands-on 
approach to civil society and democracy development, namely supporting NGOs. 
Here the tension becomes even more apparent, because it implies direct interference 
with actual CSOs. Still, the rationale behind this policy points towards a reconciliation 
of the tension between ‘home-grown’ and ‘externally manufactured’. It is argued that 
NGOs are conducive to promoting context-specific democracy, and that they do so 
by performing various democratic roles. Therefore, donor-funding to NGOs is a good 
strategy to promote this context-specific democracy. 
 The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. First, to get a sense of 
the complexity of the debate, it provides a theoretical view of the meaning of 
democracy, the meaning of civil society and the relation between the two notions. 
Second, it pays close attention to the promotion of civil society and democracy in 
1 General introduction | 23
developing countries. Third, it discusses the focus of this thesis which results in the 
formulation of the central research questions. Fourth, it describes the contributions of 
each of the studies, providing an outline for the thesis. Finally, it discusses the 
methodologies used in this thesis. 
1.2 Defining democracy
Many different meanings have been assigned to the term democracy. Some see it 
purely as a political system that allows citizens to elect their leaders for a certain 
period of time (liberal democracy). Others employ a more comprehensive notion of 
democracy where participation goes beyond elections (participatory democracy) 
and where democracy is not only confined to the political realm, but also enters the 
social and the economic realms (social democracy). Still others point out that formal 
democratic institutions do not equal democracy, they emphasise that it is the 
substance of the democratic process which is important (deliberative democracy). 
Besides these four well-known visions of democracy, there are many more to be 
found. The goal of this short overview is not to be exhaustive, but to show the basic 
distinction between comprehensive and minimal forms of democracy, and how much 
these forms differ in their appreciation of what a democratic system entails. 
 Most democracies share elements of the liberal democratic model (Carothers, 
1997, p. 11). Probably the best summary of that basic model is provided by Dahl 
(1971, pp. 1-9). Dahl assumes that responsiveness is one of the main characteristics 
of a democratic political system. In its ideal form a democracy is completely 
responsive to all its citizens. For a government to be responsive over a period of time, 
politically equal citizens must be able: 1) to formulate their preferences; 2) to signify 
their preferences to their fellow citizens and their government; and, 3) to have their 
preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government. In order to attain these 
conditions for a large number of people, Dahl (1971, p. 3) further assumes that the 
institutions of a society must provide guarantees concerning voting and elections, 
namely: the right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right of political leaders to 
compete for support and for votes; free and fair elections; and institutions for making 
government policies depend on votes. A society must also provide institutional 
guarantees for the formation and functioning of civil society, namely: the freedom to 
form and join organisations; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; 
and institutions for making government policies depend on expressions of preference 
other than votes. 
 Schumpeter is often cited as representing a minimalist position on liberal 
democracy. His definition of democracy is minimal in the sense that ‘rule by the 
people’ barely goes beyond the voting procedure. According to Schumpeter (1950, 
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p. 269) “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s votes”. He puts competition for political leadership at the 
core of his definition. By doing so he breaks with the classical theory on democracy 
which centres around the notion that the will of “the people” is translated into political 
decisions by elected representatives. In Schumpeter’s definition the role of the 
electorate is reduced to producing a government, be it directly or indirectly. When a 
government is formed it will take all the decisions for the duration of its term. The next 
elections give the citizens the opportunity to hold their rulers accountable, to re-elect 
good rulers and to reject bad ones. 
 At the ideological level, the liberal democratic model is also minimalistic (Fung, 
2003). First of all, liberal democrats are very much concerned with negative freedom, 
which basically means that citizens should be protected from pervasive state 
interference in their personal lives (Sørensen, 1993, p. 6). Freedom of individual 
choice is the highest end in this tradition, for some this end is even more important 
than democracy itself. Liberal democrats therefore propagate a minimal state, often 
referred to as the ‘night watchman state’. A minimal state limits its interference to 
protecting individual freedom, as regulation concerning any other terrain will result in 
less individual freedom. Closely related to this concern with negative freedom is the 
notion of political equality. Political equality does not go beyond the ‘one man, one 
vote’ principle. This principle ensures that every citizen can exercise his vote to protect 
his freedom vis-à-vis the politicians that rule over him.
 More comprehensive forms of democracy give both a different procedural and a 
different substantive meaning to democracy. In opposition to Schumpeter’s view, 
Diamond (2005, p. 2) states: “Electoral participation is not enough. People at every 
level of public life must become involved in the decisions that affect their lives”. 
According to Diamond this is necessary to promote social inclusion and political 
ownership of state policies. If all the different groups in society participate in 
formulating policies, policies will be better informed about the needs of citizens. This 
will increase both the legitimacy and the sustainability of policies as citizens are more 
likely to accept policies they helped to create. This kind of democracy is often 
described with the use of the adjective ‘participatory’. Diamond (2005, p. 3) also 
summarises the social democratic critique of liberal democratic ideology when he 
states: 
“Now, we all know that political equality is linked to economic equality, and that 
everywhere those with money and high social status have vastly more access to 
power and more influence over government than do the poor and middle class”. 
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Even though formal political equality provides every citizen with equal opportunities, 
social and economic inequalities will provide for very unequal outcomes. Freedom in 
the sense of non-interference thus leads to a situation of political inequality. The 
social democratic answer to this is to use state interference to combat social and 
economic inequality. Individual freedom can only be realised in a situation where 
there are no vast social and economic inequalities because marginalised citizens 
have limited freedom of choice. 
 Another prominent comprehensive view on democracy is called deliberative 
democracy. This view emphasises that the institutional characteristics such as 
electoral system, referenda, separation of power or constitutional design, should not 
be the focus when determining how democratic a system is. The legitimacy of 
decisions should not be merely based on the aggregation of votes, but must also be 
based on authentic deliberation (Bohman, 1998; Cohen, 1997; Habermas, 1996). 
Authentic deliberation can only take place when the institutional conditions of a 
country support the ideal of democratic autonomy, which is considered to be the real 
essence of democracy (Held, 1987). Democratic autonomy covers both the micro 
and macro level, and can be divided into individual and political autonomy (Hendriks, 
2006; Warren, 2001). An individual is autonomous when he or she has the capacities 
to take part in critical examination of self and others, to participate in reasoning 
processes, and to arrive at judgments he or she can defend in public argument. 
Individuals who are barely educated or who spend all their time just to subsist have 
no chance of arriving at individual autonomy. Political autonomy is based on very 
much the same idea with the difference that it functions at a higher level of abstraction, 
namely at the level of the public sphere. The public sphere is the place where 
individual judgments are transformed into collective judgments. These collective 
judgments are autonomous when they are held with due consideration and can be 
justified by the giving of reasons to others (Warren, 2001). 
1.3 Defining civil society
Like democracy, there is no uncontested definition of civil society. Different theorists 
emphasise different aspects at different levels of analysis. Some are mainly concerned 
with civil society as a realm or a sphere and relate it to other realms like the state, the 
private sphere or the market. Others are more concerned with the organisational and 
structural characteristics of civil society. Finally, some see civil society as a means 
towards a certain end (e.g., promoting democracy), thus giving it a teleological 
dimension. 
 In contemporary literature, civil society is usually positioned as a realm or space 
that is opposed to society at large, the state, the market and the family (Bebbington, 
26 | Chapter 1
1997; Fisher, 1998; Hyden, 1997; G. White, 1994). A clear articulation is provided by 
Reichardt (2006, p. 23) who states that “civil society is an intermediate social space 
between the state, the economy and the private sphere. Linked to these three spheres 
by manifold relationships and interactions, it can still be distinguished as a relatively 
independent space”. Besides clearly positioning the realm of civil society, this 
definition acknowledges that civil society is not some entity that lies completely 
outside of the three other spheres. An important aspect related to positioning is 
autonomy. In order for civil society to flourish, it needs to have a certain degree of 
autonomy. If civil society is co-opted by the private sphere, the market or the state, it 
cannot perform its societal functions independently (Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; 
Howell & Pearce, 2001; Reichardt, 2006; Wang, 2006). For Habermas (1991), civil 
society needs to be autonomous to safeguard the formation and functioning of a 
democratic public sphere. Within this sphere, equal citizens can freely debate public 
matters and influence politics by reaching consensus over issues through 
communicative action. In Habermas’ ideal type model this means that consensus is 
reached through the power of argumentation rather than through coercion. In 
contrast, Gramsci’s (1971) analysis sees civil society not as an autonomous sphere, 
but as highly intertwined with the state. Coming from a Marxist background, he saw 
the capitalist state as being made up of two overlapping spheres, a ‘political society’ 
which rules through coercion and a ‘civil society’ which rules through consent. His 
approach implies a more conflictual perspective on civil society. Even more than a 
sphere where consensus can be reached, it is a sphere of political struggle by 
societal groups over ideas and norms. As such, civil society is the sphere of both the 
development of hegemony and contestation over state institutions. It is the site where 
the power of the dominant class is produced and reproduced, and therefore it is also 
the site where counter-hegemonies should be developed to overthrow this dominant 
class.
 In terms of its organisational and structural properties, civil society is often 
depicted as space for voluntary organisation. It is a realm which is populated by all 
sorts of formal and informal organisations, like NGOs, associations based on kinship, 
social movements, community based organisations, labour unions and professional 
associations (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). As a result of this multitude, there is also a lot of 
discussion on which organisations belong to civil society and which do not. Different 
authors use different criteria, for instance concerning their economic, political and 
social roles (Edwards, 2004). When civil society is defined as an organisational realm, 
the dimensions of diversity, density and depth become important (Edwards, 2004; 
Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). If civil society is to promote pluralism and multiple interests, 
it needs to be diverse with regard to the groups it represents and the goals it seeks to 
achieve. Equally, if civil society is to create a significant positive impact on society, 
there needs to be a sufficient number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Finally, 
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civil society’s depth refers to the level of citizen participation in CSOs. This is viewed 
as an indication of the degree to which CSOs are embedded in society. Closely 
related to this are authors who view civil society from the perspective of social capital 
theory. Neo-Tocquevillians such as Putnam (2000; 1994) tend to emphasise the 
importance of structural connections. A distinction is made between bonding 
(connections within organisations), bridging (connections across them) and linking 
(connection between associations, government and the market). It is argued that 
these connections create the social fabric needed for the functioning of CSOs. In 
case effective network structures exist in civil society, the whole will be greater than 
the sum of the parts. 
 Finally, civil society is often linked to the performance of various roles. As such it 
is seen as a means toward an end (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Edwards (2004, 
pp. 13-15) provides a clear account of these roles from a developmental perspective. 
He identifies three interrelated roles: an economic, a social and a political role. The 
economic role centres on securing livelihoods and providing services where states 
and markets are weak. This role also encompasses nurturing the social values, 
networks and institutions that underpin successful market economies, including trust 
and cooperation. In their social role, civil societies are seen as a reservoir of caring, 
cultural life and intellectual innovation. They teach people the skills of citizenship and 
nurture a collection of positive social norms that foster stability and increase social 
capital. Finally, in the political role civil societies are seen as a crucial counterweight 
to states and corporate power. They are an essential pillar in promoting transparency, 
accountability and other aspects of ‘good governance’, as well as promoting 
democracy itself.
 All these approaches contain normative ideas about a ‘good’ or ‘strong’ civil 
society. As such, “civil society is simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means for 
achieving it, and a framework for engaging with each other about end and means” 
(Edwards, 2012, p. 12). This shows the complexity of the concept of civil society in a 
nutshell. At a basic level, there is no agreement about whether it is an analytical 
concept or a tool for socio-political action. Furthermore, there is disagreement about 
the meaning of civil society within all of the dimensions mentioned, namely about 
where to position civil society vis-à-vis other realms, about its most important 
organisational and structural properties and about its roles. In sum, like democracy, 
civil society can mean a lot of different things to a lot of different observers.
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1.4 The relation between civil society and democracy
To make matters more complex, the concepts of civil society and democracy are 
highly intertwined. Each different definition of democracy implies a different role or 
kind of civil society, and vice versa (Hendriks, 2006). In the liberal democratic model, 
civil society is seen as a means of protecting individual freedom against an intrusive 
state. In the comprehensive social democratic model, civil society is seen as a means 
of equalising political representation by bringing in previously marginalised groups 
(Bebbington & Hickey, 2006). In the deliberative democratic model, civil society is 
seen as the public sphere where citizens debate the means and ends of governance. 
By this process of deliberation and the public reasoning of citizens, civil society helps 
to attain the democratic ideal that government should be based on the ‘will of the 
people’ (Bohman, 1998; Habermas, 1996). As such, civil society can be seen as an 
integral part of democracy instead of being something separate. Because of this 
 interrelatedness, there is no simple and straightforward theoretical answer to the 
question how civil society contributes to democracy. The answer depends on several 
assumptions about the process of democratisation and the role of civil society in it. 
Civil society and the process of democratisation
Although most of the debate revolves around civil society being conducive to the 
process of democratisation, arguments for the opposite relation are equally plausible. 
This means that the actual direction of the causal relation between civil society and 
democracy is still being debated. In fact, one of the authors most cited for stating that 
civil society is the school for democracy, actually puts more emphasis on the opposite 
relation, namely that “political association singularly strengthens and improves 
associations for civil purposes” (Tocqueville, 1998 [1835-1840], p. 224). 
 When assuming that civil society contributes to democracy, assumptions about 
the nature of the process of democratisation become important. A basic distinction 
can be made between on the one hand theorists of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation 
like Huntington (1993) and Fukuyama (1992), who see the process of democratic 
transition as unfolding in several stages towards the liberal democratic model. On the 
other hand, there are theorists who criticise this transition paradigm by pointing out 
that democratisation processes are messy and do not follow a predefined path. Also 
the outcome of a liberal democracy is questioned by this approach. According to 
Carothers (2002), many of the ‘transition’ countries are not moving towards 
democracy. They appear to be stuck in a situation of either ‘feckless pluralism’ where 
different governments keep making the same mistakes or dominant ‘power politics’ 
where a single group has captured most of the power. The political situation in these 
countries actually calls the transition paradigm into question.
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 Both approaches employ different notions of the role on civil society in the 
process of democratisation. The latter approach contends that when removing the 
teleological dimension inherent in the transition paradigm, a more realistic picture of 
a country’s state of democracy will emerge (Carothers, 2002). This implies that an 
analysis of the democratisation process of a country, and the role of civil society in 
it, should not be based upon expectations of where a country is going, but instead 
on where a country is. Following the logic of this argument, it is difficult to make 
 generalisations about the contribution of civil society to democratisation, because 
it depends on the specific situation in a country. 
 In contrast, theorists following the logic of the transition paradigm assume that 
civil society has a different kind of contribution to the process of democratisation in 
each of the stages of democratic transition. Central to this paradigm is Rustow’s 
(1970) model of democratic transition, which divides the process of democratisation 
into three succeeding stages. First, the preparatory phase consists of the breakdown 
of the nondemocratic regime and is characterised by political struggle and uncertainty. 
In the decision phase important decisions about the shape of the main democratic 
institutions are taken. Finally, in the consolidation phase, democracy is further 
developed, ever larger parts of the population are included, and democratic norms 
and ideals become ingrained in the political culture of a country. Following the logic 
of this transition model, there are two different contributions of civil society to the 
process of democratisation (Biekart, 1999; Diamond, 1999; Sørensen, 1993). In the 
preparatory phase, civil society can contribute to the bringing about of democratic 
institutions, which is mainly done by social movements that position themselves in 
opposition to the state. As soon as the common enemy is gone these movements 
tend to disintegrate. This is when the overall resurrection of civil society has to take 
place, so it can help to protect and deepen the recently gained social and political 
rights (decision and consolidation phase). This deepening of democracy entails that 
democracy becomes “a meaningful way for diverse sectors of the populace to 
exercise collective control over the public decisions that affect their lives” (Roberts, 
1998, p. 2). Civil society’s contribution in this phase is to ensure that the political 
process is shaped in such a way that citizen participation goes beyond voting once 
every four years and that it is based on the principle of political equality as much as 
possible (Beetham, 1993).
The democratic roles of civil society organisations
There are multiple ways in which civil society organisations (CSOs) can contribute to 
the deepening of democracy. Four democratic roles can be derived from the debate: 
an educational, a communicative, a representational and a cooperative role. In its first 
role, civil society educates citizens about the norms, values and practices of 
democracy. The most relevant aspects of this role include the provision of information 
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to citizens, nurturing civic virtues and teaching citizens political skills. By widening 
and enriching the flow of information available to citizens, associations can enhance 
transparency and public accountability (Diamond, 1999; Warren, 2001). Associations 
can also foster a culture of democracy and civility by nurturing civic values (Fowler, 
2000). According to Putnam (2000), the most important of those civic values are 
generalised reciprocity and trust. The experience of cooperation within associations 
not only nurtures civic values, it also increases political skills like speaking in public, 
negotiating and building coalitions (Warren, 2001). Some authors therefore consider 
participation in associations as a stepping stone to a political career, helping to 
recruit politicians and strengthen people’s skills as future political leaders (Diamond, 
1999; Edwards, 2004).
 Second, in its communicative role, civil society provides the communication 
structure between state and society (Habermas, 1991). This role is derived from the 
idea that civil society protects a democratic public sphere in which citizens can 
debate the means and ends of governance (Edwards, 2004). Associations foster 
public communication and deliberation because they are closely connected to the 
life worlds of individuals. As such, they have a great capacity to signal individual 
concerns and can communicate them to a broader public (Warren, 2001). By doing 
so, they provide citizens with additional channels, which go beyond voting and 
lobbying, through which to make their voices heard in government decision-making 
(Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004). Beyond interest representation, the provision of 
this communication structure is essential to facilitate public deliberation (Fung, 2003).
 Third, the representational role of civil society refers to aspects of voice and 
resistance. Where the communicative role provides the communication structure, 
voice provides the actual content of communication. Civil society is often seen as a 
means for broadening political participation by bringing in the voice of previously 
marginalised groups (Fowler, 2000; Sabatini, 2002). This ensures both the constitution 
of a pluralist society and of power centres outside the state (Sørensen, 1993). These 
power centres outside the state are important for the aspect of resistance. Civil society 
organisations provide people with veto power (Warren, 2001). By opposing government, 
CSOs can provide a check against the abuse of state power (Edwards, 2004), and 
can play a disciplinary role towards the state, safeguarding standards of public 
morality and improving accountability (G. White, 1994). 
 Fourth, civil society is not necessarily a force of opposition, it can also involve 
cooperation with the government (Boulding & Gibson, 2009). In developing countries, 
cooperation can be of importance for meeting development needs. Through 
cooperation, NGOs “help to build pockets of efficiency within government agencies, 
provide strategic partners for reform-oriented ministries” and “fill voids in the 
government’s social service delivery role” (Clarke, 1998, p. 49). Besides serving as 
alternative modes of governance, associations also have become more important in 
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their role as coordinators in complex policy areas with multiple actors involved. The 
networks and contacts of associations can help manage different interests, generate 
expert knowledge, mobilise support and negotiate a policy direction (Warren, 2001).
  One striking element of these four roles is that they treat civil society as something 
which is inherently good for democracy and development. These positive accounts 
get the most attention while there is also evidence of civic participation that weakens 
the foundations of democracy (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). A prominent example of 
such ‘bad’ forms of civil society is the rich associational life during Germany’s Weimar 
republic, which served as a significant training ground for Nazi cadres and a strong 
base for their eventual rise to power (Berman, 1997). Other examples include 
organisations like the mafia, paramilitary groups with a strong civic base, single issue 
NGOs like the National Rifle Association, associations who only exist for the economic 
wellbeing of their members and activist groups who pursue their goals by violent 
means (Carothers & Barndt, 1999; G. White, 1994). 
In conclusion, the overview shows that the theoretical field concerning civil society, 
democracy and the relation between the two is highly diverse. Although there are 
some dominant perspectives, such as the neo-liberal interpretation of democracy 
and the idea that civil society is always a positive force, each of these perspectives is 
questioned. Nevertheless, donor policies in the field of promoting civil society and 
democracy have been derived from these contested ideas, and have been applied to 
countries around the world. While donors continued implementing their strategy of 
supporting NGOs, a growing number of studies started critiquing their work. 
Simultaneously, a more fundamental critique of the whole scientific debate emerged. 
The next section summarises this critique and positions the studies of this thesis 
vis-à-vis this debate on the promotion of civil society and democracy in developing 
countries.
1.5  Promoting civil society and democracy in 
developing countries
Supporting civil society organisations as a way to promote democracy has been a 
prominent strategy among bi- and multilateral donors of international development 
aid for over two decades now. Boosted by the success of civil society groups in 
Eastern Europe in overthrowing communism, donors started implementing 
programmes to support civil society as a means “to make democracy stick and 
work” in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Petrova, 2007, p. 1277). This strategy became 
so appealing that it is still being applied worldwide. It was so appealing because it 
provided donors agencies with an alternative to promoting democracy through 
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corrupt states and political parties. It allowed them to bypass these actors and 
directly connect to citizens in developing countries. Another reason for its appeal is 
that it is based on a firm belief that civil society is always a good force for democracy 
and good governance (Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2008; Hendriks, 2006; Roy, 
2008; Sabet, 2008). A speech by the former Dutch Minister of Development 
Cooperation for the Society of International Development lecture series on Democracy 
and Development clearly illustrates this belief:
“A democratic society without a vital civil society is an empty shell, as I am sure 
everyone here would agree. Strengthening civil society is crucial since it 
represents the demand side of the political equation. Civil society organisations 
such as voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs unions, charities 
and churches can amplify the voices and voice the demands of the most silent, 
invisible and impoverished citizens. They also foster many elements essential to 
democracy, such as participation and accountability” (Van Ardenne-van der 
Hoeven, 2008, p. 27).
 Most of the civil society aid for democracy promotion has been directed to NGOs. 
During the 1980s, NGOs were already part of development programmes, but mainly 
in the role of public service providers in areas where the state was weak. From the 
1990s onwards, NGOs became important as vehicles for democratisation, good 
governance and the protection of human rights (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006). This focus 
on NGOs is caused by the “central assumption underlying civil society aid carried out 
under the auspices of democracy promotion, that advocacy NGOs are a critical 
segment, perhaps the critical segment of a civil society, at least with regard to 
 democratisation” (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000b, p. 295). Also, “for many donors, civil 
society and NGOs are virtually synonymous” (Encarnación, 2012, p. 474).
 While all the merits of civil society were projected onto NGOs, studies started to 
show that they often could not live up to the image of being flexible, being closely 
connected to citizens, serving as a check on state power, fostering public deliberation, 
helping include the poor and marginalised, educating citizens on the norms and 
values of democracy, and being able to cater to local circumstances and local needs 
(Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; Hendriks, 2006; Houtzager & Lavalle, 
2010; Warren, 2001). In Africa, for instance, there were signs that NGOs were hijacked 
by the same elites who had hijacked the state. Therefore, “hopes that the NGO sector 
will be an independent, democratic force which will counteract state power may be 
misplaced” (Gary, 1996, p. 163). Hearn (2000, 2007) confirms this image when she 
concludes that African NGOs are maintaining rather than challenging the status quo. 
More generally, the representational capacities of NGOs have been questioned (Guo 
& Musso, 2007). Houtzager and Lavalle (2010) show that the representative claims of 
1 General introduction | 33
NGOs in Brazil are often nothing more than an ‘assumed representation’ of the urban 
poor. Similarly, Roy (2008, p. 677) shows that assertive community based NGOs in 
India have not helped “to expand political spaces available to poor people”. Also, 
because most NGOs are not membership-based, they do not teach citizens civic 
values (e.g. compromise, cooperation, trust) by bringing people together in 
cooperative ventures (Sabatini, 2002). These and other observations led to the 
conclusion that many of the NGOs which are part of the aid system do not represent 
the kind of civil society organisations which are so important for promoting democracy 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000a; Sabatini, 2002; Tvedt, 2006).
 The failure of NGOs to bring about all that was hoped for has been related to the 
nature of the international aid system. Donor-funding creates the paradoxical situation 
that the aid relation itself weakens the democratic capacities of the NGOs which it 
tries to strengthen. It has had the unintended effect of weakening the link between 
NGO and society as it replaced accountability to constituencies with accountability 
to donors (Aksartova, 2009; Henderson, 2002; S.C. White, 1999). Furthermore, donor- 
funding has caused NGOs to follow donor priorities rather than the priorities of their 
constituencies (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Fagan, 2005; Parks, 2008). One of the reasons 
for these failures is that donor agencies apply the same kind of strategy to very 
different contexts. Many have criticised this top-down blueprint-approach by donors, 
pointing out that civil society and democracy are highly context-specific phenomena, 
and that promoting a particular Western paradigm may damage rather than build 
democracy in developing countries (Blaug, 2002; Diamond, 1999; Easterly, 2006; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Evans, 2004; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Munck, 2009; Ottaway 
& Carothers, 2000a). 
 International donors have acknowledged the problems and have framed the 
solutions in terms of ownership, participation and sustainability. Many bi- and 
multi-lateral donor agencies started using this terminology in their policies, especially 
after signing the Rome declaration on harmonisation (2003), the Paris declaration on 
aid effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). For instance, one 
of the core principles of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers policy of the IMF and 
the World Bank was that it should be: “country-driven, promoting national ownership 
of strategies through broad-based participation of civil society”.1 Similarly, in their 
‘strategies for sustainable development’, the Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD stated that, whereas lower levels of success can be attributed to top-down 
approaches: 
1 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Factsheet Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, available at: http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm [accessed July 2010].
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“A review of experience shows that successful approaches share certain charac-
teristics. They set priorities and establish a long-term vision; seek to promote 
convergence between already existing planning frameworks; promote ownership; 
can demonstrate national commitment; and are built on appropriate participation” 
(OECD, 2001, p. 16).
All these declarations underscore the idea that aid effectiveness requires a more 
context-specific approach and that national ownership of development policies is 
one of the ways to achieve this.  
 Whether or not this pledge of the donor-community will be the solution to the 
problems with civil society and democracy aid is uncertain because the aid system 
is “a powerful structural force, impacting organisational landscapes and civil societies 
all over the world in complex ways we do not yet understand” (Tvedt, 2002, p. 363). 
One of the reasons for this lack of understanding is that beneath this critique on 
donor policies lies a more fundamental critique which also extends to the scientific 
community, namely that civil society and democracy are often treated as normative 
rather than as empirical concepts (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Hendriks, 2006; Howard, 
2003; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; Mitlin et al., 2007; Robins et 
al., 2008; Tvedt, 2007). The debate on civil society and democracy is dominated by 
Western conceptions of liberal democracy, and the language of the debate “betrays 
a normative view on how democratic development should be ‘done’, which ultimately 
obscures a potentially more fruitful engagement with the ways in which NGOs are 
embedded in their local contexts” (Mercer, 2002, p. 20). Existing forms of civil society 
around the world do not conform to idealised models, therefore a normative approach 
obscures what is actually going on (Robins et al., 2008). Orvis (2001), for instance, 
argues that narrow idealised visions of civil society prevent us from portraying African 
civil society accurately. A more realistic analysis will reveal that African civil society is 
internally less democratic and also less likely to support liberal democracy. In 
response to these problems, there has been a growing call for more contextualised 
and less value-laden research (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; 
Mercer, 2002; Tvedt, 2007).
1.6 Policy assumptions and central research questions
This thesis answers that call by focusing on the policy assumptions underlying civil 
society and democracy aid, and by analysing how they turn out in practice. This is a 
strategic choice because it bypasses the analytical problem of mixing normative and 
empirical concepts. Policy assumptions are the ideas on which policy measures 
such as supporting NGOs are based. Whether or not these ideas are of a more 
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normative or analytical nature does not matter for the analysis. When they are 
explicated, they can be used as a benchmark. By analysing how this benchmark 
relates to the empirical practice, the research becomes concrete, contextualised and 
less value-laden. Furthermore, the policy assumptions are key to understanding the 
complexity of success and failure in the field of civil society and democracy aid. This 
is the case because some of the assumptions do not relate to the local setting of 
associational life. For instance, the premise that associational life is inherently 
voluntary does not relate to many African settings where it is often involuntary, as it is 
based on kinship and other customary systems (Lewis, 2002; Sogge, 2004). 
In order to improve our understanding of both theoretical and practical (policy- 
related) issues concerning the promotion of civil society and democracy in developing 
countries, the following central research question is posed:
How do policy assumptions guiding civil society and democracy aid turn out in practice, 
and what explains any discrepancies between both?
This question has been divided into four sub-questions which relate to the four central 
policy assumptions underpinning civil society and democracy aid:
1) What national contextual factors explain for differences in civil society development 
in countries around the world?
2) What are the similarities and differences between Ghanaian and Indonesian 
 democracy-promoting NGOs in terms of their organisational characteristics and 
to what extent do these similarities and differences indicate context-specificity?
3) How does donor-funding affect the concrete organisational characteristics of 
Ghanaian and Indonesian democracy-promoting NGOs? 
4) What kind of democratic roles do Ghanaian donor-sponsored NGOs perform, 
and what organisational characteristics enable them to perform these roles?
Together these sub-questions will provide a comprehensive answer to the central 
question because they cover the two main donor strategies in the field of civil society 
and democracy aid, namely supporting civil society’s enabling environment and 
direct support to NGOs (Blair, 1997). These strategies, and the policy assumptions 
behind them, can all be connected to the pledge of donors to make their approach 
more context-specific. The comparison between Ghana and Indonesia serves to 
explicitly incorporate this element of context-specificity by introducing variation in 
context in the research design. While being in a similar phase of democratisation, 
these countries present NGOs with a very different institutional environment. As was 
argued in the introduction, there is a tension between the nature of civil society and 
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democracy aid and the goal of making this aid more context-specific. By its very 
nature, external aid represents the wish of foreign actors to influence inherently 
national processes. The goal of attaining home-grown civil society and democracy is 
therefore by definition at odds with the means of achieving it, namely external 
interference. Each of the policy assumptions can be seen as a rationale for reducing 
this tension. 
 The first strategy, supporting civil society’s enabling environment, is an indirect 
way of supporting civil society development. In this case, the ‘external manufacturing’ 
does not focus on civil society itself, but on the factors which serve as a precondition 
for home-grown civil society development. The assumption behind this strategy is 
that civil society needs an enabling environment to thrive. Although the importance of 
an enabling environment for civil society development is often stressed, supporting it 
has received far less attention than the more popular strategy of direct support to 
NGOs (Blair, 1997). One of the reasons that it has been neglected is that defining and 
measuring the context of civil society is a difficult and multi-interpretable topic which 
has received little attention (Anheier, 2005; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). 
Furthermore, civil society is often seen as a means towards an end rather than being 
an end in itself (Howell & Pearce, 2001). This makes it an important topic to tackle 
before turning to assumptions underlying the more popular strategy of supporting 
NGOs.
 The second strategy, direct support to NGOs, is more difficult to reconcile with 
the idea of home-grown civil society and democracy as it represents a direct 
interference with actual civil society organisations and how they promote democracy. 
Nevertheless, the three main policy assumptions underlying this strategy provide a 
rationale for how this strategy can still contribute to promoting context-specificity. The 
first assumption is that NGOs are locally embedded democracy promoters. It is 
believed that NGOs have the capacity to cater to local circumstances and local 
needs because they are flexible and closely connected to people’s life-worlds 
(Diamond, 1999; G. White, 1994). NGOs are thus the perfect vehicles to ensure that 
democracy becomes locally rooted and widely accepted by different segments of a 
population (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). While donors and researchers alike stress the 
importance of context, context-specificity remains an ill-defined and elusive concept 
(Anheier, 2005; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). To what extent NGOs actually are 
context-specific democracy promoters remains a question. One of the reasons for 
this is that many analysts of associations write about the North American context and 
assume a consolidated democratic system. Therefore, many attempts to come to a 
general theory on the relation between association and democracy overlook the 
notion that “the desirability of various associative contributions to democracy 
depends deeply on features of particular political contexts” (Fung, 2003, p. 534).
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 Behind the assumption that NGOs are conducive to promoting context-specific, 
or ‘home-grown’ democracy, lies the assumption that donor-funding to these NGOs 
is a good strategy to support this development. In the field of civil society and 
democracy promotion, the relevance and effectiveness of donor strategies is often 
linked to their ability to adjust to local contextual factors like local needs, local 
knowledge and local cultural practices (Easterly, 2006; Evans, 2004). It is now widely 
accepted that civil society and democracy “cannot be created from blueprints” and 
do not lend themselves to “external manufacturing” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 121). 
As outlined above, the strategy of donor-funding to NGOs has often been criticised 
for not being able to adjust to the local context. In response to this criticism, many 
bi- and multilateral donor agencies have pledged to make their approach more 
 context-specific by allowing local ownership and participation. When funding is 
based on local ownership and participation, then domestic NGOs can take the lead 
in promoting ‘home-grown’ democracy. Nevertheless, this does not change the core 
of the initial assumption, it merely changes its application. As Tvedt (2002) noted, a 
lot remains unknown about how the aid system influences these NGOs, therefore it is 
important to see how this assumption turns out in practice.
 The final assumption is that NGOs contribute to the deepening of democracy in 
a country by performing several democratic roles (educational, communicative, 
representative and cooperative). The deepening of democracy, by definition, entails 
that it becomes locally rooted. Through performing democratic roles, NGOs make 
sure that ever larger parts of the population are included in the political process, and 
that democratic norms and ideals become ingrained in the political culture of a 
country. However, for many of these roles it is unclear whether NGOs actually have 
the capacities to perform them. For instance, little is known about the actual 
representative capacities of NGOs (Guo & Musso, 2007). There are not many studies 
that explain what organisational characteristics an NGO needs to be able to perform 
a certain democratic role (exceptions include: Hadenius & Uggla, 1996; Warren, 
2001). Having this knowledge is important because “the qualities required to promote 
success in democratisation are very different” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 965). 
1.7 Contributions to the literature
Each of the studies explicates one of the central ideas underpinning civil society and 
democracy aid and investigates to what extent, or how, these ideas relate to practices, 
norms and forms of actual civil society organisations. This both helps to separate 
norm from practice, and to counter the tendency of civil society becoming an empty 
buzzword. By translating abstract concepts such as civil society, democracy and 
context into empirical research designs, they become tangible. Instead of using the 
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various theoretical perspectives, the studies in this thesis use the policy assumptions 
as a starting point for defining civil society and democracy. In this way, the research 
stays closest to the way the concepts are actually being applied by donors. Following 
Blair (1997), this means looking at the enabling environment of civil society, and 
looking at NGOs, as providing support to each of these entities constitutes the two 
basic donor-strategies in the field of civil society and democracy promotion. 
Therefore, the choice to focus on the organisational dimension of civil society, and 
within that dimension mainly on NGOs, directly relates to the fact that bi- and 
multilateral donors direct most of their funding to NGOs. 
 The use of the term ‘donor’ mainly relates to bi- and multilateral donor agencies, 
such as the UNDP, USAID, SIDA, DFID and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, as these 
are the most prominent donors behind the selected NGOs. It must be noted that the 
NGOs, rather than their donors, are the starting point of analysis. However, while the 
donors themselves are not the object of the studies, the ideas on which donor-policies 
are based are. Based on the confrontation between policy assumption and policy 
practice, policy recommendations are formulated which serve as a direct input for 
the debate on supporting civil society and democracy in developing countries. The 
approach and the added value of each of the studies will now be explained.
Contribution 1: Exploring the importance of an enabling 
environment for civil society development
The first study takes a critical look at the idea that civil society needs an enabling 
environment to thrive. It contributes to understanding how context influences civil 
society development by analysing the structural determinants of civil society affiliation 
in 53 countries worldwide. The multilevel regression analysis used associational 
membership as a proxy for measuring the strength of civil society, and defined the 
enabling environment in four key dimensions, namely: level of democracy, political 
stability, rule of law and economic development. The added value of this study mainly 
lies in approaching the matter from a development perspective. It does so in three 
ways: first, by including developing countries in the analysis; second, by including 
contextual variables which are particularly relevant for developing countries (political 
stability and rule of law) in addition to the more generally applied contextual variables 
(level of democracy and economic development); and third, by examining alternative 
explanations for membership levels in developing countries. This approach is an 
important contribution because existing studies mainly focus on Western and 
post-communist transition countries. Therefore, it remains a question whether their 
findings also apply to developing countries.
 As civil society is hard to define as a concept, concrete indicators for cross-national 
empirical measurement of the strength of civil society are scarce (Heinrich, 2005; 
Howard, 2003). The strength of civil society can be measured in terms of each of the 
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dimensions that were identified in paragraph 1.3, namely in terms of positioning (i.e. 
its independence vis-à-vis other spheres), its organisational properties (diversity, 
density, depth), and its successfulness in performing its developmental roles (social, 
political, economic). Because of the scarcity of available data, this study uses 
associational membership as a proxy for measuring the strength of civil society. This 
measurement refers to the organisational dimension of civil society. To be more 
precise, it relates to the diversity, density and depth of citizen participation as it 
measures membership levels of citizens in a broad range of civil society organisations. 
This focus on associational activity (in terms of membership levels) is particularly 
neo-Tocquevillian, a perspective which is often used by donors to justify their civil 
society support. From this perspective, increased associational activity is desirable 
as it increases opportunities for citizens to organise and interact, thereby generating 
trust and facilitating collective action (Brown et al., 2008). 
Contribution 2: Exploring the principle and practice  
of context-specificity of NGOs
The second study looks at the idea that NGOs are conducive to promoting context- 
specific democracy. Starting from the idea that democracy and civil society are 
 context-specific phenomena, it explores the meaning of context-specificity for 
individual NGOs. The empirical analysis compares the organisational characteristics 
of several democracy promoting NGOs from Ghana and Indonesia. Because Ghana 
and Indonesia represent very different contexts, this setup maximises the chances of 
finding context-specific differences in organisational configuration. Differences are 
likely to manifest themselves in four areas: 1) the mission of the organisation 2) the 
organisational strategy, 3) the organisational structure, and 4) its resources in terms 
of both financial and human capital like staff, members and volunteers (Diamond, 
1999; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Mintzberg, 1983). Together these areas capture what 
an organisation stands for, what it does to achieve its goals and how it is organised 
to do so. 
 Theory only predicts that different contexts need different organisations, it does 
not detail how these contextual differences will manifest themselves exactly in 
mission, strategy, structure and resources. Indicators for determining the context- 
specificity of these organisational characteristics are currently missing. Therefore, 
this study explores several possibilities. The study contributes to the debate by 
constructing a framework which defines context-specificity at the level of organisational 
characteristics and by analyzing to what extent NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia 
actually conform to this definition of context-specificity. Explicating this model is both 
a way of separating assumption from practice, and of making the elusive concept of 
context more tangible.
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Contribution 3: Explaining how donor-funding influences 
organisational characteristics of NGOs
The third study looks at the idea that funding NGOs is a good way to promote 
home-grown democracy. It contributes to understanding how donor-funding affects 
the way NGOs organise in terms of their mission, their strategy, their structure and 
their staff. To explain for the similarities and differences, the findings of the previous 
study are linked to the concepts of organisational field and institutional isomorphism 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1995, 2008). Within the field of organisational institutionalism these concepts 
are used to explain how and why organisations tend to become more similar over 
time. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified the ‘organisational field’ as the context in 
which the process of organisational adaptation takes place, and isomorphism as the 
process of homogenisation.
 The analysis identifies three organisational fields, namely a Ghanaian field, an 
Indonesian field and an international field. Each democracy promoting NGO is 
considered to be part of their national organisational field and, through their relation 
with international donors, of the international field. Both fields exert coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphic pressures on the NGOs. The comparison between 
countries provides a strong tool for checking which organisational field exerts most 
influence over the NGOs. In cases where NGOs are firmly embedded in their national 
organisational fields, one would expect many differences between NGOs in Ghana 
and Indonesia because the countries have entirely different social, cultural, political 
and economic backgrounds. This would indicate a contextual approach by donors, 
as they give NGOs leeway to adjust their organisations to national rules and practices. 
In contrast, in cases where NGOs are more embedded in the international donor 
field, one would expect NGOs to be similar across countries. This would point more 
towards a top-down blueprint approach by donors. 
Contribution 4: Exploring the relation between organisational 
characteristics of NGOs and the performance of democratic roles
The final study looks at the idea that NGOs contribute to the deepening of democracy 
by performing educational, communicative, representational and cooperative roles. 
This study explores how the organisational characteristics of five Ghanaian NGOs 
relate to their ability to perform different democratic roles. Despite the criticism of 
both researchers and practitioners, donors continue to invest in NGOs without major 
changes in their basic assumptions. Ghana provides a good example of this 
approach because it enjoys the status of ‘donor darling’ and is often seen as a 
textbook example of democratisation and good governance for the rest of Africa 
(Crawford, 2005). The Ghanaian state has actively involved NGOs in important social, 
economic and governance initiatives (Hughes, 2005). To support this development, 
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a group of international donors set up a pooled funding scheme for NGOs which has 
been growing each year from about 2 million US$ in 2005 to over 3.25 million US$ in 
2009.2 This makes Ghana a good case for exploring how the assumptions behind 
this aid turn out in practice.
 The study in this chapter aims to make three contributions. First, the empirical 
analysis explores the link between organisational characteristics and democratic 
roles. This contributes to understanding what kind of roles NGOs actually perform 
and what organisational characteristics enable them to do so. The framework of the 
four democratic roles serves as a benchmark. In describing these roles, many 
authors make use of metaphors like, civil society “acts as an antidote to state 
expansion” (Fowler, 2000, p. 7) or that “associations can be seen as the seedbeds of 
democracy” (Sørensen, 1993, p. 57). These claims remain very abstract and hardly 
provide any clues for empirical research. To overcome this problem, the performance 
of democratic roles is linked to concrete organisational characteristics, namely 
structure, strategy, resources and relations with the environment. Second, by 
confronting theory with practice, it identifies shortcomings in the assumed roles and 
offers solutions to improve them. Finally, the improved framework is presented as a 
tool which allows donors to review and fine-tune their policies in the field of civil 
society and democracy assistance.
1.8 Methodology
Although each of the studies takes a policy assumption and uses it as a benchmark 
for comparing and classifying empirical findings, they employ various research 
designs and research methods for doing so. Analyses are based on large scale 
quantitative data-sets and on original qualitative interview-data. This section 
discusses the choices in research design, the selection of countries, and the use of 
data and methods.
Research design and the role of theory
The several sub-questions point to both qualitative and quantitative research designs. 
Each type of design has its particular strengths and weaknesses. The quantitative 
approach reduces reality to a set of variables in order to produce generalisations 
about the relationships among these variables. This approach is especially useful to 
discover patterns in large scale data files. It is not able, however, to understand these 
patterns in a historical or social context. If the latter is what one wants to achieve, a 
qualitative design is needed (Verschuren, 2001, 2003). 
2 Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme, Core Grants, available at: www.G-RAP.org [accessed 
November 2011]. 
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 The choice for a research design should be based on the type of question. The 
first research question points to a quantitative design as it aims at finding patterns 
and correlations between country-level and individual-level variables. This is typical 
for a reductionist approach. The word “explain” can be misleading in this sense. 
Although the aim is to analyse which contextual factors explain for differences in civil 
society development in countries around the world, it does not aim to explain how 
these factors influence civil society development. The word explain should be 
interpreted in its reductionist sense, namely as explained variance. As it aims to find 
relations between variables of different levels (country-level and individual-level), the 
study employs multilevel regression models to analyse data of 53 countries. Details 
about the methodological choices concerning this analysis can be found in the 
methodological section of chapter 2.
 The other three research questions point to a holistic rather than a reductionist 
approach as they aim at understanding complex (causal) relationships. A research 
design that is well equipped for this purpose is the (comparative) case study design. 
The advantage of this design is that by taking a holistic approach, cases can be 
examined in their context. By comparing cases it can also control for differences in 
context. This is important because the same processes might lead to very different 
outcomes in different contexts (Ragin, 1989, p. 24). For answering each of the questions, 
different case study designs are used. They employ different meanings of ‘case’, 
‘context’ and ‘comparison’. For the second research question, the cases are defined at 
the country-level, namely Ghana and Indonesia. Differences in the social, political and 
economic context of both countries form the basis of the comparison. The idea of 
comparing NGOs within these different contexts directly stems from Ragin’s notion that 
the same processes might lead to very different outcomes in different contexts. The 
third research question focuses on explaining a process which transcends national 
contexts and individual NGOs. To explain for similarities in NGOs around the world, it 
looks at the institutional context of the international aid system. Finally, for the fourth 
research question, the NGOs represent the cases. These cases are compared in terms 
of their organisational characteristics and their democratic roles. Context is included as 
one of the organisational characteristics, namely in terms of the kind of relations an 
NGO has with its environment (i.e the state, citizens and other NGOs). 
 The role of theory differs slightly for each of the studies. The quantitative study in 
chapter 2 uses theory in two ways, namely for formulating hypotheses and for 
interpreting the outcomes. The main goal of this approach is theory testing. The 
second study uses a combination of theory and contextual characteristics of Ghana 
and Indonesia to get a grip on the meaning of context-specificity for NGOs. By 
constructing and applying a model for measuring context-specificity, it has elements 
of both theory building and theory testing. The third study is a clear case of theory 
building, as it results in a model which aims at explaining the process of homogenisation 
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of NGOs across different contexts. The final study uses theory to construct an 
analytical framework on democratic roles. By examining actual roles of NGOs and by 
explaining how this relates to their organisational characteristics, this study adjusts 
and refines existing theories. As such its main goal is theory building.
Country selection 
In the first study, 53 countries from all over the world are included. The goal here was 
to include as many countries as possible in order to improve our understanding of 
contextual factors affecting civil society development worldwide. The sample of 
countries was limited to the number of countries for which information was available 
on both the dependent and independent variables. 
 For the other three studies Ghana and Indonesia were selected for a specific 
purpose. Three criteria guided the selection of the countries. First, as this thesis 
focuses on civil society and democracy promotion in developing countries, they 
needed to be aid-receiving countries. Second, as it focuses on the role of 
donor-funded NGOs in the process of deepening and consolidating democracy, they 
needed to be countries where the transition to democracy has already taken place. 
Finally, to be able to explore how democracy and civil society promotion relates to 
different contexts, contrasting cases were needed. 
 The first selection criterion used the Development Assistance Committee list of 
Official Development Aid recipients of 2007.3 On the one hand, there are the ‘rich’ 
countries where development assistance is coming from and, on the other hand, 
there are different types of countries where there is little to no development assistance 
in the field of civil society and democracy. These are for instance countries that are 
very hard to access, that are in open conflict, that experience extreme poverty or 
countries that experience a combination of these factors. For this reason, when 
looking at the DAC list of ODA recipients of the OECD, the ‘extremes’ will not be 
considered in this research, leaving the low income countries (Ghana) and the lower 
middle income countries (Indonesia) eligible. 
  The second selection criterion combined the perspectives of the transition 
paradigm and Carothers’ critique of this paradigm. As seen from the perspective of 
transition theory, the commonality of Ghana and Indonesia is that they have moved 
away from authoritarian regimes and are in a process of moving towards a democratic 
regime. They are both in a phase of deepening and consolidating their recently gained 
democratic institutions. In both countries donors are supporting this development. 
However, as Carothers notes, this does not mean that they are moving in the same 
direction. He concludes that there is a group of countries that seems to be on the 
path towards democracy (including Ghana) while another group of countries seem to 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), DAC list of ODA Recipients 2007, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm [accessed June 2013].
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be stuck in ‘feckless pluralism’ or in ‘dominant power politics’ (Carothers, 2002). 
Indonesia seems to conform most to ‘feckless pluralism’ as there are changes in 
government, but regardless of which government is in place, corruption remains high. 
These categories represent quite different ‘playing fields’ for NGOs. 
 These different playing fields relate to the final selection criterion. Ghana and 
Indonesia represent contrasting cases without being extreme cases. Although they 
are in a similar ‘phase’ of democratisation, they have very different institutional 
environments. They are located on different continents and have very different social, 
cultural, political and economic structures. This provides a solid ground for comparing 
democracy-promoting NGOs in different environments. Looking at extreme cases, 
like North Korea and Sweden for instance, would not deliver the answers to the 
research questions, because in the former there is no sign of a democratisation 
process whatsoever and in the latter democracy is already firmly consolidated.
Data and methods
Each of the chapters provides a detailed account of the data and methods used for 
that chapter. Here, a short overview is provided. As the different sub-questions focus 
on different units of analysis, different combinations of data sources and data 
collection techniques have been used. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the research 
designs, the countries and the data sources for each of the research questions.
 The data collection process can roughly be divided into three parts. First, 
secondary data was gathered and combined for the quantitative analysis. This study 
uses large scale individual-level data of the World Values Survey and country-level 
data of UNDP’s Human Development Index, the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators and Freedom House’s indicators on political rights and civil liberties. 
Second, data was gathered on the national institutional context of Ghana and 
Indonesia. This information has been obtained through expert interviews and through 
document analysis (scientific literature, country reports, etc.). Finally, the main part of 
the qualitative data collection focused on a strategic sample of democracy promoting 
NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia. Extensive fieldwork was carried out in Accra (Ghana) 
and Jakarta (Indonesia) between November 2007 and April 2009. The fieldwork 
consists of 50 in-depth interviews with 46 respondents, principally with directors, 
researchers and founding members of the NGOs. To complement and check this 
data source, interviews were conducted with local experts, i.e. political scientists, 
NGO consultants and representatives of major bi- and multilateral donor agencies in 
the country (for an overview see appendix 1.1). In addition to interview data, annual 
reports, funding reports, internal documents, and websites and publications of the 
selected NGOs and their donors were also used as data source. All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and subsequently analysed through a process of thematic 
coding in the software package Atlas.ti. 
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Appendix 1.1: Overview of interview data
Overview of interview data Ghana
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Center for Democratic Development (CDD) NGO 2 persons /  
3 interviews
11/30/2007
12/03/2007
12/11/2008
Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) NGO 3 persons /  
3 interviews
12/04/2007
12/05/2007
12/10/2008
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) NGO 2 persons /  
3 interviews
12/11/2007
11/06/2008
12/12/2008
Integrated Social Development Center  
(ISODEC)
NGO 3 persons /  
5 interviews
12/06/2007
11/05/2008
11/10/2008
12/12/2008
Abantu for development NGO 2 persons /  
3 interviews
12/13/2007
11/06/2008
11/11/2008
GAPVOD (Umbrella organisation for 
Ghanaian NGOs)
NGO 1 person /  
1 interview
11/29/2007
IBIS Ghana International 
NGO
1 person /  
1 interview
12/14/2007
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person /  
1 interview
11/28/2007
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person /  
1 interview
01/23/2008
Ghana Research and Advocacy Program 
(G-RAP)
Donor 1 person /  
1 interview
11/19/2007
Faculty of law – University of Ghana University 1 person /  
1 interview
11/28/2007
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER)  – University of Ghana 
University 2 persons /  
2 interviews
11/19/2007
Department of Political Science – University 
of Ghana 
University 2 persons /  
2 interviews
11/26/2007
11/27/2007
African Peer Review Mechanism Ghana 
(APRM)
Government 
agency
1 person /  
1 interview
11/20/2007
Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) Government 
agency
1 person / 1 
interview
12/12/2007
Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment 
- NGO office (MMYE)
Governmental 
ministry
1 person / 1 
interview
11/29/2007
Note: a total of 30 interviews with 24 respondents (one respondent works for both university and for one of 
the selected NGOs).
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Overview of interview data Indonesia
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Demos  - Centre for democracy and human 
rights studies
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
03/31/2008
Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies 
(PSHK)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Partnership for Democratic Governance 
Reform 
NGO 3 persons / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy 
(Elsam)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/07/2008
Yappika - The Civil Society Alliance for 
Democracy
NGO 3 persons / 
2 interviews
04/09/2008
Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID) NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/10/2008
Institute of Research, Education and 
Information of Social and Economic Affairs 
(LP3ES)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/04/2008
Centre for strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS)
NGO 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/19/2008
03/31/2008
NGO consultant Jakarta NGO expert 1 person / 
1 interview
03/18/2008
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
04/01/2008
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/26/2008
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
01/23/2008
Asian Development Bank (ADB) Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/25/2008
Faculty of Social and Political Science - 
Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta)
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/26/2008
04/02/2008
Center for population and policy studies – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
2 interviews
03/11/2008
03/11/2009
Faculty of Social and Political Science – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
1 interview
04/20/2009
Note: a total of 20 interviews with 22 respondents.

Chapter 2
National context  
and the transformation of  
civil society affiliation*
*  This chapter is based on a paper by Kamstra, J., Ruben, R., Pelzer, B. & Elbers, W. 
and has been submitted to a peer-reviewed journal for publication.
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Abstract
This chapter analyses the structural determinants of civil society affiliation based on 
four key dimensions: level of democracy, political stability, rule of law and economic 
development. Whereas existing studies mainly focus on Western and transition 
countries, we explicitly include developing countries in our analysis. We use 
associational membership as a proxy for civil society affiliation and include data of 53 
countries. Two main factors affecting associational membership emerge from our 
multilevel regression models: legal environment and economic development. 
However, unlike previous studies, we show that both relations are quadratic instead 
of linear. We argue that this could be the case because reasons for membership are 
essentially different in the developed and in the developing world. This points to a 
transformation of civil society membership rather than simple growth. Contrary to 
popular beliefs, democratic rights and political stability do not appear critically 
important for civil society affiliation.
Keywords
Civil society, associational membership, developing countries, enabling environment, 
cross-national analysis, multilevel analysis.
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2.1 Introduction
Based on the assumption that a strong and articulated civil society is crucial for 
develop ment, many international donor agencies are engaged in supporting 
programmes aiming at strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs) in transition 
and developing countries (Diamond, 1999; Fowler, 2000; Howard, 2003; Ottaway & 
Carothers, 2000a). Yet, despite its importance, there is little clarity on which strategies 
are most appropriate to support civil society development. Therefore, current efforts 
to promote civil society building and reinforce citizen participation in civil society 
organisation are rather scattered and do not appear very coherent. 
 Blair (1997) identifies two basic donor strategies for supporting civil society 
development: (1) direct support to CSOs through funding of voluntary agencies, and 
(2) support aimed at strengthe ning an ‘enabling environment’ for civil society by 
improving its contextual conditions. While most donor agencies rely on the former 
approach, the latter strategy has received relatively little attention. Moreover, several 
studies have shown that donors face difficulties in aligning their reform programmes 
to the great variety of country settings in which they operate (C. W. Andrews, 2008; 
Fritzen, 2007), and that they frequently use a general ‘one size fits all approach’ that 
tends to ignore important historical, political, cultural and economic differences 
between countries (M. Andrews, 2012; Easterly, 2006; Evans, 2004). Consequently, a 
coherent vision on the enabling contextual factors for supporting civil society building, 
based on insights into how civil society works and how it can be strengthened in the 
most effective and efficient way, seems to be largely absent (Howell & Pearce, 2001).
 This lack of conceptual clarity is not confined to the realm of policy making alone, but 
also extends to the academic world. Several authors point out that the strength of civil 
society in individual countries is the outcome of their specific political constituency, 
socio-economic structure and cultural history, but there is little agreement in literature on 
the key factors enhancing civil society development (Heinrich, 2005; Orvis, 2001). While 
some authors emphasise the importance of a legal space for voluntary organisation 
(Blair, 1997; Reichardt, 2004), others refer to critical socio-economic conditions (Almond & 
Verba, 1963; Uslaner & Brown, 2005), to political factors (Badescu & Uslaner, 2003; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Shen & Williamson, 2005) or to the effects of religious tradition 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006; Vermeer & Scheepers, 2012) as vital 
conditions for individual affiliation to civil society organisations.
 Systematic analyses to understand the specific influence of these contextual 
factors on civil society development are hindered by the fact that concrete indicators 
for cross-national empirical measurement of the strength of civil society are scarce 
(Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2003). Civil society is a broad concept which goes by many 
names, such as third sector, nonprofit sector, voluntary sector, philanthropy and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This multitude of concepts creates confusion 
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because they are related to different theoretical traditions and none of them covers 
the whole sphere (Muukkonen, 2009). As a result, the strength of civil society can be 
measured in many different ways. It can for instance be measured in terms of the 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other sectors like the state, the private sphere or the 
market (Fowler, 2000; Howell & Pearce, 2001). Scholars analysing civil society from a 
network perspective emphasise that high levels of diversity, density and depth of 
CSOs and citizen participation strengthen civil society (Edwards, 2004). When 
analysed from the perspective of social capital theory, social connections become 
important (Pichler & Wallace, 2007; Putnam, 2000). Finally, the strength of civil society 
can also be measured by looking at the functional services provided through CSOs 
(Edwards, 2004; Uphoff & Krishna, 2004). As seen from this perspective, their 
contribution to reaching certain socio-economic or political ends becomes important 
(i.e. providing access to resources, protection or social security).
 Available data only covers a small part of the wider concept of civil society. 
Existing cross-national (sociological) studies therefore focus on aspects of civil 
society such as volunteering and associational membership (Curtis, Baer, & Grabb, 
2001; M. Hwang, Grabb, & Curtis, 2005; Parboteeah, Cullen, & Lim, 2004; Ruiter & De 
Graaf, 2006; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Most of these studies take 
contextual factors into account and use data on volunteering or associational 
membership from different waves of the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2005). 
Parboteeah et al. (2004) show for 21 countries that country wealth, country education, 
religiosity, societal collectivism and liberal democracy all have a positive effect on 
volunteering. Curtis et al. (2001) look at 33 democratic countries and find that 
volunteering tends to be particularly high in Christian and protestant countries, in 
countries with a long and continuous tradition of democracy, in social and liberal 
democratic countries and in countries with a high level of economic development. 
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) analyse membership of voluntary 
associations in 32 countries and show that statist countries have higher levels of 
individual associational membership than non-statist countries, and the same is the 
case for corporate versus non-corporate societies. Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) look 
at the influence of religiosity on volunteering in 53 countries and find that devout 
countries have higher levels of volunteering for both secular and religious people.
 This chapter tries to address some shortcomings in the current debate on 
structural determinants of differences in civil society affiliation, mainly by approaching 
the matter from a development perspective. As most theorising and testing has 
focused on Western and transition countries, the effect of adding developing 
countries to the equation remains little understood. We therefore include 53 countries 
from all parts of the world in our analysis. Associational membership serves as a 
proxy for measuring the strength of civil society, and we use a multilevel regression 
framework to identify which contextual factors play a key role in explaining membership 
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levels. Besides the commonly used context variables of the level of economic 
development and democracy, we add two variables which are particularly relevant for 
developing countries, namely political stability and conflict, and the strength of the 
legal environment. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we will test both linear and 
non-linear models, because theories on membership in the developed world 
sometimes contradict those in the developing world.
 The chapter is structured as follows: section two identifies some key contextual 
factors that could explain the strength of civil society and formulates hypotheses for 
empirical testing. Subsequently, section three discusses the possibility of non-linear 
relationships because of different situations in developing countries. Section four 
outlines the data sources and statistical procedures, while section five presents the 
results of the multilevel regression models, identifying the most important factors in 
explaining the strength of civil society worldwide. Section six summarises major 
conclusions and outlines policy implications.
2.2  Explaining national variation in civil society 
affiliation
Despite the popularity of the concept of civil society in the field of international 
development, surprisingly little has been written about the contextual factors that 
could explain its strength. This contrasts with the rich body of literature which emerged 
in the field of sociology (see introduction). A possible explanation is provided by what 
Howell and Pearce (2001) have called ‘the instrumentalisation’ of civil society. From 
the perspective of international development, civil society is usually (implicitly) seen 
as a ‘means to an end’. Many desirable ‘ends’ have been identified over the years, 
ranging from sustainable development and democracy to poverty reduction and 
good governance. Therefore, much research is devoted to detailed analyses of CSOs 
and their roles, strategies and effectiveness in achieving such ends (see for instance: 
Kamstra & Knippenberg, 2014; Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Offenheiser & Holcombe, 2003). 
 Nevertheless, several comparative studies identify key factors that may explain 
differences in civil society development (Heinrich, 2005; Hyden, Court, & Mease, 
2004; Shen & Williamson, 2005). We have chosen to make an empirical assessment 
of the influence of those factors that are theoretically relevant and for which empirical 
data is available. We therefore focus on four key factors that could influence the 
strength of civil society: (a) the level of democracy, (b) the level of economic 
development, (c) the level of political stability and (d) the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. On these factors we will formulate 
linear hypothesis as is commonly practised. In the next section we will argue why we 
also might encounter non-linear effects for these predictors.
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Democracy
Democracy is generally seen as an important factor for civil society development 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Lipset, 1994). The capacity of civil society to fulfil its 
developmental roles is directly and indirectly determined by the extent to which 
citizens enjoy democratic rights in a given country. The main argument is that civil 
society will have little room to address structural problems of inequality, discrimination 
and concentration of power and wealth if the political system of a country does not 
provide an appropriate environment for voluntary organisations capable of 
challenging existing political institutions and practices. An often mentioned argument 
is that civil society can only exercise its abilities if conditions for operating 
independently are sufficiently guaranteed (Reichardt, 2004). Compared to less- 
democratic countries, countries with stable democratic political systems and genuine 
political competition tend to grant civil society more freedom, and thus offer a more 
favourable environment for CSO development and affiliation (Edwards, 2004; Shen & 
Williamson, 2005). Democracy not only protects and promotes political pluralism, but 
also provides a space for cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups to 
exercise a reasonable level of self-determination, self-government and participation 
in decision-making processes. Less democratic regimes are inclined to reduce the 
room for civil society to act as a watchdog, to promote transparency and other 
aspects of good governance, or to protect the interests of minority groups in society. 
Put differently, when the government is less transparent, with limited accountability, 
not encouraging public discussions on policy issues and oppressing dissident 
voices, civil society will have little room to flourish. We therefore hypothesise that: (1) 
the higher the level of democracy in a country, the higher the level of civil society 
affiliation.
 
Economic development
Several arguments can be found for a positive effect of economic development on 
associational membership. First, it is argued that industrialisation leads to 
occupational specialisation and social stratification. This development gives rise to a 
diverse range of interest groups in which people can participate (Curtis et al., 2001). 
Second, economic growth is often linked to the establishment of a sizeable middle 
class which has the resources in terms of time, money and education which are 
conducive for participation in voluntary organisations (Lipset, 1994). For people to be 
able to devote time and energy to associational life a certain level of economic 
well-being is needed. Therefore, in countries where the welfare state is fragile or 
nonexistent, where high levels of poverty prevail and where the majority of people 
devote most of their time and energy simply to subsistence, participation in voluntary 
organisations can be expected to be lower. Third, civil society organisations cannot 
raise income through taxation as governments do, nor can they generate profit 
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through capital accumulation like companies. Nevertheless, they need resources in 
order to function. They require funding for (paid) staff, offices, equipment, transport, 
communication and campaign materials. Even while volunteering is generally 
regarded as an important resource for civil society (Bell, 1999), sufficient professional 
staff is needed to effectively develop and implement CSO policies and strategies. 
Economic development is therefore also important for the potential of CSOs to 
mobilise financial resources. In economically more developed countries, CSOs have 
ample opportunities for domestic fund-raising through donations, grants, corporate 
financing and membership fees. In countries with lower levels of economic 
development and a limited middle class, fewer opportunities exist for domestic 
fund-raising, and local CSOs mainly depend on international donor agencies (Fowler, 
2000; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Wang, 2006). Hence, we hypothesise that: (2) the 
higher the level of economic development in a country, the higher the level of civil 
society affiliation.  
Political stability
The level of political stability in a country is crucial for the functioning of all sectors of 
society, including civil society. Governments of countries that are politically unstable 
and whose power is challenged are often repressive towards forms of societal 
organisation. A study by the World Bank (2005) in conflict-affected and fragile African 
countries concludes that civil society in these countries was generally subjected to all 
kinds of arbitrary restrictions not sanctioned by law. As such, CSOs’ room to operate 
in many developing countries is narrow, being limited to little more than service 
delivery. Furthermore, countries with low levels of political stability are also more likely 
to suffer from (internal) violence. In such (post)conflict countries, there are still many 
areas that are physically unsafe, where governmental authority and service provision 
is often weak or non-existent and physical infrastructure is frequently damaged or 
destroyed. Under such harsh conditions, it is very difficult for CSOs to function. We 
therefore hypothesise that: (3) the higher the level of political stability in a country, the 
higher the level of civil society affiliation. 
The rule of law
The rule of law, which is defended by an independent judiciary, is important for 
ensuring the equality of citizens and restricting the abuse of state power. In relation to 
civil society this means that, “adequate rights and guarantees must exist for the 
functioning of diverse social organisations and for the exercise of vertical societal 
accountability” (O’Donnell, 2005, p. 15). In cases of a poor rule of law civil society has 
a weak position to demand accountability from state institutions. In this situation, 
especially the poor and vulnerable are deprived of their rights, as they do not have 
the resources and networks for alternative options (O’Donnell, 2005). 
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 Salamon and Toepler (2000) demonstrate the importance of the legal environment 
for the functioning of civil society. According to them, civil society is unlikely to flourish 
if the right to associate is not protected in a country’s basic legal system, regardless 
of how other legal issues are solved. Their findings stress the importance of laws that 
facilitate the formation of CSOs. If the legal framework in a country makes it difficult 
to establish CSOs because of formal requirements and restrictive registration 
procedures, civil society is less likely to develop. Moreover, unstable or arbitrary legal 
conditions affect the confidence of citizens in non-profit institutions. To safeguard 
CSO legitimacy, transparent legal conditions regarding reporting requirements and 
preclusion from making a profit are required. We therefore derive the following 
hypothesis: (4) the more favourable the legal environment in a country, the higher the 
level of civil society affiliation. 
2.3  Civil society affiliation in developing countries:  
an alternative explanation
The hypotheses of the previous section provide a grim perspective for people in 
developing countries, namely they who are most in need of CSO membership are 
least likely to have it. We argue however that this is not necessarily the case. The 
hypotheses of the previous section are based on experiences in industrialised nations 
(democracy and economic development) and presume the need of formalised CSOs 
(political stability and the rule of law). There are two reasons why developing countries 
might deviate from the hypothesised linear trends: first, memberships might be 
higher exactly because people are more in need of them, and second, informal forms 
of civil society make up for the lack of formal forms. 
A high need for CSO membership
People in developing countries are likely to be in need of CSO membership because 
of widespread poverty and a state which is often unable to provide basic services, 
freedoms or security. In these harsh conditions, people can turn to CSOs for 
safeguarding their autonomy vis-à-vis oppressive or badly functioning governments, 
exploitative and polluting companies, or just for providing the basic needs of life. 
Edwards (2004, pp. 13-15) summarises these functions in three developmental roles 
of CSOs: (a) an economic role, (b) a social role and (c) a political role. 
 The economic role centres on safeguarding livelihoods and providing services 
where states and markets are weak. CSOs then nurture the social values, networks 
and institutions that underpin successful market economies, including trust and 
cooperation. In their social role, CSOs are seen as a reservoir of caring, cultural life 
and intellectual innovation. They teach people the skills of citizenship and nurture a 
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collection of positive social norms that fosters stability, loosely collected under the 
rubric of social capital. Finally, in the political role, CSOs are seen as a crucial 
counterweight to states and corporate power, and essential in promoting transparency, 
accountability and other aspects of democracy and good governance. Taken 
together, the three dimensions present an image of why people in developing 
countries are likely to be involved in CSOs. In situations of extreme poverty, CSO 
membership can serve as a bridge towards resources. In situations of conflict, 
lawlessness and insecurity, CSO memberships provide alternative sources of social 
cohesion and stability, and finally, CSO membership helps citizens to defend 
themselves against corrupt governments. 
Formal versus informal organisations
The hypotheses formulated in the previous section imply that civil society, in order 
to function, needs a certain level of economic development, democracy, political 
stability and rule of law. However, it is questionable whether civil society actually 
needs all these conditions. It rather points to a specific form of civil society, consisting 
of formally established organisations with abundant resources, through which active 
citizens make use of their democratic rights to organise themselves and participate 
in public debates. 
 While there are fewer opportunities for formal civil society organisations in 
developing countries, this is not the case for informal forms. Especially in the field of 
international development, civil society is often equated with formally established and 
registered (non-governmental) organisations (Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; Orvis, 
2001). Even though formal organisations represent an important part of civil society, 
this view is far too narrow. Especially in developing countries, civil society also 
comprises less-formalised manifestations of organisational life, such as informal 
associations based on religion, kinship, ethnicity and gender. These groups can exist 
regardless of economic development, democratic rights or the rule of law, exactly 
because they are informal. They do not necessarily need registration, funding or an 
office location.  
 Formal and informal voluntary organisations can be strongly connected through 
a variety of networks. Wherever effective network structures exist in civil society, the 
sum can be greater than each of its parts (Pichler & Wallace, 2007; Putnam, 2007). In 
countries where formal organisations have limited possibilities or are small in numbers, 
connections with informal groups are crucial for reaching marginalised groups. This 
highlights the insurance function of social networks, which tends to be more important 
in developing countries. 
 Based on these considerations we hypothesise that: (5) (very) low levels of economic 
development, democracy, political stability and rule of law will increase CSO membership 
levels. To test this alternative option we will include non-linear (quadratic) models.
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2.4 Data source and methods
In this study we rely on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) that provides 
detailed insight in membership to a broad range of voluntary organisations in different 
types of countries, as well as the individual characteristics and motivations that 
account for CSO affiliation (Inglehart, 2005). The WVS permits cross-country comparison 
since it includes measurements of thousands of individuals across the globe that 
answered the same questions concerning their civil society affiliation. For conducting 
a logistic multilevel regression, we constructed a binomial dependent variable and 
added both individual-level (control variables) and country-level variables to the 
regression. We will now discuss both dependent and independent variables.
Dependent variable
The World Values Survey is conducted in different waves. For the construction of the 
dependent variable, data collected during the fourth wave, carried out between 1999 
and 2004, was used.4 The questionnaire contains questions relating to membership 
of fifteen different types of CSOs.5 This relates to the diversity and depth of citizen 
participation in voluntary organisations. It implies that when individuals in a country 
belong to more CSO categories, the stronger the civil society of that country is 
considered to be. 
 Constructing the dependent variable involved several choices. The first choice 
was to remove the category of membership of political parties since this relates to 
organisations positioned in the political realm, and not in civil society. After this 
selection, fourteen categories of CSOs were included in the analysis.6 Two categories 
of organisations that were included deserve some discussion: labour unions and 
professional associations. These two categories are positioned at the borderline 
between civil society, the state and the market, and were included for two reasons: 
(1) the primary objective of these groups is to promote the interests of their members, and 
(2) they often play a significant developmental role.7 
4 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ for additional information.
5 These are: (1) social welfare service organisations for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; (2) 
religious or church organisations; (3) organisations in the area of education, arts, music or cultural 
activities; (4) labor unions; (5) political parties or groups; (6) local community action groups on 
issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; (7) organisations that focus on third world 
development or human rights; (8) organisations that focus on conservation, the environment or animal 
rights; (9) professional associations; (10) youth work organisations (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs, 
etc.); (11) sports or recreation organisations; (12) women’s groups; (13) the peace movement; (14) 
voluntary organisation  concerned with health; and (15) other groups.
6 The category ‘other groups’ was also incorporated to include a wide range of CSOs.
7 Curtis et al. (2001) find that high union membership counts for former eastern bloc nations distort 
their analysis. They argue that this is the case because union membership is compulsory rather than 
voluntary in many of these countries. As they use the WVS data from right after the fall of the Berlin wall 
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 The next step was to aggregate the data on the fourteen CSO-categories into 
one dependent variable. We created a proportion variable ranging from 0 to 1, 
providing information on the total number of memberships of each individual divided 
by the maximum number of possible memberships.8 Table 2.1 provides an overview 
of the average number of memberships per country per person. Among the countries 
with high numbers of memberships are usual suspects such as the United States, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, but we also see surprisingly high levels of memberships 
in countries such as Tanzania, Bangladesh and Uganda.
Independent variables
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the basic descriptive statistics for the structural 
factors that are considered to influence CSO membership. For measuring the level of 
democracy, the Freedom House (2002)9 indicators for ‘political rights’ and ‘civil 
liberties’ were summed, resulting in a score ranging from 2 to 14.10 This combined 
indicator looks at a number of factors related to democracy, namely a country’s 
electoral process, the extent of political pluralism and participation, the functioning of 
government, and the freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion. To 
measure economic development, we used the commonly used GDP per capita 
(2003, corrected for purchasing power parity) from the UNDP11 Human Development 
Index.12 To measure political stability and the rule of law, we used the World 
Governance Indicators of 2002 from the World Bank.13 The political stability (and 
absence of violence) indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. The rule of law indicator measures the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
(1991 to 1993), the influence of communism was still strong. This reasoning does not apply to our study 
because we use data from 1999 to 2004.
8 Because the maximum number of organisational memberships is limited to 14, we used a binomial 
distribution rather than a poisson distribution to model our dependent variable. The proportion of 
memberships is linked to the covariates by using a logit link function.
9 Freedom House, Freedom of the World 2002: the annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 
available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2002 [accessed 
February 2012].
10 Here we followed Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) and inverted the scale for interpretation purposes. Higher 
scores indicate a higher level of democracy.
11 United Nations Development Programme, Human development report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s 
Diverse World, available at:  http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/ [accessed March 2012].
12 Following Curtis et al. (2001) and Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), we calculate the logarithm 
of GDP, to prevent extremely rich countries from dominating estimated regression effects.
13 World Bank, World governance indicators 1996-2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance/exelgraphs [accessed February 2012].
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Table 2.1  Respondents per country and average no. of memberships per country
Country Respondents Average 
no. of 
memberships
Country Respondents Average 
no. of 
memberships
1. Albania 937 1.598 28. Luxembourg 927 1.402
2. Argentina 1231 .583 29. Malta 998 .565
3. Austria 1447 1.391 30. Mexico 1347 .959
4. Bangladesh 1354 2.722 31. Moldova 924 .865
5. Belgium 1681 1.509 32. Morocco 1168 .258
6. Bulgaria 907 .312 33. Netherlands 979 2.999
7. Belarus 923 .516 34. Peru 1439 .933
8. Canada 1828 1.826 35. Philippines 1187 1.326
9. Chile 1151 .868 36. Poland 1039 .386
10. China 768 .340 37. Portugal 958 .377
11. Croatia 876 .686 38. Romania 1034 .294
12. Czech Republic 1781 1.020 39. Russia 2357 .375
13. Denmark 879 1.878 40. Singapore 1485 .845
14. Estonia 921 .503 41. Slovakia 1217 1.075
15. Finland 859 1.873 42. Vietnam 880 2.169
16. France 509 .616 43. Slovenia 918 .938
17. Germany 1911 .720 44. South Africa 2869 1.573
18. Greece 1009 1.141 45. Spain 2200 .468
19. Hungary 909 .429 46. Sweden 945 3.091
20. Iceland 911 2.528 47. Turkey 1128 .090
21. India 1501 1.231 48. Uganda 985 2.145
22. Ireland 906 1.160 49. Ukraine 1003 .442
23. Italy 1716 .724 50. Macedonia 984 1.013
24. Japan 1005 .813 51. Tanzania 1011 3.395
25. Kyrgyzstan 1019 .815 52. United States 1167 3.060
26. Latvia 925 .396 53. Venezuela 1150 1.436
27. Lithuania 893 .236 Total 64056 1.134
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2004, own calculations.
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of crime and violence. The governance indicators are measured in units ranging from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009).  
 Although the hypotheses on structural factors influencing CSO membership 
were formulated at the country-level, individual-level variables are also included in the 
analysis. The purpose of taking individual-level variables into account was to allow for 
individual-level variance and thereby control for composition effects. This is to ensure 
that the effects of the country-level variables are genuinely attributable to the 
country-level and are not the result of factors at the level of individuals. The variables 
at the individual-level taken into account are: age (and age squared), level of 
education, sex, attendance of religious services and the value index. These variables 
are generally considered to explain CSO membership (Curtis et al., 2001; Ruiter & 
De Graaf, 2006; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). 
 It is expected that as people get older, the chance of being a member of a CSO 
will increase. Some studies show, however, that the relationship between age and 
CSO membership is actually curvilinear (Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). To accurately 
establish the relation ship between age and membership, a squared term of the 
Table 2.2  Descriptive Statistics for Independent variables
Range Mean Standard 
Deviation
Year
Individual level variables:
Age 15 / 99 42.49 16.56 1999-2004
Highest educational level 1 / 8 4.42 2.19 1999-2004
Materialist values (dummy) 0 / 1 .29 .46 1999-2004
Mixed values (dummy) 0 / 1 .58 .49 1999-2004
Post-materialist values (dummy) 0 / 1 .12 .33 1999-2004
Sex (male=0) 0 / 1 .52 .50 1999-2004
Religious service attendance  
(inverted scale)
-8 / -1 -4.64 2.52 1999-2004
Country level variables:
Rule of law -1.13 / 2.06 .51 .98 2002
Political Stability -1.47 / 1.69 .42 .84 2002
GDP/capita (PPP US $1.000) .62 / 62.29 16.13 1.19 2003
Political rights (inverted scale) -13 / -2 -4.57 3.11 2002
Note: Averages and standard deviations are calculated over 64056 individuals.
Sources: World Values Survey 1999-2004, Freedom House (2002), World Bank (2002), UNDP (2004), own 
calculations.
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variable age was also included in the analysis. The level of education of a person is 
expected to correlate positively with CSO membership, as is the frequency of 
attendance of religious services. With regard to the latter, the scale has been inverted 
to facilitate its interpretation. Males are expected to have a different level of CSO 
membership than women, but the gender differences in CSO participation are subject 
to much debate. Finally, the value index relates to Inglehart’s (1997) concepts of (post)
modernisation that captures driving forces for human action. People adhering modern 
values are believed to emphasise physical and economic well-being, whereas people 
who adhere to post-modern values emphasise self- actualisation and quality of life 
motives. Post-materialist values tend to favour more individualistic behaviour and CSO 
membership is then perceived from a self-interest principle.14 CSO membership is 
expected to be more pronounced amongst people with (post)modern value regimes.
2.5 Results
To identify the influence of the country-level variables, a logistic multilevel regression 
was conducted in the statistical analysis program Stata.15 The model specification 
includes six different steps. The results are presented in Table 2.3. 
 The first step (model 1) included all individual-level variables. All the hypothesised 
effects of the individual-level variables are confirmed at the .001 significance level 
and the directions of most coefficients are as expected. Regarding age, the non-linear 
relationship between age and membership of CSOs was confirmed (i.e. the squared 
term is significant), indicating that somewhat older (i.e. more experienced) people 
tend to join CSOs, but at a declining share. Similarly, education proves to be a 
favourable factor for CSO membership. Interestingly, CSO membership over countries 
is strongly male-biased. This will be particularly true for labour unions and sports 
clubs, even while in some other types of organisations (e.g. churches, health groups) 
females usually represent a key driving force. Atten dance of religious services has a 
univocal positive influence on CSO participation. Finally, people adhering to 
post-material values appear to be more likely to become CSO members, indicating 
that self-actualisation and identity motives tend to dominate other, more functional 
goals of CSO affiliation.
14 In the analysis, the three categories are recoded into dummy variables for materialist values and mixed 
values that should be interpreted in relation to the reference category of post-materialist values. The 
expectation is that both dummies will have negative coefficients, and that the materialist category will 
show a more pronounced negative coefficient than the mixed category.
15 We applied the xtmelogit procedure with a random intercept for the countries using 7 quadrature 
points.
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 The second step (model 2-5) was to add country level variables (and their 
squared terms), to explain for variance at the country level. In subsequent models, 
each of the country-level variables was added to model 1 to identify their specific 
influence on the dependent variable of CSO membership. Model 2 through 4 show 
that rule of law, political stability and log GDP/capita all have a significant quadratic 
effect on CSO membership. Model 5 shows that the level of democracy has no 
significant effect (both quadratic and linear).16 This means that we cannot confirm any 
of our linear hypotheses. However, we can confirm our quadratic hypotheses for rule 
of law, political stability and log GDP/capita. Of these variables, rule of law and log 
GDP/capita are most important, as can be seen by the level of significance and the 
reduced country-level variances of model 2 and 4 as compared to the slight reduction 
of country-level variance in model 3 (political stability).17 Therefore we conclude that 
economic development and rule of law are most important in explaining variation in 
CSO member ship between countries. Figure 2.1 and figure 2.2 clearly demonstrate 
the quadratic nature of this relationship.18
 In the final model 6, all country-level variables were included to study the 
importance of each country-level variable when controlled for the influence of the 
others. Even though the between-country variance drops to .307, the (quadratic) 
effect of only one country-level factor remains significant at the .001 level in this 
model, namely rule of law. Also, both effects of level of democracy become slightly 
significant now. These deviations from the previous models are most likely due to 
 multicollinearity combined with the relatively small number of countries.19 As such, the 
results of model 6 may present a somewhat distorted picture. To check whether rule 
of law and log GDP/capita are still the most important predictors we tested several 
other models. We subsequently removed one of the country-level variables from 
model 6 and looked at the resulting increase in between-country variance and 
deviance (the higher the increase, the higher the explanatory value of the removed 
variable). This procedure showed that removing the level of democracy variable did 
not result in a significant increase of the deviance nor in a substantial increase of the 
between-country variance. The same was the case for political stability. However, the 
opposite was true for rule of law and log GDP/capita, the removal of both of which 
resulted in a significant (p<.001) increase in deviance and a substantial increase in 
16 We also tested a model with only a linear effect which appeared to be insignificant.
17 This point can also be proven by looking at the deviances of models 2 through 5 as compared to the 
deviance of model 1.
18 The quadratic nature of the relationship is also proven by the dramatic rise in explained variance when 
fitting a quadratic rather than a linear line to the total (see reported values under the figures) using OLS 
regression.
19 The country-level variables show relatively high levels of correlation, ranging from .64 to .85 (in absolute 
terms).
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 between-country variance. Hence, these analyses confirmed our initial conclusions, 
namely that rule of law and log GDP/capita are the most important predictors. 
 Finally, we removed all the quadratic terms from model 6, to analyse the importance 
of the quadratic terms in model 6. Omitting these terms, and only using linear country- 
level predictors resulted in a great and significant (p<.001) increase of deviance and 
country-level variance. The explained country-level variance of model 6 including 
quadratic terms equals 55% while only including linear terms results in a drop to 22%. 
This again underscores the importance of the quadratic relations in comparison to 
linear ones.
Figure 2.1  Rule of law and average CSO membership per country
Note: R2 linear = .047
 R2 quadratic = .247
 Labels correspond to countries in table 2.1
Sources: World Values Survey 1999-2004, World Bank (2002), own calculations.
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Figure 2.2  Log GDP /capita and average CSO membership per country
Note: R2 linear = .002
 R2 quadratic = .4
 Labels correspond to countries in table 2.1
Sources: World Values Survey 1999-2004, UNDP (2004), own calculations.
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2.6 Discussion and Outlook
In this chapter, we empirically tested four structural factors which may account for 
differences in the strength of civil society affiliation, controlling for composition effects 
of countries by including individual-level variables in the logistic multilevel regression. 
Of the four contextual factors (‘rule of law’, ‘political stability’, ‘level of democracy’ and 
‘economic development’), only the rule of law and the level of economic development 
emerge as the key mediating factors for CSO membership. Surprisingly, this relation 
is not linear but quadratic, meaning that improvement in both the rule of law and the 
economic situation in a country first ‘causes’ CSO membership to drop and after a 
certain threshold to rise again. Contrary to popular beliefs, the level of democracy 
could not be confirmed to exercise a significant influence on civil society affiliation. 
Similarly, the degree of political stability appears to be only slightly significantly 
related to CSO development. This raises two questions, first, how can we explain this 
quadratic pattern, and second, what does it mean for supporting an enabling 
environment for CSOs?
 A possible explanation for our findings is that people in poor countries where the 
rule of law is low are indeed very much in need of memberships for safeguarding their 
basic needs in life. If we zoom in on the countries on the upper left and upper right 
corner of figure 2.1 and 2.2, we see that they are on the one hand Tanzania, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam and Uganda, and on the other hand Sweden, the United States, the 
Netherlands and Iceland. In both groups high membership scores are mainly based on 
membership of religious organisations, but next to religious organisations the group 
of Western countries score a lot higher on membership of labour unions and other 
groups, and the group of developing countries score a lot higher on membership of 
local political initiatives, women’s groups, peace movements and health groups. 
Although this is a purely descriptive analysis, it seems to support the idea that people 
in developing countries have different reasons for becoming a member than people 
in the Western world. Their motives may be more connected to the basic needs in life 
(health, peace) or to fighting for rights which are not yet incorporated into the legal 
environment (local political initiatives, women’s rights). Also in developing countries, 
churches are very often involved in the provision of basic needs, and often play a 
developmental role (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Grier, 1997). In the Western countries, 
where basic rights are safeguarded by law and basic needs are covered by social 
welfare regimes and high income levels, existing theories seem to apply. If we relate this 
to Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs, those who are at the top (self-actualisation, 
self-esteem) and those who are at the bottom (physiological and safety needs) are 
most likely to have a CSO membership (Maslow, 1943).
 What does this mean for donor agencies wishing to support civil society 
development? Our analysis confirmed that country-level factors have a significant 
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influence on CSO membership, so in addition to direct support for establishing local 
CSOs in developing countries (push-factor approach), the alternative of a more structural 
(pull-in) approach focusing on the creation of ‘enabling conditions’ deserves serious 
attention. There are no good reasons to wait until formal democratic conditions or 
political stability are in place; the rule of law and economic growth are confirmed to 
be sufficient requirements for mediating CSO affiliation. However, our data suggests 
that improving these factors could actually lead to a drop in the number of CSO 
memberships.20 Although it sounds counter-intuitive, this drop in the amount of 
memberships can be interpreted as a good thing. As the situation in a country 
improves and more rights and basic needs are covered by a good rule of law and a 
good economic climate, people have less reason to be a member of CSOs which are 
providing it for them. Only after a certain level of wealth and rule of law is reached, 
memberships start rising again, but probably because of different reasons, related to 
self-actualisation and self-esteem. This points to a transformation of civil society over 
time, rather than a simple growth.
 Finally, we should acknowledge that this analysis does not permit to draw firm 
conclusions about causality. Since most variables used are time-invariant, we cannot 
confirm whether CSO organisation also favours a process towards the strengthening 
of the socio-economic or legal-political framework in particular types of countries. 
While such relationships are frequently forwarded in the debate on the roles of CSO 
in fostering development and reducing poverty or inequality (Biekart, 1999; G. White, 
1994), there is until now little empirical proof - at least at aggregate level - of possible 
complementari ties between CSO organisation and progress in reaching development 
goals.
20 Because we use cross-sectional data it is difficult to predict whether individual countries will actually 
follow this path. An alternative explanation could be that the low number of memberships in the middle 
of figures 1 and 2 are actually caused by post-communist countries. In these countries, Howard (2003) 
argues that low numbers of membership are related to the communist legacy, rather than to GDP or 
Rule of law. To test for this alternative explanation we added a dummy for former communist countries 
to our models. This analysis showed that this group of countries (while having a significantly lower 
number of memberships) does not affect our quadratic explanation.
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Chapter 3
Cut from a different cloth? 
Comparing democracy-promoting 
NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia*
*  A version of this chapter has been published as: Kamstra, J., Knippenberg, L.,  
& Schulpen, L. (2013). Cut from a Different Cloth? Comparing Democracy-Promoting 
NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia. Journal of Civil Society, 9(1), 1-20.
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Abstract
This study compares donor-sponsored NGOs promoting democracy in Ghana and 
Indonesia. Starting from the idea that democracy and civil society are context- specific 
phenomena, we explore the question of what context-specificity means for individual 
NGOs. While donors and researchers alike stress the importance of context,  context- 
specificity remains an ill-defined and elusive concept. Our study contributes to the 
debate by (1) constructing a framework which defines context- specificity at the level 
of organisational characteristics and by (2) analysing to what extent NGOs in Ghana 
and Indonesia actually conform to this definition of context- specificity. Because 
Ghana and Indonesia represent very different contexts, we maximise the chances of 
finding differences in organisational configuration. Our fieldwork data from Accra and 
Jakarta only partly confirm this expectation. Although the mission statements echo 
national differences, we find remarkable similarities in terms of strategies, structures 
and resources. These similarities lead us to conclude that the NGOs operate quite 
independently from their national contexts. In the discussion we relate our findings to 
the debate on donor support to NGOs.
Keywords
Civil society, NGO, democracy, context, development aid, comparative analysis, Ghana, 
Indonesia.
 Cut from a different cloth? | 73
3
3.1 Introduction
Effective development aid requires tailoring policies to local contextual factors like local 
needs, local knowledge and local cultural practices (Easterly, 2006; Evans, 2004). Also in 
the field of civil society and democracy it is now widely accepted that both “cannot 
be created from blueprints” and do not lend themselves to “external manufacturing” 
(Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 121). Democratic engineering has often had damaging 
effects because it enforces a particular organisational paradigm (Blaug, 2002). One 
way of overcoming this problem is by supporting domestic civil society organisations 
such as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) which can take the lead in promoting 
‘home-grown’ democracy. This solution only works, however, if the sponsored NGOs 
are themselves rooted in their society and are sensitive to local contextual factors 
because “civil societies in any context have a history and must develop in tune with their 
particular historical, cultural and political rhythms” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 121).
 Several studies have pointed out that donor funding to democracy-promoting 
NGOs has had the unintended effect of weakening the link between NGO and society. 
For instance, Henderson (2002) shows that donor support to NGOs in Russia caused 
them to be accountable towards their donors, rather than towards their constituencies. 
White (1999, p. 321) argues that, due to donor support, some of the NGOs in 
Bangladesh have “grown into formidable institutions, very far from the citizens’ 
associations of classical civil society theorists”. Hearn (2000, 2007) concludes that 
NGOs in Africa are maintaining rather than challenging the status quo, and can even 
be seen as agents of Western powers. These and other observations led to the 
conclusion that many of the NGOs which are part of the aid system are not the ones 
which are so important for promoting democracy (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Ottaway 
& Carothers, 2000a; Sabatini, 2002; Tvedt, 2006). 
 This critique has been widely accepted, not least by donors, who pledged to 
improve their approach. For over a decade now, they have emphasised the idea that 
a more context-specific approach is needed, and that national ownership and 
participation are ways to achieve this.21 However, defining and measuring the context 
of civil society is a difficult and multi-interpretable topic which has received little 
attention (Anheier, 2005; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). While the studies mentioned 
above clarify a lot about how donor funding causes NGOs to become detached from 
their societies, they do not systematically analyse what being context-specific actually 
means for NGOs. As a result, context-specificity often remains an empty concept. 
We therefore aim to contribute to the debate by exploring and substantiating the meaning 
of context-specificity for individual NGOs. 
21 Many bilateral and multilateral donor agencies started using this terminology in their policies after 
signing the Rome declaration on harmonisation (2003), the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness 
(2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).
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 The analysis is guided by two questions: (1) what are the similarities and differences 
between Ghanaian and Indonesian democracy-promoting NGOs in terms of their 
organisational characteristics and (2) to what extent do these similarities and differences 
indicate context-specificity? In our empirical analysis we compare the organisational 
characteristics of NGOs from Ghana and Indonesia. By explicitly taking variation in 
context as a starting point of our analysis, we maximise the chances of finding 
contextual differences between the NGOs. As there are currently no concrete indicators 
for determining whether or not the organisational characteristics of the NGOs are 
 context-specific, we explore several possibilities. In this exploration we link our empirical 
findings to aspects of the Ghanaian and Indonesian contexts. By doing so, we construct 
and apply a framework for determining the context- specificity of NGOs.
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss the link 
between democracy, civil society and context-specificity. Here we also explain our 
choice to compare the NGOs in terms of their mission, strategy, structure, and 
resources. Second, we describe the research methodology and the selection of 
organisations. Third, for each organisational characteristic, we compare the Ghanaian 
and Indonesian NGOs, and discuss their context-specificity. We find that, despite 
major contextual differences, NGOs principally only differ in terms of their mission 
and are remarkably similar in terms of their strategy, structure and resources. We 
conclude the chapter by summarizing our framework and findings and by discussing 
donor-dependency as a potential explanation for the similarities we find.
3.2 Democracy, Civil Society and Context-specificity
The expectation of finding organisational differences between democracy promoting 
NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia is based on two premises in contemporary literature: 
first, that each country has its own path to democracy; and second, that NGOs are 
conducive to rooting democracy in society. The idea that there is one path to 
democracy has long been invalidated. Each country has its own path, and it is not 
even sure whether it will lead to the same end state (Carothers, 2002). Although 
democracy is often portrayed as a universal ideal, it manifests itself in many forms. In 
effect, the universal ideal of ‘rule by the people’ is an important source of variation 
and deviation. Democracy can only work if it is fundamentally rooted in society; it 
needs institutions that help ordinary citizens gain control over the decisions that 
affect their lives (Beetham, 1993). Because people all over the world differ in their 
cultural habits, their language, their history and so on, rule by the people is bound to 
produce some significant differences. Therefore, “different countries might very well 
be doing what is best for them, given their circumstances, by following different 
paths” (Munck, 2009, p. 337). 
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 In general, a critical and vibrant civil society is believed to be important for 
developing democracies because it provides a counterweight to state power, it 
promotes necessary state reforms, it includes the poor and marginalised, and it 
teaches citizens the norms and values of democracy (Clarke, 1998; Edwards, 2004; 
Fowler, 2000; Hendriks, 2006). There are several reasons why NGOs are conducive 
to rooting democracy in society. First, it is believed that they promote plurality and 
inclusion. We broadly define NGOs as the formal and informal associations that exist 
outside the state and the market (Hendriks, 2006). They can take on all sorts of forms, 
representing all sorts of societal groups and interests, thereby promoting plurality. 
Furthermore, these different groups can use NGOs to gain more control over the 
democratic institutions in their country. In this way, NGOs act as an alternative 
channel, distinct from political parties and elections, by which to present the 
democratic system with a more differentiated and more constant flow of input 
(Biekart, 1999; Clarke, 1998). Second, it is believed that NGOs have the capacity to 
cater to local circumstances and local needs because they are flexible and closely 
connected to people’s life-worlds (Diamond, 1999; G. White, 1994). NGOs are thus 
the perfect vehicles to ensure that democracy becomes locally rooted and widely 
accepted by different segments of a population (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996).
 Although theory remains vague about what concrete differences we might 
expect between NGOs in different countries, it does offer some clues where we need 
to look. Like all formal organisations, NGOs “need structures for defining goals, 
making decisions, mobilizing resources and directing resources towards goals” 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 316). Successful organisations, i.e. the ones that survive, have a 
structure and strategy that best serve the purpose of the organisation and are 
consistent with the environment in which it operates (Mintzberg, 1983). For NGOs this 
means that they need to adapt their “mission, their functions and their structures” to 
the social and political context in which they operate (Diamond, 1999, p. 230). 
Following these ideas we will compare the NGOs on: (1) their mission, (2) their 
organisational strategy, (3) their organisational structure, and (4) their financial and 
human resources (Diamond, 1999; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Mintzberg, 1983). 
Together these areas capture what an organisation stands for, what it does to achieve 
its goals and how it is organised to do so. 
3.3 Data and Methods
The research employs a comparative case study design. This approach is appropriate to 
study phenomena within their specific contexts. By contrasting the contexts, the way 
different conditions affect different outcomes of the phenomenon can be examined 
(Yin, 2003). In this study, Ghana and Indonesia represent the different contexts and 
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the democratisation NGOs represent the phenomenon. As Ghana and Indonesia are 
such different countries, we would expect NGOs to adapt to their environments and 
show different ‘outcomes’ in terms of their mission, their strategy, their structure and 
their resources. As little is known about context-specificity, we cannot start looking 
for clues in the context. Instead, we start by comparing the NGOs and subsequently 
link our findings to the different contexts. 
 The NGOs have been selected by means of criterion sampling (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). It is a qualitative sample, and as such it is not randomised and not 
representative in statistical terms. The purpose of this sampling technique is to 
capture the variety of a phenomenon within the boundaries of the criteria. Three 
criteria guided the selection. The first criterion was that the NGOs work in the field of 
promoting (aspects of) democracy. The second criterion was that they are supported 
by international donors22. The third criterion was that local experts (i.e. political 
scientists, NGO consultants and representatives of major bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies in the country) had to consider them to be important players in the 
field of democratisation in their country. Based on these criteria, and the interviews 
with experts, a short list of organisations was compiled which captured a diverse 
group in terms of focus, age and size. Table 3.1 provides an overview.
 This chapter is based on extensive fieldwork data, collected in Ghana (Accra) 
and Indonesia (Jakarta) between 2007 and 2008. It consists of 47 in-depth interviews 
with 43 respondents, principally with directors, researchers and founding members 
of the NGOs (for an overview see appendix 3.1). To balance their stories, interviews 
were conducted with the aforementioned local experts. In addition to interview data, 
the analysis uses annual reports, funding reports, internal documents, and NGO 
websites and publications. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and subsequently 
analysed through a process of thematic coding in the software package Atlas.ti. 
22 This criterion did not specify the number of donors, the type of donors or the amount of funding. With 
regard to these aspects, the group is highly diverse both within and between countries. In terms of 
the number of donors there are NGOs that have a large number of donors and NGOs with very few 
donors. CDD is an example of the former, as they have received grants from, among others, the UNDP, 
the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and SIDA. On the other 
hand, there is KID which depends for almost all of its funds on the Netherlands Institute of Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD), because ‘so far, beside the Dutch embassy, they are the only funders of KID’s 
activities’ (Interview KID, April 2008). The researched NGOs are supported by a variety of types of 
donors, which include bilateral, multilateral and nongovernmental funding agencies. Partnership, for 
instance, mainly relies on funding from bilateral donors who channel their funds through the UNDP (a 
multilateral donor), while ISODEC has a long-term funding relation with the NGO Oxfam NOVIB. Finally 
there are big differences in terms of their budgets. For the year 2007, Abantu anticipated a budget of 
US$ 0.4 million as compared to the Partnership which had an estimated budget of US$ 10 million.
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3.4 Different Countries, Different Organisations?
In this section we compare the NGOs in terms of their mission, strategy, structure, 
and resources. Subsequently, we explore to what extent these findings indicate 
 context-specificity by relating them to the context in Ghana and Indonesia. In this way 
we aim to demystify the concept of context-specificity and make it more tangible.
Comparing Missions 
When comparing mission statements, we find clear deviations between countries in 
the kind of topics being tackled. Table 3.2 summarises the mission statements of the 
selected NGOs.
 In Indonesia, for example, corruption and human rights are prominent topics. 
The organisations tackle different aspects of these problems. Demos promotes “human- 
rights based democracy” and aims “to promote the participation and representation of 
marginalised people” (Interview Demos, March 2008). Elsam also sees the promotion 
of human rights as essential for promoting a democratic political order. According to 
the director, their mission is “to introduce human rights as a political instrument in 
Indonesia” (Interview Elsam, April 2008). This requires institutional reform because the 
current judicial institutions are perceived to be part of the problem rather than the solution. 
KID aims at improving the quality of the democratic discourse at the local level by educating 
strategic young individuals about the norms and values of democracy. They argue that 
the nature and quality of participation is as important for improving democracy in 
Indonesia as the quantity of participation (Interview KID, April 2008). Partnership 
seeks to strengthen the democratic quality of the civil service sector and the security 
and justice sectors by targeting corruption and improving transparency, accountability 
and respect for human rights in these sectors.23 PSHK believes that more attention 
should be given to legal reform. According to PSHK “law continues to be a crucial 
area in need of reform” because, “settlement of serious law violations in terms of 
corruption and human rights require effective legal institutions”.24 Finally, Yappika 
bases its work on the idea that a strong civil society movement is necessary for 
improving democracy and human rights in Indonesia. Besides providing grants for 
NGOs at the local level, they developed a more hands on approach after the fall of 
Suharto because “the environment supported involvement in dialogues with policy 
makers” (Interview Yappika, April 2008).
23 Internal document: Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (2006), Strategic Plan 2007-2011 
(Jakarta).
24 PSHK, About PSHK, available at: www.pshk.or.id [accessed July 2010].
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 In Ghana, by contrast, the focus lies on different aspects, namely on poverty and the 
exclusion of vulnerable groups (Abantu, ISODEC), and on identifying and overcoming 
institutional gaps in the macro political system (CDD, IDEG, IEA). ISODEC has its 
roots in service delivery work for vulnerable groups in society. They commence from 
the ideal that “poor and marginalised people and their organisations achieve their 
economic justice” and that they “have an effective voice in influencing decisions 
affecting their lives”.25 Abantu has a similar goal with a different target group, namely 
to promote the position of women in Ghanaian society: “It has been set up to support 
women’s organisations, to build their capacity for policy influencing” (Interview Abantu, 
25 Internal document: ISODEC (2006), The ISODEC Rights-based Advocacy Programme (RBAIII) 2007-
2009 (Accra: ISODEC), p. 18.
Table 3.2  NGO mission statements
Organisation Mission summary
G
ha
na
Abantu Build women’s capacity to participate in decision-making, influence 
policies from a gender perspective and address unequal social 
relations.
CDD Promote democracy, good governance and the development of liberal 
economic environment. 
IDEG Generate knowledge and enhance capacity of citizens to influence 
public policy choices in order to consolidate democracy and good 
governance.
IEA Promote good governance, democracy and a free and fair market 
economy.
ISODEC Achieve economic and social justice and a life of dignity for all by 
promoting rights, accountability and responsibility.
In
d
on
es
ia
Demos Enhance community capacity to promote democracy and human 
rights through the practise of discourse; dissemination and cooperative 
networks.
Elsam Promote the existence of a society that respects human rights and 
democracy and attains social justice as well as gender sensitivity.
KID Facilitate commitment of citizens to democracy and facilitate their 
participation, so people can monitor and control public decision-
making.
Partnership Promote good governance by strengthening public service governance, 
deepening democracy and improving security and justice, while 
considering gender equality and marginalised groups.
PSHK  Contribute to consistency of legal enforcement and legal reform with 
independent research.
Yappika Promote a democratic and independent civil society that fights for 
democracy and human rights.
Source: NGO websites.
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December 2007). Both organisations look at how their constituencies are served by 
existing institutions and stress the need for inclusion and distributive justice. The 
other organisations (CDD, IDEG, IEA) take a different perspective, focusing on 
“systems and processes of the central government, and how policy is made and 
implemented” (Interview CDD, December 2007). They identify institutional problems 
that relate to the lack of decentralisation, constitutional reform, the separation of 
powers, political party reform, and the quality of electoral procedures. Besides 
identifying similar problems, they also develop similar solutions. For instance, in 
order to overcome the weak position of parliament in relation to the executive, IDEG 
“builds the capacity of parliament at the national level through workshops and 
seminars” (Interview IDEG, December 2007), IEA takes parliamentarians “through 
courses on various subjects” (Interview IEA, December 2007), and CDD teaches 
“new members of parliament about the rules and procedures of parliament” (Interview 
CDD, November 2007).
Context and Mission 
In both Ghana and Indonesia the mission statements and, subsequently, the areas in 
which the NGOs work, reflect the different problems that Ghana and Indonesia face 
on the path of consolidating and deepening their democracies. Despite some 
parallels in their historic development, Ghana and Indonesia present NGOs with a 
very different institutional environment. Both countries experienced a prolonged 
period of colonial rule where a European state imposed its repressive and extractive 
administrative structures. Indonesia officially gained independence in 1949 after a 
violent struggle against their Dutch colonisers. In Ghana the transition of power from 
the British colonisers was more peaceful and took place in 1957. After decolonisation, 
both countries had short experiences with parliamentary democracy (Chazan, 1988; 
Sundhaussen, 1989). However, the most long-lasting regimes were the military ones, 
in Ghana under Rawlings and in Indonesia under Suharto. In Ghana the transition to 
democracy was gradual and peaceful, and took place between 1992 and 2000 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). In contrast, the 1998 transition in Indonesia was short and 
violent (Schwarz, 1999). 
 Currently, both countries struggle with different societal problems. In Ghana, the 
combination of widespread poverty and the lack of education (illiteracy rate of 42%) 
are an obstacle to basic democratic practices such as participation and demanding 
government accountability (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010). These are the issues being 
tackled by NGOs such as ISODEC and Abantu. In Indonesia, poverty is less 
widespread and the level of education is generally higher with an illiteracy rate of 
about 10%.26 Here, one of the main societal obstacles to democracy is conflict. 
26  Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World fact book 2011, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook [accessed May 2011].
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Throughout the archipelago, past and present conflicts between ethnic and religious 
groups cause a lot of instability and are rated as one of Indonesia’s biggest 
governance problems (Kaufmann et al., 2009). During these various conflicts human 
rights have often been violated, which explains the prominence of the topic in the 
mission statements of the Indonesian NGOs.
 The macro political environment also presents democratic development with 
different obstacles. In Ghana, for instance, the separation of powers is a significant 
weakness in the democratic system on which NGOs such as CDD, IEA and IDEG 
work. Although both countries have a history of concentration of power in the 
executive, in contrast to Indonesia, Ghana has not broken with this history. The 
executive remains dominant, especially over the legislative branch (Abdulai & 
Crawford, 2010; Lindberg & Zhou, 2009). Because Ghana functions as a two-party 
system, the president usually has a safe majority in parliament. His power to appoint 
and dismiss ministers among the parliamentarians ensures that this majority is loyal 
to his policy because “every parliamentarian from the presidential party wants a 
ministerial appointment” (Interview University of Legon - Faculty of Law, November 
2007). The dominance of the executive weakens the separation of powers, designed 
to ensure checks and balances between the different branches of government. In 
Indonesia this is less the case because their presidential system functions differently. 
In order to be able to govern, the president needs to build coalitions with multiple 
parties in parliament, which strengthens the separation of powers (Perdana & 
Friawan, 2007).
 A related problem with democracy in Ghana, on which each of the selected 
Ghanaian NGOs has some sort of programme, is the lack of decentralisation. CDD, 
IDEG and IEA work on it from an institutional perspective, and ISODEC and Abantu 
from the perspective of the participation of the poor and women respectively. 
Although Ghana has decentralised structures in the form of districts, the central 
executive dominates these structures, leaving less space for local input and 
participation. The District Assemblies are only partly decentralised because the 
president has the right to appoint and dismiss the District Chief Executive and 
one-third of the assembly members. The independence of the districts is also 
undermined by financial dependence on the central government, which allocates 
only 5% of the national budget to them. This is not sufficient to attract qualified 
personnel and sustain a local bureaucracy. As a result, many of the bureaucratic 
structures at the local level still take orders from Accra (Crawford, 2008; Owusu, 
2005). 
 In contrast, in Indonesia an ambitious decentralisation programme was 
implemented after the fall of Suharto. In a short period of time, the central government 
transferred most of its tasks along with two-thirds of its bureaucracy to the local level 
(Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005). The decentralised structure consists of provinces, 
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districts, sub-districts and municipalities. Except for the sub-districts, these structures 
have direct elections for both the legislative and the executive. As in Ghana, the most 
important source of income comes from the central government, which allocates 
25% of its budget to the sub-national level (Perdana & Friawan, 2007).
 In Ghana the centralisation of power is an obstacle to democracy, but in Indonesia 
dispersed power delivers its own set of problems. First of all, the aforementioned 
conflicts are sometimes linked to the process of decentralisation. Although it helped 
to improve the situation in long-lasting conflicts such as Aceh and East Timor, some 
argue that in other cases the handing over of decision-making authority to the local 
level actually fuelled the fire of ethnic conflict and secessionism (Brancati, 2006). 
Second, Indonesia copes with much higher levels of corruption than Ghana 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). During the New Order regime, corruption was also high, but 
limited to a relatively small clique around Suharto. After the fall of Suharto, corruption 
spread through the Indonesian system, following the separation of powers. In the 
judiciary, it became so widespread that almost nobody working for it was above 
suspicion (Ghoshal, 2004). In addition, the process of decentralisation effectively 
spread corruption throughout the country, bringing it closer to the people (Aspinall & 
Van Klinken, 2011; Hadiz, 2004). Therefore, many NGOs in Indonesia, including PSHK 
and Partnership, see combating corruption as an important aspect of improving 
democracy there. To sum up, the mission statements of the NGOs in Ghana and 
Indonesia can be called ‘context-specific’ because they relate to important issues 
which can be identified in the wider socio-political environment in which they operate. 
Comparing Strategies
From our interview data we uncovered a range of strategies being pursued by the 
NGOs. Table 3.3 summarises our findings, and despite some deviating strategies, 
like ISODEC’s service delivery work and KID’s focus on political education at the 
regional level, it also shows some remarkable similarities. First, almost every 
organisation in our sample has embraced research-based advocacy as a main 
strategy, and second, within this strategy they focus on non-confrontational forms of 
advocacy, mainly targeting the central government.
 The strategy of research and advocacy can be summarised as identifying 
a problem, conducting research on this problem, writing a research report with 
 recommendations, and finally advocating these recommendations among policy- 
makers. At Demos “there are only two divisions, one for advocacy and one for 
research, but it’s not really separated” (Interview Demos, March 2008). High quality 
research is seen as a necessary input for advocacy activities because “you cannot 
promote advocacy work without having evidence” (Interview Abantu, December 
2007), and advocacy activities are “are only taken seriously by the government when 
they are backed by research” (Interview IDEG, December 2008). Advocacy follows 
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research because “research will only fill up your bookshelves if you do not advocate 
the findings” (Interview PSHK, April 2008). The strategy is so appealing that even 
organisations focusing on community development (Yappika and ISODEC) added it 
to their repertoire. They had similar reasons for doing so. At Yappika, they reasoned 
that “just to channel money to NGOs is not enough” and that they “also had to build 
experience in policy advocacy to be able to influence policy reform” (Interview 
Yappika, April 2008), while ISODEC “wanted to have a bigger impact on society, so 
the idea of rights-based advocacy came in” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). 
 The range of possible advocacy tactics is rather broad, from all kinds of protests 
to careful institutionally embedded forms of communication and advice (Jenkins, 
2006). In both Ghana and Indonesia, institutional advocacy tactics are dominant. The 
NGOs advocate their messages through roundtables, conferences, seminars, book 
launches, radio, TV, newspapers, and lobbying parliamentarians and policymakers. 
By employing such non-confrontational strategies, the organisations find it easier to 
get access to parliamentarians and policymakers and make sure that “they take your 
work into account and use it to improve the governance system in the country” 
Table 3.3  Comparing NGO strategies
Organisation Main type of strategy
Research and Advocacy Service 
delivery
Political 
education
Civil society 
capacity 
building
Institutional Protest
G
ha
na
Abantu √ √
CDD √
IDEG √ √
IEA √
ISODEC √ √ √ √
In
d
on
es
ia
Demos √
Elsam √
KID √*
Partnership √ √
PSHK √
Yappika √ √ √
* Most of the other NGOs are also involved in political education programmes, but not as a main strategy. 
Furthermore, KID’s approach to political education differs from the other NGOs. Whereas for the other 
NGOs it is more part of their advocacy work, KID has set up several democracy schools throughout 
Indonesia where local politicians, civil society activists and community and business leaders follow a 
curriculum on the norms, values and practices of democracy.
Sources: Interviews, NGO documents, NGO websites
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(Interview IEA, November 2008). The best guarantee for getting access and being 
heard is having informal contacts because when “people have personal friends in 
government, it works very well in getting issues pushed through” (Interview CDD, 
November 2007). Therefore, they go playing golf with the minister (Interview 
Partnership, April 2008), stay in close touch with “the good guys in parliament and 
government” (Interview Elsam, April 2008), and invite “ministers, members of 
parliament and ambassadors for an informal lunch” (Interview IEA, November 2008). 
ISODEC and Yappika are the only organisations in our sample which are prepared to 
employ protest forms of advocacy to put pressure on the government. They usually 
start their advocacy activities with institutional forms like lobbying, but “if lobbying 
brings no change, we back off and organise for a demonstration” (Interview Yappika, 
April 2008). ISODEC applied the same logic in their campaign against the privatisation 
of water in Ghana:
“The water campaign started in a workshop setting with policymakers and the 
community. But when the minister wanted to go ahead with this water privatisation, 
[…] there is no compromise, so definitely something has to be done to stop it. 
And the only way is to demonstrate. So our mode of advocacy may be different 
from that of the other NGOs” (Interview ISODEC, November 2008).
Although the other NGOs join advocacy coalitions and lend their expertise to them, 
they do not engage directly in the activity of organizing demonstrations. Like PSHK, 
they “focus more on the research and policy advocacy, so we only do demonstrations 
with coalitions, not in our work plan, but indirectly” (Interview PSHK, April 2008). 
Different reasons are given for not joining or organizing demonstrations. Some think 
it is the job of other organisations to do this (KID), others say that their donors would 
not approve of this strategy (Partnership), and again others point out that this would 
damage the relationship of trust they have built with the government (IDEG, Abantu). 
Context and Strategy
In Ghana, the non-confrontational approach to influencing state officials can be 
placed within a context where state-society relations are quite good. In Indonesia, 
where state-society relations are more antagonistic, this is however not the case. 
After a history of repression, both Ghana and Indonesia now have an enabling 
legal environment for democracy-promoting NGOs. By its very nature, promoting 
democracy is politically sensitive as it means challenging and criticizing existing state 
institutions. During the military regimes of Suharto (Indonesia) and Rawlings (Ghana), 
only de-politicised NGO activities such as relief and community welfare activities 
were permitted. All other independent NGO activity was looked upon with suspicion 
and vocal NGOs were actively repressed or co-opted (Gyimah-Boadi & Oquaye, 
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2000; Hadiwinata, 2004). To fight for democracy in such a context is dangerous and 
requires careful non-confrontational tactics in order to avoid persecution. In Indonesia, 
NGOs had to act like chameleons and adopt the state ideology as their own ideology 
(Hadiwinata, 2004). In Ghana, large groups of citizens reacted to repression by 
retreating into local forms of organisation, outside the scope of the state (Chazan, 
1988). 
 Towards the end of the military regimes, societal groups became more vocal, 
openly confronting the regime with demands for change. In both Ghana and 
Indonesia, the transition to democracy opened the space for NGOs to pursue their 
own agenda’s and have their own ideologies. Constitutional provisions now safeguard 
the right to engage in a whole range of democracy promoting activities such as civic 
education, community organisation, civil society building, mobilisation, lobby and 
advocacy, and protest and demonstrations.
 Although the current legal environments in Ghana and Indonesia allow a similar 
range of NGO activities, state-society relations make it more likely for Indonesian 
NGOs to pursue confrontational strategies than NGOs in Ghana. In contrast to 
Ghana, the transition to democracy was particularly violent in Indonesia, causing 
conflicts throughout the country. This reinforced a sense of mutual suspicion and 
distrust, which had been building up between state officials and civil society groups 
in the decade before the fall of Suharto (Hadiwinata, 2004). Many NGOs proliferated 
to oppose the hegemony of the Indonesian state (Clarke, 1998). State officials 
therefore generally see civil society actors as destabilising, and many NGOs still 
perceive of the state as an adversary, therefore “many of civil society’s tactics are 
confrontational and hardnosed” (Ibrahim, 2006, p. 7). In Ghana, state-society 
relations also started out from low levels of mutual trust, but since the transition to 
democracy there has been a growing space for interaction between NGO leaders, 
government officials and even activists (Darkwa, Amponsah, & Gyampoh, 2006). 
State-society relations improved most notably when the opposition party NPP first 
came to power in 2000. While in opposition, the NPP had collaborated with many 
NGOs, which improved mutual understanding and trust (Interview University of 
Legon - Faculty of Political Science, November 2007). In such a context, it is less 
likely and perhaps less necessary for NGOs to resort to confrontational strategies.
Comparing Structures 
In both Ghana and Indonesia, the NGOs are hierarchic organisations, which “do not 
have members but they have a governing board” (Interview UNDP, April 2008). The 
governing board represents “the highest decision-making body” (Interview Abantu, 
November 2008). The main task of the board is to outline the strategic direction of the 
organisation, because “at the end of the day the board decides about the issues we 
will focus on” (Interview IEA, December 2008). Below the board level, the management 
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takes most of the daily decisions. In principle, the policy will be “decided at the top of 
the structure, but in the practice, all of the policies are discussed in the executive 
staff” (Interview Yappika, April 2008), and “most of the activities are designed together 
with the board” (Interview Elsam, April 2008). These boards often include founders of 
the organisation and important national figures, as is the case with Partnership, 
where the board consists of “prominent leaders in Indonesia, from the private sector, 
from NGOs, from the university, and from the government we have ministers and 
even the president” (Interview Partnership, April 2008). This is an understandable but 
also rather paradoxical situation, if we realise that the mission of quite a few of these 
organisations is to strengthen the position of the common citizen against the existing 
power holders.
 Because the structures of the NGOs are closed to membership participation, the 
people they supposedly work for have no direct influence on the direction of 
organisational policy, nor are the organisations formally accountable to them. This is 
also the case for ISODEC and Demos, even though they are democratic membership 
organisations. They both regard marginalised people in their country as their 
constituency, but they have not yet succeeded in including them in their membership. 
At ISODEC, “the membership is very restricted, there is no mass membership” 
(Interview ISODEC, November 2008) and at Demos “there are about 35 members, 
staff members, human rights activists, journalists and academics” (Interview Demos, 
March 2008). Both organisations intend to be more inclusive, but neither has 
succeeded in doing so because their constituencies are relatively large and 
sometimes difficult to reach. 
 In general, the NGOs in the sample experience problems in defining and limiting 
their constituencies: “The problem with these national NGOs is that they don’t have a 
clear constituency, unlike grassroots NGOs whose constituency is very clear, but with 
these NGOs the constituency is everybody” (Interview Asian Development Bank, 
March 2008). Abantu and Yappika for instance have very large constituencies as they 
are working for ‘women in Ghana’ and for ‘NGOs in Indonesia’, and at many of the 
think-tanks and policy institutes the constituencies are even less well defined: “You 
talk about policymakers, civil society itself, the general public itself, development 
partners, researchers, academics. Because our main tools are research, advocacy 
and training, it is quite a broad constituency” (Interview CDD, December 2007). Not 
knowing exactly for whom you work weakens the link with society because then there 
is also no societal group to whom you should be accountable. 
Context and Structure 
The legal framework in both Ghana and Indonesia allows for a whole range of 
organisational forms. As a result their civil society sectors are populated by all sorts 
of formal and informal associations such as advocacy groups, service delivery 
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NGOs, faith-based organisations, trade unions and community-based organisations 
(Darkwa et al., 2006; Ibrahim, 2006). If we take context-specificity to mean that we 
should find a similar variety of organisational forms in our sample, we can conclude 
from our empirical findings that this is clearly not the case. However, because this 
criterion looks at a spectrum of organisational forms in an NGO community, it does 
not tell us much about the context-specificity of the organisational structure of 
individual NGOs. As the context does not provide direct clues to what kind of 
organisational structure would be ‘context-specific’ in either country, we will take a 
more normative approach.
 Democracy is about the inclusion, participation and representation of all 
segments of society. According to Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1623) “to serve as 
an organ of socialisation into the practice of democracy, the associations in question 
must themselves be democratically structured”. Similarly, Robinson and Friedman 
(2007, p. 644) hypothesise that internally democratic NGOs “can make a positive 
contribution to the process of democratisation by fostering pluralism, promoting 
democratic values, and enhancing political participation”. In other words, contributing 
to these particular aspects requires organisations that are themselves rooted in their 
society and open to societal input. From this perspective, we would expect con-
text-specific NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia to have organisational structures 
that strengthen their links with society and facilitate the participation and inclusion of 
many different societal groups. 
 The optimal structure for strengthening the link with society is a democratic 
membership organisation. Organisational structures can be either conducive or 
obstructive to rooting an organisation in its environment. A distinction can be made 
between two extremes, namely hierarchic non-membership organisations and 
democratic membership organisations (Jenkins, 2006).27 Hierarchic non-membership 
structures insulate themselves from their environment by having top-down power 
structures. The management and the board of the organisation can determine the 
organisational course regardless of what happens in the environment. Interaction 
with the environment is carefully managed and in its most extreme form limited to the 
composition of the board. At the other end of the spectrum are democratic 
membership organisations. The bottom-up power structures make the membership 
the highest decision-making authority, thereby institutionalizing environmental input. 
By being open and accountable to the environment, the organisation loses control, 
but achieves embeddedness. 
 Instead of open structures, in both countries we find hierarchic non-membership 
organisations that are closed to citizen participation. This seems paradoxical 
because, while striving for democracy, the people and groups they claim to work for 
27 Although there are various intermediate forms, such as hierarchic membership organisations, we 
focus here on the two extremes for the sake of our argument.
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are not included. Furthermore, many of the NGOs have trouble pinpointing their 
constituency, so it is not clear for whom they work and to whom they should account. 
The only two democratic membership organisations in the sample, ISODEC and 
Demos, are not the kind of organisations where a constituency organises and speaks 
for itself. As the people for whom they work (the poor and vulnerable) are not included 
in their membership, they can be characterised as trustee organisations, i.e. they 
speak for those who do not speak for themselves (Ottaway, 2000).
Comparing Human Resources
In terms of human resources, we find that NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia are 
dominated by hired professionals with an elite profile, namely highly trained 
academics, many of whom received education abroad. The volunteers that work 
within the NGOs are small in number and resemble the elite profile of the staff. The 
core staff of every NGO in our sample is almost exclusively composed of hired 
professionals, like at Demos where “almost 90% of the staff studied at university” 
(Interview Demos, March 2008). Managers in Ghana and Indonesia mentioned the 
level of education as the most important quality of their personnel. The general 
tendency is that “to be a core staff, you have to have some professional competence” 
(Interview CDD, November 2007), and sometimes “even the supporting staff, like the 
receptionist, has a good first degree” (Interview IEA, December 2007). Many of these 
academics received their masters or PhD at European or American universities, and 
among the NGO leaders are prominent national scholars such as Dr. Gyimah-Boadi 
(formerly IEA and currently CDD) in Ghana and Dr. Ignas Kleden (KID) in Indonesia. 
Partnership provides a good example of this elite profile. According to the UNDP their 
staff “is similar to the Indonesian staff we would have at UNDP” while adding: “In fact, 
a lot of our staff works there now, and vice versa” (Interview UNDP, April 2008). 
Partnership itself not only confirms this image but even strengthens it: “Basically we 
work with university graduates, not only at the policy level but also on a more practical 
level” (Interview Partnership, April 2008).
 Organisations which started out with volunteers and activists, like ISODEC and 
Elsam, now also mainly work with academics. In the case of ISODEC, people that 
have been hired with a lower level of education are encouraged to pursue an 
academic degree abroad.28 Elsam notes that this process of professionalisation has 
had mixed consequences, namely gaining expertise in their field of work at the cost 
of losing touch with society: 
28 Internal document: ISODEC (2006), Narrative Progress Report: July – December 2005 (Accra: G-RAP).
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“Before, we had the activists from the 90s generation, but since 2000 we see a 
different character. [...] I think the new generation has more expertise about 
human rights [...] but lacks the experience of organizing the basis, like peasants, 
workers, or the urban poor. [...] So we have very skilful staff for dealing with the 
government and for legal drafting, but they have a very limited knowledge about 
society” (Interview Elsam, April 2008).
The NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia also resemble each other in the sense that 
volunteers are small in number and have a high level of education. In some 
organisations “nobody volunteers” (Partnership) or the number is “very minimal” 
(ISODEC). Usually these volunteers are “either fresh graduate students or students 
who are in their last semester doing an internship” (Interview PSHK, April 2008). Most 
of them stay for a limited period or become staff members. Besides domestic 
students, the NGOs also receive international graduate students (Abantu) or PhD 
candidates (KID) as volunteers. At the level of project implementation, the number of 
volunteers sometimes rises. Yappika can count on about twenty active students who 
“help organizing mass actions, they organise their friends and make banners” 
(Interview Yappika, April 2008), while Demos cooperates “with 32 key informants, 130 
local researchers, and about 1200 informants” to implement their research (Interview 
Demos, March 2008). However, although these volunteers perform valuable functions 
at project level, they have no influence within the organisational hierarchy. 
Context and Human Resources 
There are basically two ways of determining the context-specificity of human 
resources. One way would be to assess whether the people working for the NGOs 
reflect different societal groups. This is a difficult approach, as it requires defining 
important societal groups in Ghana and Indonesia, which are complex societies with 
multiple divisions between ethnic, religious, social and economic groups. A more 
practical approach would be to see whether they have staff members who maintain 
a link with society. Here we can use a (crude) distinction, which is often made in 
non-profit literature, between organisations that are dominated by professional staff 
and organisations that are dominated by volunteers and activists (Hwang & Powell, 
2009). While not being mutually exclusive, these categories draw a clear picture of, 
on the one hand, people who are motivated by a salary and are hired because of their 
expertise and, on the other hand, people who work for free and are motivated by their 
ideals. We would expect to find a mix of both: professionals who are hired to perform 
certain technical tasks to keep the organisation running, and volunteers and activists 
who have their feet on the ground and serve to strengthen the link with the communities 
they work for.
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 Both benchmarks indicate that our findings are not context-specific. In both 
Ghana and Indonesia the NGOs are dominated by professionals. More specifically, 
they are dominated by a group of highly trained academics, many of whom received 
education abroad. This means that instead of including a diversity of domestic 
groups, in both countries the NGOs are controlled by an academic elite. Even most 
of their volunteers resemble this elite profile. Furthermore, although volunteers 
perform some important functions at the level of project implementation, their 
influence at higher levels in the organisation is minimal. These findings also contrast 
with the importance of volunteerism in wider civil society in both countries, because 
at community level 84% of the Indonesians are performing volunteer work (Ibrahim, 
2006, p. 30) and in Ghana “civil society is characterised by a significant level of 
human resources (mainly volunteers) that work for NGOs operating at different levels, 
in both urban and rural settings” (Darkwa et al., 2006, p. 8).
Comparing Financial Resources
In terms of financial resources, neither Ghanaian nor Indonesian NGOs manage to 
raise enough income domestically to sustain their organisation. Interviewees named 
several sources of domestic income, namely membership dues, philanthropy and 
marketing expertise. As none of the organisations has an extensive membership, this 
provides no substantial source of income. In terms of philanthropy, we find some 
differences between Ghana and Indonesia. In Ghana, philanthropic gifts were 
virtually absent. In Indonesia, some organisations managed to get some, like PSHK 
whose building is “a donation from one of our founders”, but none of these gifts could 
cover the costs of day-to-day operations (Interview PSHK, March 2008). Finally, in 
both Ghana and Indonesia, most organisations generate some resources by “selling 
publications and professional expertise to other institutions” (Interview CDD, 
November 2007). During the 1990s, ISODEC raised about 40% of its income in this 
way. They were “doing service delivery and consultancies for the government”, but 
“when we shifted focus from service delivery to advocacy […] all of a sudden we lost 
all those contracts” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). Nowadays, none of the 
organisations manages to raise more than 20% of its income domestically. 
 Because of the lack of local revenues, “the bulk of finance comes from donor 
support” (Interview CDD, November 2007), and “most of our money comes from 
international relations” (Interview Yappika, April 2008). Despite differences in the 
number of donors, the types of donors (e.g., private aid agencies, bilateral or 
multilateral donors) and the amount of money they get, the organisations are united 
by the fact that none could survive in its current form without donor support. IDEG 
explains that in Ghana “most civil society organisations and most policy institutes 
depend upon foreign donors” and that without this foreign assistance they “could not 
be operating, because internal sources in Ghana are zero” (Interview IDEG, December 
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2007). In Indonesia the same story is told. According to the Asian Development Bank 
(Interview March 2008), “NGOs are very much donor-oriented [as] very few come up 
with their own money”, adding that “if the tap is closed I do not know what will happen 
to them”. Such financial problems are described as “a common problem”. 
Context and Financial Resources
In terms of financial resources, we could define context-specificity as the ability of an 
organisation to sustain itself locally without being dependent on international funding. 
In that case, the NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia would not be classified as being 
‘context-specific’ because of their donor-dependency. One might say that this finding 
is unsurprising as one of the selection criteria was that the NGOs receive donor 
funding. However, receiving donor funding does not necessarily imply donor- 
dependency. NGOs that receive funding still have the opportunity to reduce 
dependency by raising their own income. To see whether our findings really indicate 
a lack of context-specificity, we also need to look at the potential availability of 
domestic resources for NGOs. In that case the picture changes somewhat because 
the Indonesian context provides NGOs with more opportunities than the Ghanaian 
context.
 Domestic sources of income can take the form of private giving, charging 
membership fees and obtaining government subsidies (Wang, 2006). In general, 
Sub-Saharan Africa represents the least favourable region for local fundraising, 
whereas Asian developing countries have more favourable indicators. Although 
Ghana scores better on many indicators than other Sub-Saharan countries, it still 
scores lower than Indonesia (Kluijver, 2010). On average, Indonesians earn about 
three times more than Ghanaians, with a per capita income (purchasing power parity, 
2010) of US$4,300 compared to US$1,600.29 In both countries, wealth is spread 
unequally among the population, but because of the higher level of income, there is 
a smaller percentage of the population living below the poverty line in Indonesia 
(13%) than in Ghana (29%).30 The highest concentration of wealth can be found in 
urban centres on Java, such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta. These cities see a rising 
middle class with more disposable income (Asian Development Bank, 2010). Along 
with the growing wealth, there is a growing culture of corporate social responsibility, 
which creates opportunities for NGOs to raise funds (Ibrahim, 2006). Although Ghana 
has a comparable pattern of concentration of wealth in urban centres (mainly in the 
south), this has not yet translated into a stable urban middle class (Government of 
Ghana, 2007). Because of the widespread poverty, Ghanaians have less disposable 
income for membership dues or private donations to NGOs (Darkwa et al., 2006). In 
29 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World fact book 2011, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook [accessed May 2011].
30 Ibid.
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addition, there is virtually no culture of corporate philanthropy (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). 
Finally, state support as a source of income is hardly available in either Ghana or 
Indonesia. Although it is possible to get government contracts for social service 
delivery activities, it is very unlikely to receive funding for the more politically sensitive 
activity of promoting democracy (Darkwa et al., 2006; Ibrahim, 2006). Summing up, 
in Ghana, donor-dependency can be related to the absence of local resources, 
whereas this is not the case for Indonesia.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
The main aim of this chapter was to contribute to the debate by giving substance to 
the elusive concept of context-specificity. Based on our exploration, we have created 
a framework for judging the extent to which an NGO can be classified as context- 
specific. First, based on the premise that each country follows its own path to 
democracy and encounters different obstacles on its way, we expect these different 
obstacles to manifest themselves in the mission statements of the NGOs. In other 
words, a mission statement is context-specific when an NGO focuses on problems 
with democracy which are relevant for their country. Second, although the appropriate 
strategy (i.e. confrontational or non-confrontational) always depends on the specific 
situation, it is possible to say something more in general about strategy and context. 
Each country has its own type of (political) culture and state-society relations with a 
repertoire of acceptable and unacceptable ways of reacting to a problem. A strategy 
which works in Ghana might, for instance, be counter-productive in Indonesia. Third, 
based on the premise that NGOs act as vehicles for involving citizens, we link 
 context-specificity to having democratic structures which are open to membership 
participation of all kinds of citizens. In this sense we equate context-specificity with 
being open to societal input. Fourth, in terms of human resources we find a useful 
distinction in non-profit literature, namely between professionals and volunteers/
activists. Without becoming too deterministic, we would expect a context-specific 
NGO to not only work with professionals, but to also have some staff that maintains a 
link with society (broadly defined as volunteers and activists). Finally, raising your own 
income and independence from external donors are used as a benchmark for 
determining financial context-specificity. To this principle we add a ‘reality check’ by 
looking at various economic indicators which represent the potential for raising an 
income locally. 
 If we relate our empirical findings to this framework, we are presented with a 
mixed picture in terms of context-specificity. The different contexts in which the NGOs 
are situated are well reflected in their mission statements, so in that sense the 
organisations can be classified as being context-specific. When looking at strategy, 
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the non-confrontational approach of Ghanaian NGOs fits with the state-society 
relations, while this was not the case in Indonesia. The organisational structures of 
both Indonesian and Ghanaian NGOs lack context-specificity, as most have 
hierarchical structures which are closed to societal input. In terms of human resources, 
we find NGOs which mainly rely on professionals rather than on volunteers and 
activists. Finally, none of the NGOs is able to raise enough income locally to sustain 
its organisation. However, the resulting donor-dependence was more expected in 
Ghana than in Indonesia because of the lack of financial resources within the country. 
In summary, based on our framework, we can conclude that NGOs in Ghana are 
more in tune with their context than Indonesian NGOs. 
 At the same time, the similarities we find across both countries are striking. Apart 
from what they aim to achieve (mission), when looking at how they do it (strategy), 
who is doing it (human resources) and with what kind of structure and financial 
resources, context seems to be of no importance. Regardless of the context, the 
dominant organisational configuration is that of a hierarchic non-membership 
organisation, which is dependent on donors for its finances and owned and run by an 
academic elite with a bias for doing research and non-confrontational advocacy. The 
similarities between both countries are so strong that it seems as if the NGOs were 
cut from the same cloth. 
 How can we explain these similarities across such different contexts? One 
possible explanation might be the fact that all NGOs in our sample are donor- 
dependent. To shed light on this issue we need to elaborate on the aspect of financial 
resources. Within our framework, financial resources can be seen as an overarching 
aspect, potentially affecting the ‘context-specificity’ of all other organisational charac-
teristics. This is the case because finance directly relates to organisational autonomy. 
We can show how this works by translating the critiques of donor funding mentioned 
in the introduction into the terminology of our framework. These studies basically 
argue that donor-dependence and upward accountability have caused mission to 
follow money, structures and human resources to conform to particular organisational 
paradigms, and strategies to become less confrontational. One could say that do-
nor-dependence inhibits the danger of replacing context-specificity with donor-spec-
ificity. A pure donor-specific NGO would be a professional organisation (structure 
and human resources) which is able to apply and account for funding (financial 
resources), which reacts to donor priorities (mission), and which does not act in a way 
that puts donors in a difficult position (strategy). Although our analysis does not 
permit us to draw firm conclusions about the effect of donor-dependence on the 
organisational form of NGOs, our findings in Ghana and Indonesia seem to indicate 
a high degree of donor-specificity. So despite the pledge of donors to adapt their 
funding strategies to the local context and to promote local participation and 
ownership, this has not yet resulted in context-specific partner organisations. 
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Appendix 3.1: Overview of interview data
Overview of interview data Ghana
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Center for Democratic Development (CDD) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
11/30/2007
12/03/2007
12/11/2008
Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) NGO 3 persons / 
3 interviews
12/04/2007
12/05/2007
12/10/2008
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/11/2007
11/06/2008
12/12/2008
Integrated Social Development Center  
(ISODEC)
NGO 3 persons / 
5 interviews
12/06/2007
11/05/2008
11/10/2008
12/12/2008
Abantu for development NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/13/2007
11/06/2008
11/11/2008
GAPVOD (Umbrella organisation for 
Ghanaian NGOs)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
11/29/2007
IBIS Ghana International 
NGO
1 person / 
1 interview
12/14/2007
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/28/2007
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
01/23/2008
Ghana Research and Advocacy Program 
(G-RAP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/19/2007
Faculty of Law – University of Ghana University 1 person / 
1 interview
11/28/2007
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER)  – University of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/19/2007
Department of Political Science – University 
of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/26/2007
11/27/2007
Note: a total of 27 interviews with 21 respondents (one respondent works for both university and for one of 
the selected NGOs).
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Overview of interview data Indonesia
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Demos  - Centre for democracy and human 
rights studies
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
03/31/2008
Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies 
(PSHK)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Partnership for Democratic Governance 
Reform 
NGO 3 persons / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy 
(Elsam)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/07/2008
Yappika - The Civil Society Alliance for 
Democracy
NGO 3 persons / 
2 interviews
04/09/2008
Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID) NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/10/2008
Institute of Research, Education and 
Information of Social and Economic Affairs 
(LP3ES)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/04/2008
Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS)
NGO 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/19/2008
03/31/2008
NGO consultant Jakarta NGO expert 1 person / 
1 interview
03/18/2008
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
04/01/2008
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/26/2008
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
01/23/2008
Asian Development Bank (ADB) Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/25/2008
Faculty of Social and Political Science - 
Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta)
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/26/2008
04/02/2008
Center for Population and Policy Studies – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
2 interviews
03/11/2008
03/11/2009
Faculty of Social and Political Science – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
1 interview
04/20/2009
Note: a total of 20 interviews with 22 respondents.
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Abstract
In the field of civil society and democracy promotion, the relevance and effectiveness 
of donor strategies is often linked to their ability to adjust to local contextual factors. 
Despite the importance attached to tailor-made approaches, donor-sponsored 
democracy promoting NGOs in such different parts of the world as Ghana and 
Indonesia have very similar organisational characteristics. This paper explores the 
question of why they are so similar. We draw on institutional theory and use the 
concepts of organisational field and organisational isomorphism to illustrate how 
different pressures result in the homogenisation of organisational characteristics. We 
find that besides the more commonly identified unequal power relation between 
donor and recipient, homogenisation also stems from the NGOs themselves and 
from the relation between their various organisational characteristics (i.e. mission, staff, 
strategy and structure). Furthermore, we argue that the process of homogenisation 
can be seen as the institutionalisation of trust between donor and recipient. In our 
discussion we reflect on what our findings mean for donor support to NGOs and 
democracy.
Keywords 
Civil society, democracy, organisational isomorphism, international development aid, 
Ghana, Indonesia.
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4.1 Introduction
In the 1990s the international aid system embraced civil society organisations such 
as NGOs as the panacea for democracy and development. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, they were welcomed “as an antidote to state expansion” (Fowler, 
2000, p. 7) and “as the seedbeds of democracy” (Sørensen, 1993, p. 57). A critical 
and vibrant civil society was generally perceived as a positive force for democracy 
(Ottaway & Carothers, 2000a). The many desirable functions of NGOs include serving 
as a check on state power, fostering public deliberation, helping to include the poor 
and marginalised, educating citizens on the norms and values of democracy, and 
being able to cater to local circumstances and local needs (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 
2004; Fowler, 2000; Hendriks, 2006; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Warren, 2001).
 This positive image deteriorated when studies from around the world showed 
that many donor-funded NGOs were not able to live up to these high expectations. 
Moreover, they linked this failure to the nature of the international aid system. Donor- 
funding had various negative effects such as accountability to donors instead of 
constituencies, NGOs maintaining rather than challenging the status quo, and NGOs 
following donor priorities rather than their own (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Fagan, 2005; 
Hearn, 2000, 2007; Henderson, 2002; Parks, 2008). In addition, several authors 
noted the tendency of donors to apply blueprint approaches and enforce a particular 
Western organisational paradigm in very different countries (Blaug, 2002; Easterly, 
2006; Evans, 2004). The outcome of these processes was that donor-sponsored 
NGOs around the world started resembling each other, a phenomenon which has 
been described by several names, such as ‘NGOisation’ (Alvarez, 1999) and 
‘institutional monocropping’ (Evans, 2004).
 The aid system has been identified as an important factor in causing NGOs to 
homogenise. It is “a powerful structural force, impacting organisational landscapes 
and civil societies all over the world in complex ways we do not yet understand” 
(Tvedt, 2002, p. 363). This lack of understanding is often linked to a lack of value-free 
systematic academic research on NGOs (Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; Mercer, 2002; 
Opoku-Mensah, 2007; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000a). Opoku-Mensah (2007, p. 13) for 
instance, argues that NGO research “has remained largely normative and ‘action- 
oriented’, paying relatively little attention to questions of power”. To incorporate these 
questions of power, an analytical approach is needed which recognises that NGOs 
in developing countries do not necessarily express the societal needs and values of 
the country, but often “mirror the needs and values expressed at donor conferences” 
(Tvedt, 2007, p. 45).
 This study aims to contribute to our understanding of why NGOs are so similar 
by looking at how donor-funding affects the concrete organisational characteristics of 
NGOs (their mission, staff, strategy and structure). We analyse these processes for 
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donor-sponsored NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia. The analysis in chapter 3 has 
shown that the NGOs are strikingly similar in their organisational characteristics 
despite major contextual differences. This study builds on the outcomes of that 
analysis and focuses on finding an explanation for such similarities.
 We look at mission, staff, strategy, and structure because these are the 
organisational characteristics for which (in theory) it would be logical to find 
differences rather than similarities between NGOs from different countries. Like all 
formal organisations, NGOs “need structures for defining goals, making decisions, 
mobilizing resources and directing resources towards goals” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 316). 
Successful organisations, i.e. the ones that survive, have a structure and a strategy 
that best serve the purpose of the organisation and are consistent with the environment 
in which it operates (Mintzberg, 1983). For NGOs this means that they need to adapt 
their “mission, their functions and their structures” to the social and political context 
in which they operate (Diamond, 1999, p. 230). Based on these ideas, one would not 
expect to find many similarities between NGOs from different continents.
 To uncover the processes stimulating the homogenisation of organisations we 
use the concepts of institutional isomorphism and organisational fields (Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995, 
2008). These concepts have been widely applied in business, non-profit and 
administrative science literature to tackle questions of organisational similarity (see 
for instance: Benders, Batenburg, & van der Blonk, 2006; D’Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 
1991; Dacin, 1997; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Reay & Hinings, 
2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In contrast, there are only a few empirical studies on 
development NGOs devoted to this phenomenon (these include: Aksartova, 2009; 
Ebrahim, 2002, 2005; Ramanath, 2009). None of these studies, however, uses 
variation in context as a starting point for their analysis. For our analysis this is 
important because, as Ghana and Indonesia are such different countries, we 
minimised the chance that the similarities in organisational characteristics are actually 
caused by similarities in the social, cultural, economic and political environments.
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we explain our 
research methodology and summarise the outcomes of our previous analysis of the 
Ghanaian and Indonesian democracy promoting NGOs. Second, we introduce the 
concepts of organisational field and institutional isomorphism. Third, we show that in 
both the Ghanaian and Indonesian organisational fields, international actors have 
become more important for NGO survival than national actors. Fourth, we use the 
notion of institutional isomorphism to analyse how donor-dependency affects the 
organisational characteristics of NGOs in terms of mission, staff, strategy and 
structure. We find that besides the more often identified imposition of rules and 
regulations by donors, there are many more subtle processes stimulating 
homogenisation, which are not necessarily imposed by donors. We conclude our 
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empirical analysis with a flowchart showing the various forces at work, and more 
importantly, how they are interrelated and reinforce each other. In our discussion we 
reflect on what our findings mean for donors wishing to support NGOs and 
democracy.
 
4.2 Data and methods
The chapter is based on extensive fieldwork in Ghana (Accra) and Indonesia (Jakarta) 
between November 2007 and April 2009. The fieldwork consists of 47 in-depth 
interviews with 43 respondents, principally with directors, researchers and founding 
members of the NGOs. To balance their stories, interviews were conducted with local 
experts, i.e. political scientists, NGO consultants and representatives of major bi- and 
multilateral donor agencies in the country (for an overview see appendix 4.1). In 
addition to interview data, the analysis uses the annual reports, funding reports, 
internal documents, and websites and publications of the selected NGOs. All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and subsequently analysed through a process 
of thematic coding in the software package Atlas.ti. 
 The research was organised so as to maximise the chance of finding different 
NGOs by looking in two different parts of the world. The underlying idea was that 
democracy and civil society are context-specific phenomena and that supporting 
them therefore requires a tailor-made approach (Howell & Pearce, 2001). To study the 
NGOs within their specific contexts, the research employed a comparative case 
study design. By contrasting the contexts, it is possible to examine how different 
conditions cause different outcomes of the phenomenon (Yin, 2003). Ghana and 
Indonesia represent the different contexts and the democratisation NGOs represent 
the phenomenon. 
 We found that the Ghanaian and Indonesian NGOs are very similar despite major 
contextual differences. Although mission statements echo national differences, there 
are remarkable similarities in terms of strategies, structures and resources. Regardless 
of the context, the dominant organisational form is that of a hierarchic non-membership 
organisation (structure), which is dependent on donors for its finances (financial 
resources) and which is owned and run by an academic elite (staff) that focuses on 
doing research and non-confrontational lobby and advocacy work, such as organizing 
seminars, roundtables and debates (strategy). This contrasts with the image of an 
‘ideal’ democracy promoting NGO, which is financially independent, has a leadership 
that is elected by and accountable to its members, is open to membership 
participation in the process of decision-making, has a membership that is open to all 
kinds of citizens, and can act as a countervailing power because confrontational 
advocacy tactics such as mass demonstrations are also part of its repertoire. We 
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conclude that despite the pledge of donors to adapt their funding strategies to the 
local context and to promote local participation and ownership, their partner 
organisations do not conform to this ideal (Kamstra, Knippenberg, & Schulpen, 
2013). This paper builds on this study by exploring the role of donor funding in the 
similarities we encountered.
 The NGOs have been selected by means of criterion sampling (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). It is a qualitative sample, and as such it is not randomised and not representative 
in statistical terms. The purpose of this sampling technique is to capture the variety of 
a phenomenon within the boundaries of the criteria. Three criteria guided the 
selection. The first criterion was that the NGOs work in the field of promoting (aspects 
of) democracy. The second criterion was that they are supported by international 
donors, which ensures that they are in fact related to the international aid system. 
Although we did not restrict our selection to one type of donor, bi- and multilateral 
agencies such as the UNDP, USAID, SIDA are the most prominent donors behind the 
selected NGOs.31 Furthermore, it is important to note here that the level of donor- 
dependency was not part of the second selection criterion, i.e. high donor-dependency 
was an outcome, not an input. The third criterion was that the aforementioned local 
experts had to consider them to be important players in the field of democratisation 
in their country. Based on these criteria, a shortlist of organisations was compiled 
which captured a diverse group in terms of the focus, age and size of the organisation. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview.
4.3  Organisational fields, institutional isomorphism 
and democracy promoting NGOs
Within the field of organisational institutionalism the concepts of organisational field 
and isomorphism are used to explain how and why organisations tend to become 
more similar over time. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified the socially constructed 
‘organisational field’ as the context in which the process of homogenisation takes 
place.  An organisational field refers to “those organisations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar 
services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Scott (1995, p. 56) rephrased 
it into “a community of organisations that partakes of a common meaning system 
and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than 
31 Some of the NGOs are also supported by other types of donors, such as foundations and private aid 
agencies. ISODEC for instance has a long term funding relation with the NGO Oxfam NOVIB, and 
Elsam is supported by a consortium of international NGOs, including EED (Germany), MISEREOR 
(Germany), HIVOS (Netherlands) and 11.11.11 (Belgium).
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with actors outside the field”. Both definitions emphasise a group of organisations in 
a shared institutional environment, but Scott’s definition adds the importance of 
field-level interactions. 
 Field-level interactions are important because they are both the cause and the 
effect of the institutionalisation of an organisational field. On the one hand, interacting 
organisations develop common understandings and practices which in time structure 
the rules and resources of the organisational field, and, on the other hand, the rules 
and resources of the field shape and guide field-level interactions (Phillips, Lawrence, 
& Hardy, 2000). These interactions do not necessarily produce a stable equilibrium. 
Organisational fields are simultaneously characterised by continuity and change, 
because there is a shared interest of key actors in preserving and reproducing the 
field, while at the same time there is an endless struggle over dominating the field and 
its resources (Borum, 2004). Besides intra-field conflicts, there can also be inter-field 
conflicts, that is, organisations can be part of different organisational fields and as 
such be faced with conflicting institutional demands. When faced with conflicting 
demands, organisations will usually respond to the strongest and most important 
one for their survival (D’Aunno et al., 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). 
 The organisational field provides the context for the process of organisational 
homogenisation which DiMaggio and Powell (1983, pp. 194-152) termed institutional 
isomorphism. Some argue that isomorphism is the result of a competitive struggle 
between organisations. The environment can sustain only a limited number of 
organisational set-ups, so non-isomorphic organisations are selected against 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977). In contrast, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that 
organisations tend to be isomorphic because they incorporate institutional rules 
which function as rationalised myths in society. Organisations do so because it 
increases their legitimacy, their access to resources and, as such, their chances of 
survival, even if the adopted practices and procedures are not directly conducive to 
the core activity of the organisation. In other words, adaptation is important because 
it increases legitimacy rather than performance. 
 Three mechanisms drive isomorphic change: coercive isomorphism, mimetic 
isomorphism and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive 
isomorphism stems from unequal power relations. The formal and informal rules and 
expectations of powerful actors can have a strong homogenising effect on the groups 
of organisations who depend upon them. The most powerful actor in this respect is 
usually the state. Failure to comply with the rules can result in punishment, loss of 
resources and/or loss of legitimacy. Mimetic isomorphism is the result of uncertainty. 
In fields where it is difficult to measure performance, there are no clear indicators for 
what is the best or most desirable practice. Organisations react to this uncertainty by 
attempting to model themselves after organisations in their field that are perceived to 
be successful and legitimate. Finally, normative isomorphism is related to the concept 
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of professionalisation. Organisations conform to what is perceived to be the right 
thing to do. Two main sources of professionalisation are formal education and the 
growth and elaboration of professional networks and bodies. Both instil individuals 
with almost identical norms and values about best practices. Coercive isomorphism 
is the result of vertical relations between organisations, whereas mimetic and 
normative isomorphism stem from horizontal relations between peers (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008). 
 The concepts of organisational field and organisational isomorphism have not 
often been used to describe the aid system. Nevertheless, they are very relevant for 
understanding some of the existing structures and processes which lead to the 
homogenisation of actors within this field. If we take the perspective of democratisation 
NGOs, we can identify several important actors within their organisational field, 
namely the state, citizens, fellow NGOs and international donor agencies. With each 
type of actor, both horizontal and vertical relations are possible, and interaction with 
these actors can initiate all three forms of isomorphism. The state can be seen as a 
regulatory agency, but also as a target for NGOs advocacy activities, and sometimes 
even as a ‘customer’ of NGO service delivery, research and/or consultancy. Similarly, 
international donors can impose rules and regulations which accompany funding, 
but can also be strategic partners and ‘customers’ of NGO service delivery, research 
and/or consultancy. Citizens can be passive, as constituents, customers or targets of 
the NGOs. At the same time they can also be active, as the members (or even 
owners), volunteers, supporters or financial contributors to NGOs. Finally, fellow 
NGOs can be important as partners, as competitors or as donors. 
 All these actors put different demands on NGOs, but the strongest demands 
come from actors which can influence the survival of the NGOs. As Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) have pointed out, organisations adapt to gain legitimacy and access to 
resources and to thereby increase their chances of survival. In other words, either 
adaptation will bring rewards (resources/legitimacy), or lack of adaptation will have 
negative consequences for an NGO (loss of resources/legitimacy). In the next section 
we will shortly evaluate the importance of each actor for NGOs in terms of resources 
and legitimacy.
4.4  Shifting importance from national to international 
actors for NGO survival
The state is not an important actor for NGOs in terms of resources, as state support 
is hardly available in either Ghana or Indonesia. While in many European countries 
the government is one of the biggest financers of NGO activities, this pattern does 
not apply to poorer countries (Wang, 2006). In Indonesia, state support is unlikely 
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because state-civil society relations are characterised by a sense of mutual suspicion 
and distrust, which had been building up in the decade before the fall of Suharto in 
1998 (Hadiwinata, 2004). Many NGOs opposed the hegemony of the Indonesian 
state (Clarke, 1998). State officials therefore generally see civil society actors as 
destabilising, and many NGOs still perceive the state as an adversary (Ibrahim, 
2006). In Ghana, state-civil society relations also started out from low levels of mutual 
trust, but since the transition to democracy there has been a growing space for 
interaction between NGO leaders, government officials and even activists (Darkwa et 
al., 2006). This has not translated into government funding for NGOs, however, as the 
government itself is underfunded. Although it is possible to get government contracts 
for social service delivery activities, NGOs are very unlikely to receive funding for the 
more politically sensitive activity of promoting democracy (Darkwa et al., 2006; 
Ibrahim, 2006).
 Conforming to state demands is mainly important in terms of legitimacy. In both 
Ghana and Indonesia the state has long been the most powerful actor, regulating 
and controlling NGO activity. Both countries have a history of NGO repression. During 
the military regimes of Suharto (Indonesia) and Rawlings (Ghana), only de-politicised 
NGO activities such as relief and community welfare activities were permitted. All 
other independent NGO activity was looked upon with suspicion and vocal NGOs 
were actively repressed or co-opted (Gyimah-Boadi & Oquaye, 2000; Hadiwinata, 
2004). To fight for democracy in such a context is dangerous and NGOs adopted 
non-confrontational tactics in order to avoid persecution. In Indonesia, NGOs had to 
act like chameleons and adopt the state ideology as their own ideology (Hadiwinata, 
2004). In short, to be able to exist (at least officially), conforming to state demands 
was of utmost importance.
 Although NGOs still need to conform to the rules and regulations of the state, 
the rules have become less restrictive. As a result, the influence of the state over the 
shape and direction of NGOs has decreased considerably. Towards the end of the 
military regimes in Ghana and Indonesia, societal groups became more vocal, 
openly confronting the regimes with demands for change. In both countries, the 
transition to democracy opened the space for NGOs to pursue their own agendas 
and have their own ideologies. Currently, the legal framework of both countries allows for 
many different organisational forms, both membership and non-membership, centralised 
or decentralised and formal or informal organisations, to exist. Furthermore, in terms of 
strategies, in both Ghana and Indonesia non-confrontational as well as confrontational 
forms of advocacy are allowed (Darkwa et al., 2006; Ibrahim, 2006). In other words, 
the state allows for a lot more variation in organisational characteristics than the 
actual variation encountered. 
 In Ghana and Indonesia NGOs do not depend upon each other for survival. 
Fellow NGOs could be important for survival if they are gatekeepers for access to 
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various kinds of resources such as funding and network resources (i.e. contacts with 
politicians). In times of repression in particular, survival can also depend upon 
collaboration with groups of like-minded and trusted organisations. Although some 
of the NGOs in our sample are gatekeepers for access to resources with regard to 
partner organisations at the local level, this is not the case at the national level. At the 
national level, the democratisation NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia can be 
considered as peers. They have interdependencies, either as competitors and/or 
partners, but they do not directly rely upon each other for resources or legitimacy. 
Collaboration for survival is also not as necessary as there is no systematic repression. 
 Citizens can be important actors for the survival of NGOs both in terms of 
resources and legitimacy. As (active) members, as volunteers and as financial 
contributors they have the potential to influence the shape and direction of an 
organisation. During the democratic turnover in Indonesia especially, citizen 
participation in NGOs played an important role (Schwarz, 1999). Nowadays, however, 
citizens have no major part to play in them. This becomes very clear if we look at the 
organisational constellation of the NGOs in our sample. They are hierarchically 
structured (mostly) non-membership based organisations, working with a professional 
staff, using (mostly) non-confrontational strategies and depending on donors for 
most of their income. In other words, citizens are not active as members, they are 
hardly ever used as volunteers because NGOs work with professionals, they are 
rarely mobilised as supporters in mass protest actions to legitimise NGO claims 
because NGOs employ non-confrontational advocacy strategies, and finally, citizens 
are not used for contributions as the money comes from donors.
 International donors are currently the single most important actors for the survival 
of the selected NGOs, both in terms of legitimacy and resources. None of the NGOs 
manages to raise more than 20% of their income locally. In contrast, donors provide 
substantial resources which would have otherwise been unavailable to NGOs in 
Ghana and Indonesia. In order to access these resources, NGOs need to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of donors. This puts donors in a position to exert a lot of 
influence over NGOs because lack of adaptation to donor requirements risks the loss 
of legitimacy and funding.
 The source of homogenisation can now be pinpointed by going back to the 
notions of organisational field and conflicting field demands. NGOs in both Ghana 
and Indonesia can be pictured as part of a national and an international organisational 
field. The two most prominent forces which could have rooted NGOs in their national 
organisational field, and which could have caused NGOs to organise differently in 
Ghana and Indonesia, are the state and citizens. These actors could have confronted 
NGOs with important demands. In the current setting, however, national demands 
have been largely absent. The state has the power to make demands, but their 
regulation is not very restrictive anymore. Citizens can make demands, but as NGOs 
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do not depend upon them for their survival, these demands are not of crucial 
importance. In contrast, demands from international donors are crucial for the survival 
of NGOs. 
4.5  Donor-dependence and the process of 
homogenisation
Our field-level analysis firmly points to international donors as a potential source of 
homogenisation. This finding is not particularly new as we know that donors “are 
positioned to influence nonprofit mission and activity […] because of their close 
control of the financial resources or inputs needed by nonprofits to survive” (Frumkin 
& Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 290), and “civil society organisations often have to alter their 
missions and characters to obtain such incomes” (Wang, 2006, p. 25). Our analysis 
adds that this position of international donor has to be related to the absence or 
weakness of national actors and their demands. Furthermore, although donor-funding 
has been pointed out as a source of homogenisation, we do not have a detailed 
understanding of how this process works. This section therefore analyses how 
 donor-dependence affects the way NGOs organise in terms of their mission, their 
structure, their staff and their strategy. Besides the direct imposition of rules and 
regulations, homogenisation can also be the result of more subtle and less explicit 
forces at work (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is especially important to unravel these 
indirect forces because they are key to understanding the process of homogenisation 
and the role of both donors and NGOs in it.
Mission, agenda setting and the importance of language
Although the mission statements of the NGOs relate to different problems in Ghana 
and Indonesia, the terminology they use to frame their work is very similar. Consider 
for instance the mission of the Indonesian NGO Partnership:
“Disseminating, advancing and institutionalizing the principles of good and 
clean governance among government, civil society and business, while 
considering human rights, gender balance, the marginalised and environmental 
sustainability.”32
Compare it with the mission of the IEA in Ghana:
32 Partnership for Governance Reform, vision and mission, available at: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/vision- 
and-mission [accessed January 2013].
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“Our mission is to promote good governance, democracy and a free and fair 
market economy. We believe that the creation of an environment in which 
economic, social, political and legal institutions function openly and freely is the 
key to sustainable economic growth and human development.”33 
Both rely heavily on what Craig and Porter (2006) call ‘NGO terminology’, which is 
common in Western debates on (neoliberal) democracy and development and 
features terms like ‘sustainability’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘good governance’. 
 Having a mission statement and using the right language is important for getting 
access to funding. For instance, the term ‘good governance’ can be found in mission 
statements in both Ghana and Indonesia. According to one respondent this is not 
strange because “good governance is the mantra. If you use the word good 
governance, you can make money” (Interview NGO consultant Jakarta, March 2008). 
Similarly, one Indonesian NGO director notes that finding support “is not always easy 
because we have to find the right language. I mean, maybe our ideas are in line with 
what they want, but sometimes we have to find the right language in the proposal” 
(Interview PSHK, April 2008). In Jakarta you can hire people who are specialised in 
proposal writing to make sure you use the right language. This strategy of framing is 
a good example of how isomorphism can work indirectly. It is not something which is 
directly imposed on the NGOs by donors, but NGOs choose to adopt it in order to get 
access to resources. 
 Besides adopting donor language, in Ghana we find some evidence of NGOs 
adopting each other’s language and programmatic focus to get access to funding. 
There are three policy think-tanks (IEA, CDD and IDEG) with almost identical mission 
statements, namely to promote “democracy and good governance” in Ghana. 
Furthermore, the kind of programmes they implement to attain this mission also 
resemble each other. One respondent expressed frustration about this copying 
behaviour:
“If you are working in training parliamentarians, suddenly everybody thinks let’s 
also go into parliament. […] Whereas you could collaborate and get better 
results, people are just doing very similar things” (Interview NGO Ghana, 
December 2007).34
Later on in the interview, the respondent explains that it is the strong competition for 
funding and the resulting distrust between the NGOs which hampers collaboration 
and stimulates duplication. This could be explained by the fact that it is difficult to 
measure performance in the field of democratisation. This introduces a lot of 
33 Institute of Economic Affairs, vision and mission, available at: www.ieagh.org [accessed January 2013]. 
34 Anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.
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uncertainty for an NGO, which needs to show its donors that what it is doing is 
relevant. Therefore, modelling oneself after a successful peer can be used as a 
strategy to gain legitimacy and access to resources. In the case of these three 
think-tanks, the link between the three is very direct because some of IEA’s former 
employees went on to become founding members of IDEG and CDD.
 Earmarking is the name given to the most direct form of interference by donors 
with the mission and programmatic focus of an NGO. Many of the NGOs in Indonesia 
observe the tendency of donors to earmark more of their funding. In this way they 
directly influence what an NGO should do in order to get funding. According to one 
respondent, donors used to be more flexible, but nowadays “they are more concerned 
that we use the money for a particular issue like the poverty issue or the issue of 
pluralism” (Interview Elsam, April 2008). The tendency of donors to spend their 
money according to their own priorities also affects a big institution like Partnership:
“In the donor coordination meeting they usually present their programmes, their 
priorities. We can have some information on that […] and then we basically draft 
our proposals based on their guidelines” (Interview Partnership, April 2008).
Crawford (2003) argues that international donors played an active role in setting 
Partnership’s agenda, not only by putting certain topics on the agenda, but also by 
keeping some sensitive issues off the agenda, like the role of the military. While 
respondents in Ghana did not use the term earmarking, the processes they describe 
are very similar:
“I still believe that there are donors who push the agenda. You can send your 
strategic plan and if they are not interested they won’t give you anything. You 
know, they will still try to tilt it a little bit to themselves” (Interview IEA, December 
2007).
ISODEC mentioned that their most important donor (Oxfam Novib) changed their 
focus to other West-African countries, “to make ourselves relevant to Oxfam Novib, 
we had to develop a programme that had West-Africa as a focus”. Not conforming to 
what donors want is risky, because “if what you are doing does not fall within their 
priorities, they can decide to stop funding at any time and then they just leave you 
hanging there” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). This clearly illustrates the 
impact of donor-dependence: if there are no other funding-sources available, you 
have to adapt your organisation to suit donor demands or face bankruptcy. 
 These processes put NGOs between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, 
they want to keep their integrity, pursue their own mission and set their own agendas, 
while on the other hand they need money to sustain their organisations. Throughout 
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the interviews with the NGO directors, researchers and project managers in both 
Ghana and Indonesia, a similar pattern kept returning. Respondents would state that 
their organisation pursues its own agenda and deny following donor demands, while 
later on in the interview they would acknowledge or vent their frustration about the 
influence of donors on their agenda. The following quote of a Ghanaian NGO staff 
member shows this struggle in a nutshell:
“We don’t go in the direction of where the wind is blowing. Because sometimes 
there is a lot of money out there, but you would have to alter your mandate to be 
able to access it. We don’t shift our agenda to be able to access funding” 
(Interview Abantu, December 2008).
Nevertheless, the same respondent also states that:
“A lot of times, if we had our own way, we would do things differently. A lot of 
times we wish we did not have to take anybody’s money to work with” (Interview 
Abantu, December 2008).
 The NGOs are not powerless however. They use several strategies to reduce the 
influence of donors (Elbers & Schulpen, 2011). First, they attempt to avoid being 
dependent on one donor by seeking support from multiple donors. This is especially 
an issue for KID, which relies on the Netherlands Institute of Multiparty Democracy 
(NIMD) for most of its funds. As a result, “sustainability is a big challenge, and I think 
we are now trying to expand the possibility of funding from other donors, in order to 
anticipate this question of sustainability” (interview KID, April 2008). Second, they can 
approach the donors that are most likely to fund their activities. This is how Demos 
operates: “Following our agenda, we have to see which donor agencies have a track 
record in doing this kind of work. We try to approach them and to convince them 
about the importance of these programmes” (Interview Demos, March 2008). Third, 
they try to earn some of their own income, mostly by selling their expertise through 
consultancy work for the government. Finally, the use of donor language can also be 
a strategy to reduce donor influence. By defining a broad mission, which “deals with 
democracy and good governance”, CDD anticipates shifts in donor focus. This kind 
of mission statement captures many different topics, like “transparency, representation, 
participation, integrity and nowadays the topic of decentralisation. So at any point in 
time most of the focus of donor support will align nicely with the CDD objective” 
(Interview CDD, December 2007). This last strategy can be labelled as a form of 
decoupling because it functions as a buffering strategy which enables the NGO to 
protect the core of their work from external influence (Ebrahim, 2002, p. 104). 
Nevertheless, at CDD they also argue that the bottom line remains that “there is a 
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power relation when somebody is supporting you”, which means there will always be 
“a limit to the extent in which you can make significant input and change the direction 
of whatever proposal the donor is making” (Interview CDD, December 2007).
Professional staff as outcome and driver of isomorphism
In terms of personnel the NGOs are dominated by an (often) internationally educated 
academic elite. On the one hand, donors actively contribute to this by encouraging 
their partner organisations to hire high quality staff. The Ghana Research and 
Advocacy Program (G-RAP)35 provides a good example. This consortium of bilateral 
donors, which provides funding to all the Ghanaian NGOs in our sample, states in its 
mid-term review that the organisations they fund should be “more able to attract, 
retain, motivate and develop capable staff” and that with this staff NGOs will be able 
to “generate high quality evidence-based research based on robust primary 
sources”.36 According to one respondent, donors can be very rigid in this respect:
“Some of their requirements are quite constraining. For example you know a very 
good economist without a PhD, but they say they want an economist with a PhD. 
[…] You end up picking an inexperienced PhD. […] They have very rigid 
requirements, and you have to fit” (Interview IDEG, December 2007).
On the other hand, NGOs use acquiring qualified staff as a strategy to gain the trust 
of donors, because: “I believe that if we have a high quality of work, then many donors 
will trust us” (Interview PSHK, April 2008). This trust is needed not only to gain funding, 
but also to account for it. One interviewee claims, for instance, that “you need very 
qualified chartered accountants to be able to report to your donors” (Interview CDD, 
December 2008). The opposite is also true, if you are not able to hire competent staff, 
donors might lose their trust. One organisation which struggles with this problem is 
ISODEC. Due to a lack of finances they experience problems hiring and retaining 
highly educated staff, which complicates their ability to meet donor requirements.37
 Again the issue of language is important. If you do not speak the language of the 
donor, you will not be able to access funding. For the NGOs it is important to have 
staff members who “graduated from European or American universities. They can 
write a proposal in good English and present it in a very sophisticated PowerPoint. 
Without that you cannot get any money” (Interview NGO consultant Jakarta, 2008). 
Furthermore, it is one thing to speak English, but it is another thing to be able to relate 
to the international debates on good governance, democratisation, legal reform and 
35  Currently G-RAP is called STAR-Ghana.
36 Internal document: Brown, D. and Atampugre, N. Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme 
(G-RAP): Mid-term Review 2004-6. Accra: G-RAP; 2007, p. 9-10.
37 Internal document: ISODEC. Narrative Progress Report: July – December 2005. Accra: G-RAP; 2006.
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gender mainstreaming. In this respect it greatly helps NGOs that many of their staff 
members studied these subjects abroad and are educated in the terminology used 
by donors. An additional advantage is that because of their expertise and their ability 
to justify their work in donor terminology, professionals strengthen the bargaining 
position of NGOs in relation to their funders (Ebrahim, 2002). 
 Having a highly educated staff which speaks the ‘donor language’ also has its 
drawbacks. According to one respondent, the problem with NGO staff in Jakarta is 
that “it has become too elite” and as a result:
“Their language is not something that people understand. […] For instance, it is 
very difficult to use the word good governance in Indonesian. People don’t 
understand what it is, it is very difficult for you to sell the governance issues. We 
have an Indonesian translation, but what does it really mean?” (Interview Asian 
Development Bank, March 2008).
In other words, the disadvantage of using donor terminology is that it alienates local 
constituencies. Furthermore, it indicates that donors end up sponsoring NGOs which 
are led by a quite homogenous group of local elites who know each other very well. 
In Accra “everybody knows everybody” (Interview IEA, December 2007) and in 
Jakarta “it is a small development world. So if you draft a proposal, you would meet 
the same persons all over again” (Interview Partnership, April 2008). This reduces the 
plurality of inputs and increases the chances of copying behaviour. Thus one donor 
notes: “There are so many actors now in the governance scene, working on very 
similar areas” (Interview UNDP, April 2008).
 As pointed out by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), education is an important source 
of homogenisation. Through education, people internalise shared norms and 
terminology which makes it easier for them to communicate with each other. The fact 
that most of the NGO personnel have a university education and that many studied 
in donor-countries is a strong sign of normative isomorphism. Education and profes-
sionalisation does not only influence the language the staff use, but also their 
perception of the world, its problems and the kind of solutions available to these 
problems (mission and strategy). A group of academics in Jakarta or Accra will define 
different problems and goals than a group of farmers or urban poor in the same 
country. In the next section we show that this is also the case for strategy.
Strategy follows support and education
Besides influencing the focus areas of NGOs, donor-funding also influences the kind 
of strategies NGOs use to tackle these topics. In Ghana for instance, in order to be 
able to get funding from the aforementioned G-RAP programme, an organisation 
must employ the strategy of research and advocacy. Furthermore, our finding that 
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confrontational advocacy strategies, such as mass protest actions, are less utilised 
indicates that they are not popular among the selected NGOs. There are several 
reasons why they would rather employ non-confrontational strategies. First, and 
unrelated to donor-funding, many of the NGOs have close relations with the state 
officials they try to influence and resorting to confrontational advocacy would therefore 
damage their access to the state. Second, many of the bi- and multilateral donor 
agencies also cooperate with the state. NGOs that are funded by these donors do 
not use confrontational strategies towards the state because, as Partnership in 
Indonesia points out, their donors “would not approve of it” (Interview Partnership, 
April 2008). Because of their frequent high-level interactions with both the international 
community and the state, it is not in Partnership’s interest to put both themselves and 
their donors in a difficult position with regards to the state. Third, donors can have 
their own sensitivities, like an NGO which mentioned that it was not allowed to 
advocate against Canadian companies because it received funding from CIDA.
 The kind of strategies organisations pursue is also influenced by the process of 
professionalisation. The Indonesian NGO Elsam provides a good example of how 
professionalisation of staff affects the way you work:
 
“Before, we had the activists from the 90s generation, but since 2000 we see a 
different character. […] I think the new generation has more expertise about 
human rights […] but they lack the experience of organizing the basis, like 
peasants, workers, or the urban poor. [...] So we have a staff which is very skilful 
in dealing with the government and which has very much experience in legal 
drafting, but they have a very limited knowledge about society” (Interview Elsam, 
April 2008).
This shows that having a highly educated staff produces a bias with regard to the 
type of problems that are being tackled and with regard to how they are tackled. 
While activists might seek to mobilise the community, academics would probably 
prefer to organise a seminar with government officials. This bias reinforces itself 
because it also works the other way around. To attain a certain mission and execute 
a certain strategy, you need a staff which is capable of doing so. So when your 
mission is to promote good governance and attain this by doing research and 
advocating the results at high level seminars and roundtables with government 
officials, you will need to employ a highly educated staff.
Organisational structure and upward accountability
In terms of organisational structure we do not find any evidence of the direct 
interference of donors. Donor-dependence does have an indirect effect, however. 
In both Ghana and Indonesia the dominant organisational structure is that of a 
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hierarchical non-membership organisation. For some NGOs there are signs that their 
structure is the result of mimicking peers, like the three very similar think-tanks in 
Ghana, or of mimicking donors, like the Indonesian NGO Partnership which mimics 
the departmentalisation of their most important donor the UNDP (Interview UNDP, 
April 2008). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily explain the general absence of 
members. 
 The absence of members can be best explained by our earlier observation that 
they are not crucial for NGO survival. This is exactly what Abantu experienced when 
they wanted to set up a membership-based organisation:
 “We tried to establish a self-sustaining membership organisation, called Netright, 
but the membership dues could not sustain it. We had to turn to donors, and 
once you become dependent, the social-movement character of your 
organisation is compromised […] then you become more of an NGO” (Interview 
Abantu, December 2007).
Another respondent explains why becoming donor-dependent causes an NGO to 
lose touch with its constituency:
“A lot of these NGOs rely on donors. Therefore they should be accountable to the 
donor who gives them money, but they should also be accountable to their 
constituencies. A lot of these NGOs don’t have a clear constituency, and they 
don’t have a strong feeling that they should be accountable to their constituencies. 
They are serving the donor more, and that is why they are busy with this report 
on good governance rather than looking at what it really means for the people” 
(Interview Asian Development Bank, March 2008). 
It basically means that once an NGO applies for funding, the rigorous tasks of 
proposal writing and conforming to upward accountability standards shift the attention 
away from constituencies and towards donors. Democratic membership and downward 
accountability are not necessary for gaining access to funding or for being perceived as 
legitimate by the donor community. Furthermore, for their strategy of non-confrontational 
advocacy, they do not need a membership. Having expertise and having the right 
contacts with state officials is more important for this strategy because “they [the 
state] need our brain anyway” (Interview PSHK, April 2008). Membership consultation 
and participation would not be conducive to this strategy because it is time consuming 
and can result in conflicting ideas about what should be done. In contrast, a hierarchic 
organisation can decide quickly where and when to lobby politicians.
 Although the lack of citizen participation and representation hardly creates 
problems of legitimacy in the eyes of donors, it does sometimes create problems with 
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regard to the state. For instance, the Government of Ghana has the tendency to 
“always come out and say: hey, you don’t represent anybody” (Interview ISSER, 
November 2007). NGOs can only overcome this accusation if they manage to link up 
with partner organisations and mobilise community based organisations. Another 
danger comes from the upward accountability to donors, which introduces the risk 
that organisations become detached from their domestic political system (Sabatini, 
2002). This is especially the case in Indonesia: “When we talk to some government 
agencies, who of course sometimes still do not like us, they would say ‘You are like 
the agent of the USA’, or ‘You work for the agent of Australia’” (Interview PSHK, April 
2008). It is for this reason that organisations must also sometimes refuse funding or 
resist donor conditionalities. For instance, “USAID wanted to put their name and logo 
in all the publications. We said no, because if we do that, parliament members or 
the public will see YAPPIKA as an American agent” (Interview YAPPIKA, April 2008). 
In short, funding creates a trade-off between legitimacy in the eyes of donors and 
in the eyes of the state.
4.6 Isomorphism as the institutionalisation of trust
Our analysis consists of two parts. In the first part we looked at the organisational 
fields of Ghanaian and Indonesian NGOs, and we concluded that in both fields 
international actors (donors) have become more important than national actors (the 
state and citizens) for NGO survival. In the second part we therefore focused on 
donor-funding as the most important source of homogenisation. Here we showed the 
various ways in which donor-dependence affects an NGO’s mission, staff, strategy 
and structure. Figure 4.1 provides a summary of some of the forces at work. It is 
important to note that it focuses on the process of homogenisation of the organisational 
characteristics of NGOs under the influence of donor funding. Thus, it does not 
include some of the aspects we indentified: it does not depict how strategy is also 
influenced by the kind of relations an NGO has with the state, how relatively small 
NGO communities stimulate mimicry and duplication, or how NGOs use several 
strategies to mitigate the influence of donors.
 When we look at figure 4.1, four observations stand out. First, it shows that donor 
funding has a direct influence on the mission statement through agenda setting and 
earmarking, on staff by stimulating and sometimes forcing NGOs to hire professionals, 
and on strategy by approving non-confrontational strategies while disapproving 
 confrontational ones. We have not drawn a relation between structure and funding, 
because we found that funding has only an indirect influence in the sense that having 
a membership based organisation is not necessary for getting access to funding. 
Second, it shows that homogenisation is not only a matter of imposition. On the one 
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hand, funding conditions push NGOs to adapt, but, on the other hand, the NGOs 
are active actors in their quest for funding. They frame their mission statements in 
donor language and use professional staff to get access to and account for funding. 
Using non-confrontational strategies is also a way of retaining this access. Third, the 
organisational characteristics also influence each other. Having the promotion of 
legal reform as a mission statement, for instance, requires professional staff with a 
profound knowledge of the legal system. Furthermore, working with professionals 
increases the bias for non-confrontational strategies, which in turn reduces the need 
of having a membership organisation. Fourth, it shows that the combination of these 
three processes produces multiple series of feedback-loops which reinforce the 
process of homogenisation. These loops are not solely donor-driven, but can also 
be attributed to the NGOs themselves. Furthermore, they are strengthened by the 
 interrelatedness of the organisational characteristics of the NGOs.
Figure 4.1  The drivers of homogenisation
Mission
(donor language)
 
 Structure(non-membership) 
Staff
(professionals) 
 
 
Strategy
(non-confrontational
advocacy) 
 
 
 
Donor funding 
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……have a preference for … 
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for … 
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 Although donor-funding catalyses the process of homogenisation, it is the 
dependence on donors that seems to be the driving force behind these feedback- 
loops. The coercive power of donors stems not from their own power per se, but from 
the lack of alternative resources for NGOs. Applying for funding can be seen as the 
first step in the process of homogenisation. Once NGOs become part of the system, 
there is a big chance that they will be “absorbed by this logic of industry” (Interview 
NGO consultant Jakarta, March 2008). This is especially due to the process of 
 professionalisation. As the NGOs start working from modern offices with an academic 
staff, they also become more in need of money to pay for these things. At present, 
only donors are willing to provide NGOs with such money. This is how the feedback- 
loops reinforce each other: in order to get access to donor money, you need to speak 
the donor-language, know the donor priorities, be able to write funding reports and 
preferably behave in a non-confrontational manner. In sum, it is a self- reinforcing 
process which stimulates dependency rather than ownership and sustainability. 
 The outcome of this process of homogenisation can be characterised as the 
 institutionalisation of trust between donor and recipient. It means that the more an 
NGO conforms to donor standards, the more it can be trusted with donor money. In 
many of the interviews, respondents (both donors and NGOs) used the term ‘trust’ 
when talking about access to and accounting for funding. For Partnership, for 
instance, “having UNDP’s name as backing has been really useful for them in getting 
money and getting trust basically” (Interview UNDP, April 2008). Trust of donors is 
something which you have to earn by building a track-record. In Ghana some of the 
NGOs mentioned that their donors have become more flexible over time. Whereas 
before they were “micromanaging our things […] it gets better when you establish 
yourself and develop an expertise in a certain area. They become suggestive, rather 
than demanding a certain outcome” (Interview CDD, December 2007). The more an 
NGO complies with donor standards, the more it becomes a ‘trustworthy’ organisation. 
As one respondent states: “I think that the trust and confidence in us also comes from 
our ability to conform with the standards of transparency and accountability that they 
[the donors] wish us to deliver” (Interview Yappika, April 2008). The bi- and multilateral 
donors of the pooled funding mechanism STAR-Ghana (formerly G-RAP) are quite 
explicit about this in their eligibility requirements for NGOs who wish to apply for 
funding: “Must demonstrate standards of good organisational governance”.38 Thus, 
conforming to the organisational paradigm which is promoted by donors makes you 
a legitimate organisation which can be entrusted with grant money. 
38 STAR-Ghana, eligibility requirements, available at:  www.starghana.org [accessed January 2013].
 Worlds apart but much alike | 119
4
4.7 Discussion
We first need to discuss the limitations of our findings before discussing their 
implications for donor agencies. Figure 4.1 should not be seen as a model which 
applies to all donors and NGOs in the same way. It is a summary of the various 
processes we encountered in Ghana and Indonesia, which, taken together, provide 
the first building blocks for a theoretical model on the homogenisation of NGOs 
around the world. Further research is needed to test and refine the relations depicted 
in figure 4.1. It would be especially important to include different types of NGOs and 
to differentiate between different types of donors because: “Every donor has their 
own procedures. There are donors who are a little bit flexible and there are donors 
who are very rigorous”, adding that “European Union partnerships are the ones who 
are very rigorous” (Interview Demos, March 2008). The current findings are mostly 
applicable to these more bureaucratic bi- and multilateral donor agencies, as they 
provide most of the funding for the selected NGOs. Some of the relations depicted in 
figure 4.1 might change for private aid agencies or foundations. For instance, a Dutch 
NGO sponsoring an Indonesian NGO might be less concerned with their Indonesian 
counterpart pursuing a confrontational advocacy strategy against the state because 
they are not involved in high-level interactions with state agencies.
 When we focus on these bi- and multilateral agencies, our analysis leaves donors 
wishing to support NGOs and democracy with a mixed picture. Our findings largely 
confirm the image “that these internationally supported groups are different from the 
civil society groups that have been described as being so crucial to democracy” 
(Sabatini, 2002, p. 9). They are largely closed to citizen participation, led by elites and 
have agendas that are influenced by international donors at the expense of local 
priorities and needs. This situation is not in the interest of donors (assuming they are 
serious about their attempts to promote genuine democracy, rather than advancing 
their own paradigms), nor is it in the interest of the NGOs (assuming they are 
concerned about the needs of their constituencies, rather than the needs of donors). 
However, our analysis has shown that it is very difficult to get out of the current system 
because it causes NGOs and their donors to be entangled in a tight grip.
 One way for donors to overcome this problem is to extend their funding to 
organisations with a different set of characteristics, which are probably less professional 
and would certainly be less predictable in cases where their decision making is 
based on membership participation. This would require flexible funding schemes 
with less technical accountability requirements. For these bigger bi- and multi lateral 
donors in particular, this would have fundamental implications for the way they 
organise themselves. As one bilateral donor noted:
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“The strange thing about development aid is that there is a pressure to spend a 
lot of money in a limited time. Here at the embassy we have a comparatively big 
budget and a small staff to manage it. So for efficiency reasons, we channel 
most of our money to big organisations like the World Bank, the UNDP, Unicef 
and the ADB. We do support some NGOs, but the problem is that an Indonesian 
NGO can never spend ten million Euros annually in an accountable way” 
(Interview Netherlands Embassy Jakarta, March 2008).
We should not forget that, in the current system, donors are also actors who are part 
of a larger organisational field in which they usually also depend on other actors for 
their survival. As one respondent noted, “if it is a country-tied donor, then the politics 
of that country will play a role as well. So you cannot really blame them entirely as it 
is taxpayers’ money” (Interview Abantu, December 2008). Therefore, a change in the 
way they operate would require a more fundamental change in upward accountability 
procedures to the parliaments of donor countries. In other words, in the short term we 
cannot expect this type of donors to go beyond their current type of partners as their 
room to manoeuvre is also bound by conditionalities.
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Appendix 4.1: Overview of interview data
Overview of interview data Ghana
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Center for Democratic Development (CDD) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
11/30/2007
12/03/2007
12/11/2008
Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) NGO 3 persons / 
3 interviews
12/04/2007
12/05/2007
12/10/2008
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/11/2007
11/06/2008
12/12/2008
Integrated Social Development Center  
(ISODEC)
NGO 3 persons / 
5 interviews
12/06/2007
11/05/2008
11/10/2008
12/12/2008
Abantu for development NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/13/2007
11/06/2008
11/11/2008
GAPVOD (Umbrella organisation for 
Ghanaian NGOs)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
11/29/2007
IBIS Ghana International 
NGO
1 person / 
1 interview
12/14/2007
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/28/2007
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
01/23/2008
Ghana Research and Advocacy Program 
(G-RAP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/19/2007
Faculty of law – University of Ghana University 1 person / 
1 interview
11/28/2007
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER)  – University of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/19/2007
Department of Political Science – University 
of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/26/2007
11/27/2007
Note: a total of 27 interviews with 21 respondents (one respondent works for both university and for one of 
the selected NGOs).
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Overview of interview data Indonesia
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Demos  - Centre for democracy and human 
rights studies
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
03/31/2008
Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies 
(PSHK)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Partnership for Democratic Governance 
Reform 
NGO 3 persons / 
1 interview
04/03/2008
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy 
(Elsam)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/07/2008
Yappika - The Civil Society Alliance for 
Democracy
NGO 3 persons / 
2 interviews
04/09/2008
Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID) NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/10/2008
Institute of Research, Education and 
Information of Social and Economic Affairs 
(LP3ES)
NGO 1 person / 
1 interview
04/04/2008
Centre for strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS)
NGO 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/19/2008
03/31/2008
NGO consultant Jakarta NGO expert 1 person / 
1 interview
03/18/2008
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
04/01/2008
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/26/2008
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
01/23/2008
Asian Development Bank (ADB) Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
03/25/2008
Faculty of Social and Political Science - 
Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta)
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
03/26/2008
04/02/2008
Center for population and policy studies – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
2 interviews
03/11/2008
03/11/2009
Faculty of Social and Political Science – 
Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta)
University 1 person / 
1 interview
04/20/2009
Note: a total of 20 interviews with 22 respondents.
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Chapter 5
Promoting democracy in Ghana:  
Exploring the democratic roles  
of donor-sponsored NGOs*
*  A version of this chapter has been published as: Kamstra, J., & Knippenberg, L. 
(2014). Promoting democracy in Ghana: exploring the democratic roles of donor- 
sponsored non-governmental organisations. Democratization, 21(4), 583-609.
126 | Chapter 5
Abstract
This chapter examines the democratic roles performed by Ghanaian nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs). Drawing on a comparative case study approach, it explores 
how the organisational characteristics of five donor-sponsored NGOs relate to their 
ability to perform different democratic roles. Our analysis reveals that some of the 
democratic roles require contradicting organisational characteristics, which are 
therefore difficult to combine within one organisation. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
that these NGOs do not contribute to democracy as predicted by theory. In particular, 
they are weak at providing channels of communication between state and society, 
and at directly representing, involving, and being accountable to ordinary citizens. 
We argue, nevertheless, that they perform these functions in a different way.
Keywords
Civil society, NGOs, democratisation, democratic roles, international development 
aid, Ghana.
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5.1 Introduction
Supporting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to stimulate democratisation is 
a prominent strategy among donors of international development aid. This strategy is 
firmly rooted in a normative conception of the merits of civil society: “In the eyes of 
many donors and recipients, and even of many democratic theorists, the idea that 
civil society is always a positive force for democracy, indeed even the most important 
one, is unassailable” (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000a, p. 4). Its desirable functions 
include serving as a check on state power, helping include the poor and marginalised, and 
educating citizens on the norms and values of democracy (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 
2004; Fowler, 2000; G. White, 1994).
 Donor policies based on these positive assumptions have been criticised. 
Empirical studies have shown the negative effects of external funding of NGOs, such 
as accountability to donors instead of constituencies and NGOs maintaining rather 
than challenging the status quo (Fagan, 2005; Hearn, 2007; Henderson, 2002). Aside 
from donors, civil society researchers are also criticised for letting ideals obscure 
reality. The dominant Western conceptions of liberal democracy “betray a normative 
view on how democratic development should be done” (Mercer, 2002, p. 20).  This 
calls for a new research agenda, based on descriptive rather than normative concepts 
(Tvedt, 2006). Empirical research should focus on studying “the nature of the 
relationship between civil society organisations and democracy” (Kopecky & Mudde, 
2003, p. 1). This chapter answers that call by exploring the link between organisational 
characteristics and democratic roles. It aims to contribute to understanding what kind 
of roles NGOs actually perform and what organisational characteristics enable them 
to do so.
 The study focuses on a group of donor-sponsored NGOs in Ghana. Ghana 
provides a “good case” because it is often seen as a textbook example for democra-
tisation in Africa and enjoys the status of “donor darling”. It has a “particularly 
favourable context for democracy promotion measures, if performance is poor here, 
it [...] is unlikely to be better elsewhere in Africa” (Crawford, 2005, p. 572). The 
Ghanaian state actively involves NGOs in important social, economic, and 
governance initiatives, and international donors are keen on supporting this 
development (Hughes, 2005). Despite growing criticism in the academic literature, 
donor support to Ghanaian NGOs has actually been increasing.39
 We start by identifying four democratic roles in existing literature: an educational; 
a communicative; a representational; and a cooperative role. Using Warren (2001) 
and Hadenius and Uggla (1996), we link the performance of these roles to 
39 The largest funding scheme for promoting NGO involvement in democracy in Ghana (called G-RAP) 
grew from about US$2 million in 2005 to over US$3.25 million in 2009 (http://www.G-RAP.org, 
accessed November 2011).
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organisational characteristics such as structure, strategy, resources, and relations 
with the environment. In the empirical analysis we focus on two related questions: (1) 
what kind of democratic roles do donor-sponsored NGOs perform in Ghana?; (2) 
what organisational characteristics enable them to perform these roles? The analysis 
reveals, first, that the roles of Ghanaian NGOs differ from the ones described in 
theory. In fact, some theoretical roles are not performed by any of the NGOs. Second, 
we find that none of the NGOs performs all roles simultaneously, which is mainly due 
to contradicting organisational demands. Third, although the roles they perform are 
criticised in terms of donor-dependence, accountability, and legitimacy, our findings 
put this criticism in a new perspective. To better capture our findings, we then propose 
a new framework with adaptations to the educational, the communicative and the 
representational roles. In the conclusion we use this new framework to question the 
common assertion whereby NGOs should be democratic themselves in order to be 
able to contribute to democracy.40 Finally, we link our findings to the debate on donor 
support for NGOs.
5.2 Democratic roles of NGOs
Civil society can be defined as an intermediate social sphere distinct from government, 
business, and the private sphere. This social sphere is occupied by voluntary 
organisations, such as clubs, associations, social movements, and informal networks 
(G. White, 1994). These interconnected formal and informal organisations and groups 
are referred to as NGOs. This definition is neutral as it does not attribute any positive 
role or function to NGOs. However, when related to democracy, NGOs are generally 
seen as a positive force. Their democratic roles are presented here as analytically 
distinct categories although they overlap in practice.
The educational role
Since Tocqueville, civic associations have been labelled as “schools of democracy” 
(Tocqueville, 1998 [1835-1840]). The central aspects of the educational role are 
providing information, nurturing civic virtues, and teaching political skills. By widening 
the flow of information available to citizens, associations can enhance transparency 
and public accountability (Diamond, 1999). Associations can also foster a culture of 
40 This assertion stems from a neo-Tocquevillian interpretation of the democratic role of NGOs. Its 
commonality can be explained by the fact that this interpretation has received the most contemporary 
attention (Fung, 2003). Examples include Hadenius and Uggla (1996: 1623), who state that “to 
serve as an organ of socialisation into the practice of democracy, the associations in question must 
themselves be democratically structured”, or Robinson and Friedman (2007: 644), who hypothesise 
that internally democratic NGOs “can make a positive contribution to the process of democratisation 
by fostering pluralism, promoting democratic values, and enhancing political participation”.
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democracy and civility by nurturing civic values (Fowler, 2000). According to Putnam 
(2000), the most important civic values are generalised reciprocity and trust. 
Associations can teach these values by bringing people together into cooperative 
ventures (Sabatini, 2002). The experience of cooperation within associations also 
increases political skills like speaking in public, negotiating, and building coalitions, 
and is therefore considered as a stepping stone for future political leaders (Diamond, 
1999; Edwards, 2004).
 To fulfil an educational role, ideally, an organisation should have a democratic 
structure and a voluntary membership with a broad popular base amongst common 
citizens (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004). The process of membership participation 
stimulates “socialisation into democratic norms through a process of learning by 
doing” (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996, p. 1622). By participating in democratic structures 
members gain experience in debating, negotiating, and voting. These processes 
familiarise members with norms of reciprocity and trust, respect for minority rights, 
and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Warren, 2001). These educational effects are 
only achieved through interaction, if members choose to subscribe to an organisation 
without participating, few of them will be achieved (Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 2003).
The communicative role
The underlying idea of the communicative role is that NGOs safeguard a democratic 
public sphere wherein citizens debate the means and ends of governance (Edwards, 
2004; Fung, 2003). The communicative role should be understood as the provision of 
a communication structure, rather than communication itself. According to Habermas, 
a communication structure does not refer “to the contents of everyday communication, 
but to the social space generated in communicative action” (cited in: Warren, 2001, 
p. 79). Associations foster public deliberation because they can signal the concerns 
of individual members and communicate them to a broader public. By acting “as an 
intermediary or (two-way) transmission belt between state and society” (G. White, 
1994, p. 384), they provide the communication structure between the individual 
citizen and the formal political system. The content of communication is considered 
part of the representational role of civil society.
 For the communicative role it is important that an organisation has relations with 
both society and the state (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). If an organisation is not open 
to popular demands and has no relations with the state, it cannot function as a 
channel of communication between state and society. Being open to popular 
demands implies having a constituency for whom you work and to whom you are 
accountable. In relation to the state, NGOs should be autonomous without being 
disconnected (Warren, 2001). Hence, the communicative role requires that NGOs 
maintain the right balance between state and society because becoming too close to 
one would risk disconnecting with the other.
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The representational role
Representation refers to voice and resistance. Besides political parties and elections, 
NGOs are an alternative channel that allows citizens to present the democratic 
system with a more differentiated and constant flow of input. NGOs serve as a catalyst 
by advocating for government policy changes on behalf of their constituencies (Lewis 
& Kanji, 2009). As such, they complement voting and tend to equalise representation as 
time and commitment are more equally distributed than money (Fung, 2003). NGOs 
also stimulate political participation, improving the functioning of democratic 
institutions (Diamond, 1999). With respect to resistance, associations can act as a 
watchdog and provide their members with veto power. By opposing government, 
associations offer a check on the abuse of state power, safeguarding standards of 
public morality and improving accountability (Edwards, 2004; Lewis & Kanji, 2009; G. 
White, 1994).
 This role implies active participation in a public debate. Having a large voluntary 
membership, preferably among common citizens, is an important asset for fulfilling 
this role. It provides a direct link with societal groups and, especially when combined 
with a democratic decision-making structure, it legitimises claims of representation. 
If mobilised, a membership also serves as a source of countervailing power. Not 
being dependent upon the state is crucial for actually using this veto power against it 
(Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). Finally, representation requires a carefully chosen strategy 
to advocate constituency interests. There is a broad range of possible advocacy 
tactics; whether a confrontational or non-confrontational strategy is most effective 
depends on the specific situation (Jenkins, 2006).
The cooperative role
Aside from opposing the state, NGOs can also cooperate with it. Warren (2001) 
distinguishes two types of cooperation, subsidiarity and coordination. Filling gaps in 
the service-delivery role of the government is a particular form of subsidiarity. Within 
developing countries in particular, NGOs can “help to build pockets of efficiency 
within government agencies, provide strategic partners for reform oriented ministries”, 
and “fill voids in the government’s social service-delivery role” (Clarke, 1998, p. 49). 
Associations have also become more important for coordinating complex policy 
problems, especially those involving multiple actors. Their networks connect 
stakeholders, generate expert knowledge, mobilise support, and negotiate policy 
directions (Warren, 2001). In order to be an interesting partner, an NGO needs to have 
something special to offer, like a strong network or service-delivery capacity. To 
complement the government in areas such as education or health care, an NGO 
needs ample capacity and expertise in their field of work. Providing coordination in 
complex policy areas requires specialised knowledge and being able to bring 
together different groups. 
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Table 5.1 summarises the most important organisational conditions for fulfilling each 
of the democratic roles.
5.3 Methodology
This chapter is based on extensive fieldwork in Ghana (Accra) in 2007 and 2008. The 
research employs a multiple case study design in which the NGOs represent different 
cases. Five key organisations were purposively selected, capturing a variety of do-
nor-sponsored democracy-promoting NGOs. All selected NGOs are part of the 
Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP), a funding scheme aiming at 
enhancing the democratic quality of political processes by stimulating NGO 
engagement.41 In 2007, 17 organisations were supported by G-RAP, classified as 
think-tanks, development organisations and advocacy networks.42 The selected 
organisations cover these three categories: three think-tanks (CDD, IEA, IDEG), one 
development organisation (ISODEC), and one advocacy network (Abantu). This 
sample captures both the diversity of the funding scheme and the dominance of the 
think-tanks within it. Table 5.2 provides a basic overview of the selected NGOs.
 The organisational characteristics and democratic roles of the selected organisations 
were discussed in 27 in-depth interviews with 21 respondents (see Appendix 5.1 for 
an overview). All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and thematically coded. The 
41 G-RAP was established in 2004 and is financed by the UK, Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands; Interview G-RAP, 
November 2007. Currently G-RAP is called STAR-Ghana.
42 G-RAP, available at: http://www.G-RAP.org [accessed December 2007].
Table 5.1  Organisational characteristics for performing democratic roles
Democratic role Organisational characteristics
Educational Information
Civic virtues
Political skills
- Large voluntary membership among 
common citizens
- Democratic decision making structure
Communicative Channels of communication 
between state and society
- External and mutual relations with the 
state and society
Representational Voice
Resistance
- Large voluntary membership among 
common citizens
- Democratic decision making structure
- Mobilisation capacity (membership)
- Independence from state 
- Advocacy strategy (confrontational or 
non-confrontational)
Cooperative Cooperation
Subsidiarity
- Expert knowledge & network
- Service delivery capacity
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majority of interviewees were directors, researchers, and founding members of the 
selected NGOs. To balance their stories, additional interviews were conducted with 
local scientists, government (related) agencies, donors, and an international NGO. 
Moreover, interview data was complemented with annual reports, funding reports, 
NGO websites, and secondary literature.
5.4 Democratic roles of the think-tanks
Because IEA, CDD, and IDEG are strikingly similar in many respects, we group them 
in our analysis. One possible reason for this similarity is that some of IEA’s former 
employees would become founding members of IDEG and CDD (Interviews: ISSER, 
November 2007; IDEG, December 2007; IEA, November, 2007). The think-tanks all 
see promoting democracy and good governance as their main mission, are 
hierarchically structured, and have an academically trained core staff. Their main 
strategy focuses on doing research and advocating the results through meetings and 
workshops, mainly for parliamentarians and policy-makers of the central government. 
They work on macro-political issues such as decentralisation, constitutional reform, 
and electoral procedures. Finally, all think-tanks have close relations with the 
government, universities, and international donors. None of them have extensive 
grassroots connections. According to an employee of CDD this is because “we are 
looking at systems and processes and therefore our main interest is to look at the 
central government and how policy is made and implemented” (Interview CDD, 
December 2007).
The educational role of the think-tanks
The educational activities of the think-tanks are shaped by their strategy of research 
and advocacy, and propagate their profile as knowledge institutions. Their whole 
organisation is geared towards generating and disseminating expert knowledge. 
Each think-tank has its own library and employs academic researchers qualified in 
fields like political science, economy, or law. Sometimes, they also cooperate with 
university-based researchers, and some think-tank employees have part-time 
positions at universities (Interview IDEG, December 2007).
 Despite difficulties in obtaining and maintaining quality staff, the think-tanks 
have been able to carve out a reputation as expert institutions. Qualified researchers 
are scarce in Ghana, and NGOs compete with each other, the state, and companies 
to attract them. Because “most good researchers don’t live in Ghana, bringing 
them here is very expensive” (Interview IEA, December 2007). The loss of staff to 
better-paying organisations is a common problem among NGOs in Ghana (Interview 
ISODEC, November 2008). Despite these problems, the calibre of their personnel 
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remains their most important feature (Ohemeng, 2005). They are respected for it by 
both the general public and by government officials who use them for consultation 
(Arthur, 2010; Kpessa, 2011; Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2012). In comparison to most 
NGOs in Ghana, the think-tanks are an exception to the rule of a weak track record 
and understaffing (Arthur, 2010; Interview IBIS, December 2007): 
“Institutions like CDD or IDEG are heavyweights. They have the manpower and 
expertise, so they can actually engage government in debate. If we take an 
NGO from outside Accra, say Tamale, they don’t have the capacity to engage 
government in discussion” (Interview APRM, November 2007).
 The think-tanks use non-confrontational advocacy tactics to advance their 
research findings. Through roundtables, conferences, seminars, book launches, radio, 
TV, and newspapers, all kinds of stakeholders are educated on policy issues. 
Research provides the content for these educational activities. For instance, at IEA:
“We prepare policy briefs, identifying an issue, and making recommendations. 
You send this to the most influential people across the country. Parliamentarians, 
District Chief Executives, universities, the media and so on, and you hope that 
they get the message” (Interview IEA, December 2007).
Educational activities mainly target state officials: “A minister may not have a degree 
in economics or finance, so you have to educate them, that is the basis of our work” 
(ibid.). Parliamentarians are frequently targeted because the think-tanks perceive the 
position of parliament as weak vis-à-vis the executive. To strengthen parliament, they 
give parliamentarians courses on subjects ranging from technical issues to the very 
basics of “teaching new parliamentarians about the rules and procedures of 
parliament” (Interview CDD, November 2007). For their part, parliamentarians and 
other government officials contact the think-tanks for consultation, research, and 
education (Kpessa, 2011; Interview MMYE, November 2007; Interview Department of 
Political Science (UG), November 2007; Ohemeng, 2005; Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 
2012).
 The think-tanks also try to educate Ghanaian citizens about their democratic 
rights and duties, mainly through the popular media. IDEG also started working at the 
district level because: “we realised that people are unable to advocate their own 
issues, so we need to build that ability at the local level” (Interview IDEG, December 
2008). However, their outreach to ordinary citizens is limited. Their institutions are 
Accra-based, and most of their publications have a technical nature and are not 
geared towards ordinary citizens. While many observers consider their capacity to 
interact with the state as a merit, they also see their limited connections to society as 
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a shortcoming (Interviews: ILGS, December 2007; APRM, November 2007; 
Department of Political Science (UG), November 2007; G-RAP, November 2007). We 
will discuss this further under the representational role.
The communicative role of the think-tanks
The think-tanks provide channels of communication with the state. This directly 
relates to their main strategic and educational focus, i.e. scrutinizing and influencing 
government policy. Political advocacy usually targets governmental decision-makers 
for recommendations to be adopted (Reid, 2000). The IEA provides a typical example: 
“Our number one targets are parliamentarians and policymakers because when they 
make new policies we hope that they use our work to improve the governance system 
in this country” (Interview IEA, December 2007).
 The importance of parliamentarians and policy-makers is reflected in the efforts 
the think-tanks put in building and maintaining relations with these groups. The IEA 
regularly invites “ministers, members of parliament and ambassadors for an informal 
lunch”, which is “very important, because formal meetings are easier if you already 
have this informal relationship” (Interview IEA, November 2008). Lobby and advocacy 
are best facilitated by personal friendships:
“For instance, our director is a good friend of the former Minister of Education. 
He comes here and they chat and take a drink, and in the process our director 
mentions what is on his mind, which works very well in pushing some issues 
through” (Interview CDD, November 2007).
Such relations are commonplace because “Accra is a very small world” where 
“everybody knows everybody” (Interviews: IEA, December 2007; IDEG, December 
2007; Abantu, November 2008). Although “government, civil society, and university 
all have their own roles”, the separation between them is less pronounced because 
“they know each other from school or from their village, so personal connections are 
easily made” (Interview Netherlands Embassy, November 2007).
 Because having access to the government is so important, the think-tanks adjust 
their advocacy strategy accordingly. Although they can be critical of government 
policies, their approach mainly consists of non-confrontational forms of communication 
and advice based on research outcomes. According to an employee of IDEG, 
 confrontational strategies would damage the relationship of trust with the government 
(Interview IDEG, December 2008). Instead, IDEG presents its criticism as a “sugar- 
coated tablet, because they are trying to work with all the political parties, so they 
try not to antagonise anybody” (Interview ISSER, November 2007). This form of 
self-censorship can be explained by the privileged position the think-tanks have in 
terms of access to the government. By building a reputation as research institutes, 
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CDD, IEA, and IDEG have earned their seat at the table: “We get a lot of invitations 
from various ministries to sit on their board and to talk at their workshops and retreats” 
(Interview IEA, December 2008). The Ministry of Manpower Youth and Employment 
confirms this: “We quite appreciate what they are doing and we have been working 
with them. We invited them to meetings and seminars and they have invited us [to 
meetings and seminars], and we have responded to their invitations” (Interview 
MMYE, November 2007). As the think-tanks benefit from the status quo, they are less 
likely to resort to radical forms of action against the state. Besides benefitting from 
privileged access, getting too close to the government also has its drawbacks, which 
we discuss in the next section.
The representational role of the think-tanks
The think-tanks are weak in terms of representation, which raises concerns about 
their accountability, legitimacy, and independence. Three related issues are 
addressed, namely their lack of connection to Ghanaian society, their close links with 
the government, and their high dependence on international funding.
 First, the think-tanks do not have the organisational characteristics to represent 
ordinary citizens. They only have an office in Accra43, have no membership, and do 
not represent anyone in particular. Furthermore, they are often characterised as 
urban elites with a limited connection to the wider Ghanaian society (Interviews: 
ILGS, December 2007; APRM, November 2007; Department of Political Science 
(UG), November 2007; ISSER, November 2007; G-RAP, November 2007). Because 
they have no local branches, “the level at which they can touch base with the districts 
is very limited. And you cannot sit in Accra and say that you are assessing governance 
in Ghana, you need to go to the local level” (Interview APRM, November 2007). The 
executive director of CDD describes this “over-concentration of prominent and 
technically strong NGOs in the urban rather than rural areas” as one of the problems 
affecting the overall effectiveness of Ghanaian civil society (Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah, 
2012, p. 17). Particularly the rural and urban poor remain excluded (Arthur, 2010; 
Haynes, 2003; Mohan, 2002; Porter, 2003). As these think-tanks frequently influence 
the national policy agenda and have become one of the main avenues for government 
consultation with the citizenry (Kpessa, 2011), their lack of accountability to ordinary 
citizens creates a problem of legitimacy. The question remains in whose name they 
are influencing government.
 A second concern relates to their independence vis-à-vis the state. In contrast to 
many think-tanks in the developed world, CDD, IEA, and IDEG adhere to the principle 
of non-partisanship. According to an employee of IEA, being perceived as neutral by 
both the state and societal actors is important because “otherwise your research 
43 In October 2010, after the fieldwork period, CDD opened an additional office in the northern regional capital Tamale, 
thereby reducing their Accra bias.
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goes to nothing” (Interview IEA, December 2007). However, according to Ohemeng 
this neutrality is questioned by many Ghanaians. He finds many personal links 
between the (then) ruling New Patriotic Party and the IEA and CDD (Ohemeng, 2005). 
This compromises their independence from the government, which undermines their 
ability to be a watchdog.
 A final concern is their donor-dependence. In Ghana, “the NGO sector is 
basically donor-driven” (Interview ISSER, November 2007), which affects sustainability 
and accountability. International funding is the lifeline of the Ghanaian think-tanks. 
Without foreign assistance they would probably not even exist, as “internal sources 
[for our kind of work] in Ghana are zero” (Interview IDEG, December 2007), and “the 
bulk of our finance comes from donor support” (Interview CDD, November 2007). As 
they have few sources of local income, “the big problem is how sustainable they are 
after donor funds dry up” (Interview Department of Political Science (UG), November 
2007). Furthermore, overdependence on external funding draws accountability (even 
further) away from the ordinary Ghanaian citizen and inhibits the danger of co-optation 
(Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Darkwa et al., 2006; Porter, 2003; Porter & Lyon, 2006).
The cooperative role of the think-tanks
With their research capabilities and expertise, the think-tanks are useful partners for 
the state. Because the Ghanaian state has limited capacity for gathering and 
processing policy information, the think-tanks supplement the government’s effort in 
developing appropriate policies and institutions (Ohemeng, 2005). Many Ghanaian 
parliamentary committees and individual members of parliament maintain ties to 
policy think-tanks to compensate for this lack of “in-house” research staff and 
resources (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2012, pp. 342-343). The think-tanks see it as one 
of their main tasks “to assist policymakers in implementing good policies for the 
nation” (Interview IEA, November 2008). The IEA even drafted several laws, the “Right 
to Information Bill” and the “Whistleblowers Bill”. The frequent meetings with state 
officials, as described in the communicative role, show that the think-tanks are very 
active at this kind of cooperation.
 The think-tanks also provide coordination in complex policy issues with multiple 
actors. By organizing seminars and round tables, the think-tanks provide platforms 
where the state and societal groups can debate (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2012). For 
societal groups, these can be valuable meetings that offer them a chance to present 
their issues directly to state officials. In this way, CDD helped the Ghana Federation 
for the Disabled (GFD): “They initiate a bill, but cannot take it far. As CDD has direct 
contacts with parliament, we can take it from there” (Interview CDD, November 2007). 
Studying this particular case, Oduro (2009, p. 637) finds a division of labour, while 
GFD organises demonstrations to pressurise the government: “CDD became the 
intellectual powerhouse of the GFD, doing all the lobbying for the law to be passed”.
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5.5 Democratic roles of ISODEC
“Every life matters” is the motto of ISODEC, which aims to enhance sustainable 
human development by empowering the less fortunate. ISODEC is a democratically 
structured membership organisation with a general assembly of members as its 
highest decision-making body. Membership is, however, limited to about forty former 
employees and individuals supporting the values of ISODEC. Unlike the think-tanks, 
ISODEC focuses on their constituency at the grassroots and has offices throughout 
the country. Their work is rooted in community level service-delivery for both the 
urban and rural poor. Since 1987 they have been working in basic education, health, 
water, and sanitation. In 2000 they initiated a research and advocacy programme, 
promoting alternative development strategies with campaigns addressing issues like 
transparency, trade, and public goods.
The educational role of ISODEC
ISODEC primarily educates less-empowered citizens and their organisations. This 
approach directly relates to their mission that “poor and marginalised people 
[...] have an effective voice in decisions affecting their lives, and develop the capacity 
to exercise these rights”.44 Education has always been an important part of their 
 service- delivery work. It ranges from teaching communities about health and 
sanitation to programmes for raising political awareness and skills. ISODEC’s Centre 
for Budget Advocacy, for example, teaches citizens how to read the national budget, 
because “no one really understands what the budget is about, [while] it is the biggest 
document that controls how things move around in this country” (Interview ISODEC, 
December 2007). By teaching marginalised citizens skills to comment on the budget, 
ISODEC hopes that “their issues are also being forwarded to the public domain” 
(ibid.; see also: Abbey, Azeem, & Kuupiel, 2010).
 The educational activities of ISODEC mainly rely on their close relations to the 
grassroots and on staff that can translate complex issues into simple messages. 
Their countrywide service-delivery activities provide ISODEC with access to local 
communities. In these deprived communities, their approach has to take into account 
high illiteracy rates, which are generally above the Ghanaian average of 35%.45 
Making policy information accessible to these groups requires “translating policy 
documents into local languages, and using pictures and cartoons to explain some of 
the issues” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007).
 
44 Internal document: ISODEC (2006), The ISODEC Rights-based Advocacy Programme (RBAIII) 2007-2009 (Accra: 
ISODEC), p. 18.
45 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA world fact book 2011, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook [accessed May 2011].
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The communicative role of ISODEC
Whereas the think-tanks provide channels of communication with the state, ISODEC 
focuses on the grassroots. The think-tanks’ “starting point is reviewing government 
policy while our starting point is listening to communities” (Interview ISODEC, 
November 2008). Their extensive grassroots connections and strong presence 
outside Accra make ISODEC “a unique case” within the Ghanaian NGO sector 
(Interview ISSER, November 2007).
“They are one of the few examples of a national organisation with competence in 
macro-economic issues which, at the same time, is rooted at the local level. They 
cover the whole range. [...] Compared to that, typical research institutes like IEA 
and CDD are much less rooted” (Interview G-RAP, November 2007).
This countrywide presence enables ISODEC to signal problems at the grassroots 
level and communicate them to the central government, which brings us to the rep-
resentational role.
The representational role of ISODEC
ISODEC provides the poor and marginalised with a voice in the public domain. 
Through their service-delivery activities they learn about the needs of their 
constituency and feed this into their advocacy activities (Interview ISODEC, December 
2007). ISODEC wanted to give their constituency a direct voice by recruiting them as 
members, but failed in doing so: “Membership remains institutional, there is no 
membership of the masses” (Interview ISODEC, November 2008). This raises a 
legitimate concern: “ISODEC tries to represent the poor, but whether they are 
genuinely representative is a different question” (Interview ISSER, November 2007). 
Accountability is not institutionally embedded and therefore depends on goodwill. 
Despite the absence of a broad membership base, ISODEC gets enough support to 
make its voice heard and to mobilise resistance. This is crucial for their advocacy 
strategy: “Advocacy is about numbers. If you cannot raise numbers and make the 
noise that politicians will hear, you will not have an impact” (Interview ISODEC, 
November 2008).
 ISODEC combines confrontational and non-confrontational forms of advocacy. 
They usually start with non-confrontational forms and use confrontational strategies 
as a last resort, like their campaign against the privatisation of drinking water. It 
started with a workshop with policy-makers and the community, “but when the 
minister wanted to go ahead with privatisation, [...] something had to be done to stop 
it, and the only way was to demonstrate. So our mode of advocacy may be different 
from the other NGOs” (Interview ISODEC, November 2008). Through mass-mobilisa-
tion, they managed to block most of the plans and forced a seat at the government 
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table (Agyeman, 2007; Yeboah, 2006). This is an example of exercising veto power 
against the government, because “they realised that we have the capacity to pull 
back their policies” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007).
 ISODEC can resort to confrontational action not only because of their mobilisation 
capacity, but also because they are more distant from the state. In fact, “they have to 
be independent from the central government, because how would they otherwise 
be able to turn around and criticise them?” (Interview ISSER, November 2007). 
In contrast to the think-tanks, ISODEC has “not really worked on using informal 
contacts very much” (Interview ISODEC, November 2008). As good relations are not 
their first priority, their message is usually more critical of government policy. They are 
therefore generally “perceived [by the government] as a very critical watchdog” 
(Interview G-RAP, November 2007).
The cooperative role of ISODEC
Their grassroots connections and service-delivery experience make ISODEC an 
interesting partner for the government. They have a history of performing a subsidiary 
role by taking over and complementing government services (Interview G-RAP, 
November 2007). For instance, in the area of reproductive health they cooperate with 
the Ministry of Health: “The ministry provides technical staff, and ISODEC provides 
the network resources that allow the ministry to work in that area” (Interview ISODEC, 
December 2007).
 Good relations with the government are crucial for performing a cooperative role. 
Especially during the 1990s, ISODEC “always had a budget surplus because of 
doing service-delivery and consultancy for the government” (Interview ISODEC, 
December 2007). This relation changed in 2000 when ISODEC refocused from ser-
vice-delivery to advocacy at the same time as a new government came to power: “It 
was as if we all of a sudden became vocal, because we started dealing with policy 
issues. People thought we had become political and were against the new 
government” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). The timing of this shift combined 
with the confrontational nature of their advocacy harmed their relationship with the 
new government, and “affected our income because we lost all those contracts” 
(Interview ISODEC, December 2007).
 As a result of this income loss, they became more donor-dependent, reducing 
their freedom to set their own agenda. For instance, when Oxfam-Novib shifted to 
other West-African countries, “we had to develop a West-African programme to make 
ourselves relevant to them” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). It also affected their 
ability to attract qualified staff: “Our salaries are not competitive, so we are losing 
competent staff to international NGOs” (Interview ISODEC, December 2007). By 
raising some domestic income, ISODEC reduces its dependence, especially in 
comparison to other NGOs:
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“They publish a newspaper, have a microfinance institution and do community 
service-delivery. This allows them to generate money on their own rather than 
relying solely on donors. If you look at the other NGOs, from the computers to the 
building, everything comes from donors” (Interview ISSER, November 2007).
These activities could not however cover their losses. In the end, losing income, 
competent staff, and part of one’s independence impact negatively on each of the 
aforementioned roles.
5.6 Democratic roles of Abantu
Abantu is part of an international network with offices in London, Nairobi, and Kaduna. 
The office in Accra operates as an independent organisation, coordinating 
programmes in West Africa. Most of their work, and hence our analysis, focuses on 
Ghana. Abantu aims to promote the position of women in Ghanaian society by 
supporting women’s organisations, “to build their capacity for influencing policy” 
(Interview Abantu, December 2007). As a non-membership organisation with a 
hierarchical structure, they keep in touch with their constituency by networking with 
women’s groups throughout the country. To empower women, Abantu employs three 
strategies: (1) training and capacity-building; (2) advocacy and public aware-
ness-raising; and (3) research and publication.46
The educational role of Abantu
Educating women and their organisations lies at the heart of Abantu’s work. The 
marginalisation of women and their low political participation is considered a major 
challenge to democratic consolidation in Ghana (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; 
Ofei-Aboagye, 2004). Therefore, Abantu targets “all women”, in order “to make them 
aware of their rights”, and “policymakers who must make sure that change happens 
for women” (Interview Abantu, November 2008). Women and their organisations at 
the grassroots level receive training ranging from technical issues, like ICT training, to 
political issues, such as “running public forums in the regions to educate the general 
public about why to vote for women” (Interview Abantu, November 2008). Female 
politicians are trained in democratic principles and skills, i.e. negotiation, presentation, 
and dealing with the media.47 Female District Assembly members are especially 
targeted, “because of the unequal position of women in local communities” (Interview 
Abantu, December 2007).
46  Internal document: Abantu (2005), Strategic Plan 2005 – 2007 (Accra: Abantu).
47  Internal document: Abantu (2006), Strengthening NGOs’ Capacities for Engaging with Policies from a Gender 
Perspective, interim report to Ford Foundation, (Lagos: Abantu).
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 Abantu’s educational activities mainly rely on their network. They do not have 
enough staff to implement all their activities by themselves. Furthermore, working at 
the local level is difficult because “we only have an office in Accra, and we cannot 
pretend to know everything about the regions” (Interview Abantu, December 2007). 
Abantu therefore contacts likeminded organisations in the regions: “We partner up 
with them because they have regional offices. They do the mobilisation and then we 
deliver the programme” (Interview Abantu, December 2007).
The communicative role of Abantu
Like ISODEC, Abantu mainly provides channels of communication to the grassroots, 
namely women’s groups throughout the country. Their network is part of the broader 
Ghanaian women’s movement, which some describe as “one of the most impressive 
civil society networks in Ghana” (Interview G-RAP, November 2007). It enables them 
to collect information on the needs of women and “bring their issues into the public 
domain” (Interview G-RAP, November 2007). Although Abantu is less well connected 
to the central government than the think-tanks, they have good connections to the 
Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, because the minister (at the time of 
interviewing) “was a former activist who worked with a lot of women’s groups, so she 
virtually is their friend” (Interview ISSER, November 2007).
  The Women’s Manifesto for Ghana project shows how Abantu connects women’s 
groups to the national political system. The manifesto outlined “critical issues for 
women and ways to address them” (Interview Abantu, December 2007). In order to 
write it, Abantu consulted stakeholders throughout the country, including women’s 
groups, NGOs. District Assembly women, media personalities, and political parties. 
This project is therefore:
“a showcase of how broad-based political processes and partnerships involving 
mass-membership organisations can enable small organisations to transcend 
their limitations, maximise their resources, create a productive division of labour 
and, most significantly, give their projects legitimacy and grounding” (Tsikata, 
2009, p. 190).
This grounding and legitimacy helps the ‘Coalition on the Manifesto’ in advocating 
the use and acceptance of the manifesto by the government.
The representational role of Abantu
Besides stimulating women to represent themselves, Abantu also represents the 
voice of women in the public domain. Their strategy involves both confrontational and 
non-confrontational advocacy methods. Like ISODEC, they use coalitions to pressurise 
the government: “For instance, when the Economic Partnership Agreements were 
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signed, we [the coalition] were pitch-camping at the place where the ministers were 
meeting EU delegates, to make sure that they do not make the wrong decision” 
(Interview Abantu, November 2008). In this way, Abantu strives to keep gender issues 
on the agenda. Some of these coalitions have been successful in bringing about new 
legislation, most notably the passing of a Bill against domestic violence (Adomako 
Ampofo, 2008; Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah, 2012; Tsikata, 2009).
 In contrast to ISODEC, Abantu is nowadays more careful about maintaining 
good relations with the government: “In the eighties people perceived women’s work 
as antagonistic. Although we are still fighting, strategies are more humane, so the 
government is accessible to us” (Interview Abantu, November 2008). As a result:
“Hard forms of action no longer constitute a major part of our advocacy work. [...] 
Now it is more lobbying and advocacy in the form of strategy meetings and such. 
You do not want it to look like you are against them” (Interview Abantu, November 
2008).
Abantu now attaches more importance to informal contacts with state officials 
because “the informal connections do a greater part of the work” (Interview Abantu, 
November 2008). In this sense, their mode of advocacy resembles that of the 
think-tanks.
 Because Abantu is a non-membership organisation, they do not directly 
represent the voice of their constituency. Instead, projects like the manifesto are used 
to gather information on women’s needs at the grassroots level. Legitimacy and 
grounding then has to come from mass-membership organisations mandating 
Abantu to speak on their behalf. This backing is important because the Government 
of Ghana has the tendency to “always come out and say: hey, you don’t represent 
anybody” (Interview ISSER, November 2007). Lack of finances and donor-dependence 
make it harder to organise direct forms of representation:
“We tried to establish a self-sustaining membership organisation, called Netright, 
but the membership dues could not sustain it. We had to turn to donors, and once 
you become dependent, the social-movement character of your organisation is 
compromised” (Interview Abantu, December 2007).
It means having to deal with “frustrating accountability procedures” and with donors 
who “lack sufficient understanding of the needs and concerns of our people” 
(Interview Abantu, December 2007).  While signalling that donors have become more 
open for negotiation, they still influence Abantu’s work: “A lot of times, if we had our 
own way, we would do things differently” (Interview Abantu, November 2008).
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The cooperative role of Abantu
Abantu is a typical example of an advocacy group with a low capacity for performing 
a cooperative role. They are a relatively small organisation in terms of both staff and 
budget which limits their capacity for cooperation. In addition, their strategy to work 
at both the national and the district level has overstretched their resources. Therefore, 
rather than offering their own capacity, they try influencing the allocation of state 
capacity: “We do not do service-delivery, it is just policy advocacy backed by 
research” (Interview Abantu, November 2008).
5.7 To each, its own: comparing the NGOs
Table 5.3 presents an aggregation of our empirical findings, answering our empirical 
questions. It shows what kind of democratic roles are performed, and what 
organisational characteristics enable the NGOs to perform them. Comparing the 
NGOs to each other reveals that none of them performs all roles simultaneously. They 
each specialise in certain roles, which is mainly due to contradicting organisational 
characteristics. Furthermore, it reveals that the roles they perform are affected by 
donor-dependence.
Causes and consequences of specialisation
The NGOs specialise in some roles at the expense of others. The think-tanks focus 
on communicating with, cooperating with, and educating state officials, but have 
weak links with society and represent nobody. Abantu educates female politicians 
but, like ISODEC, is not as closely connected to the state as the think-tanks. Instead, 
Abantu and ISODEC have stronger links to society, aiming to represent and educate 
their constituency. Whereas ISODEC cooperates with the government in the field of 
service-delivery, Abantu does not perform any cooperative role.
 Careful examination of Table 5.3 reveals that performing each democratic role 
requires different and sometimes contradictory characteristics, which are difficult to 
combine within one organisation. The NGOs in our sample illustrate that providing 
channels of communication with the state is difficult to combine with confrontational 
actions against the same state. The think-tanks refrain from confrontational strategies 
to protect their good relations with the state. For Abantu, confrontational strategies 
have become less common because they want to improve their relations with the 
state. ISODEC’s confrontational approach resulted in a loss of access to the state. 
Similarly, organisations performing a representational role are less suited to perform 
a cooperative role of coordination. Because the think-tanks do not represent a certain 
constituency, they can bring together different stakeholders in policy debates. 
Because ISODEC and Abantu represent the voice of their constituency, they are more 
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likely to be one of the stakeholders in such debates. So, each NGO understandably 
occupies its own niche.
 This also explains why they are susceptible to criticism. In fact, they are often 
criticised in terms of roles they do not perform. The characteristics which make an 
organisation strong in one role potentially weaken them in other roles. For instance, 
ISODEC’s confrontational approach enables them to independently voice the needs 
of the marginalised, but being too confrontational provokes the criticism of being 
anti-government. This undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of the government, 
Table 5.3  Aggregated empirical findings
Democratic role Organisational characteristics
Educational Educating state 
officials
- Research as input
- Non-confrontational advocacy strategy
- Close relations with state
- Relations with universities
- Professional staff (expert knowledge / research 
capacity)
Educating 
citizens
- Close relations with grassroots 
- Network with other NGOs
- Ability to translate complex issues into simple 
messages
Communicative Channels of 
communication 
with state
- Close relations with state
- Informal contacts with state officials
- Non-confrontational advocacy strategies
Channels of 
communication 
with society
- Close relations with grassroots
- Network with other NGOs
- Presence throughout the country
Representational Indirect voice - Demarcated constituency
- Close relations with constituency
- Network with other NGOs
- Advocacy strategy (confrontational or non-
confrontational)
Resistance - Confrontational advocacy strategy
- Mobilisation capacity (membership, constituency, 
coalitions with other NGOs)
- Independence from state
Cooperative Coordination - Close relations with state
- Relations with universities 
- Organizing seminars and roundtables 
- Not representing any group (‘neutrality’)
- Professional staff (expert knowledge / research 
capacity)
Subsidiarity - Close relations with state
- Service delivery capacity
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which also undermines their access. Similarly, their professional staff and close 
(informal) relations with the state enable the think-tanks to educate and influence 
state officials, while provoking the criticisms of having an urban elite bias, being 
co-opted by political parties, and not representing ordinary citizens. So, getting too 
close to the government undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. 
This shows that NGOs have to perform a balancing act to prevent an asset becoming 
a liability.
Democratic roles and donor-dependence
Dependence on donor funding affects all the NGOs in our sample. As Ghanaians 
have little disposable income for membership dues or private donations (Darkwa et 
al., 2006), and there is virtually no culture of corporate philanthropy (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2004), financial resources for NGOs are scarce in Ghana. Paradoxically, while donor 
support enables most of them to exist in the first place, it also negatively impacts 
upon their work. First, the case of the think-tanks highlights the issue of sustainability, 
potentially affecting the performance of each role. Second, as evinced by the case of 
Abantu, donor-dependency replaces downward accountability with accountability 
towards the donor, thus damaging representation. Third, as was evident in the case 
of ISODEC, it reduces freedom to set your own agenda. For instance, donors can be 
sensitive about confrontational strategies, limiting the extent to which donor-funded 
NGOs can pose a countervailing force. Finally, competition for funds can divide the 
Ghanaian NGO community (Interview IBIS Ghana, December 2007):
“There is very little collaboration amongst the organisations, I think as a result of 
rivalry and competition. Because the country is so small, and we are so 
underdeveloped, there is a lot of backstabbing. Just for funding people would lie. 
So now you find that that collaboration is not there yet” (Interview with one of the 
NGOs, anonymous because of sensitivity).
To overcome this, G-RAP provides core funding rather than project funding. As a 
result, “people are beginning to feel comfortable with each other” (Interview with one 
of the NGOs, anonymous because of sensitivity). This does not however solve the 
underlying problem of dependency, which is ultimately a problem of sustainability.
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5.8  Comparing theory and practice: towards a  
new framework
We now turn to comparing each theoretical role presented in table 5.1 to the practices 
presented in table 5.3. Two observations stand out. First, our empirical analysis 
revealed that Ghanaian NGOs perform different kinds of democratic roles and use 
different organisational characteristics for performing them than the ones presented 
in table 5.1. Second, some of the theoretical roles are not performed by any of the 
NGOs. Based on these findings we propose a new theoretical framework. 
The educational role in theory and practice
Theoretically, the educational role requires democratic membership organisations with 
a broad popular base amongst common citizens because the education of citizens 
takes place through the process of membership participation. None of the NGOs in 
Ghana perform this kind of educational role. The organisational constellations of the 
think-tanks and Abantu represent the exact opposite, namely hierarchically structured 
non-membership organisations. Even ISODEC does not fulfil this kind of educational 
role because, while having a democratic structure, their membership does not include 
the poor and vulnerable for whom they work. Instead of an educational role shaped by 
processes of membership participation, they each perform a different kind of 
educational role. Education takes the form of organizing training sessions, seminars, 
radio programmes, workshops and research presentations, with different NGOs 
targeting different kinds of groups (e.g. policymakers, women, urban poor). Based on 
these findings, it seems important to divide the educational role into an internal and an 
external domain. The internal educational role then focuses on processes of ‘learning 
by doing’ within the organisation, whereas the external educational role focuses on 
teaching people outside the organisation ‘how to do it’. An organisation does not need 
to have members or a democratic structure for performing an external role, it is more 
important to have access to the groups you want to educate (state officials or citizens), 
and to have the right strategy, qualified staff (expertise) and enough resources.
The communicative role in theory and practice
The idea that NGOs provide a two-way transmission belt between citizens and the 
political system fails to describe the NGOs in this study. We found organisations that 
focus mainly on one end of the belt. The think-tanks have close connections to the 
government, while ISODEC and Abantu maintain close linkages with the grassroots. 
If we isolate a citizen-oriented channel, on the one hand, and a state-oriented one, on 
the other, it would provide a better description of our findings, in which none of the 
organisations proved strong at providing a channel of communication in both 
directions at the same time.
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The representational role in theory and practice
Ideally, an NGO performs a representational role by allowing citizens to organise and 
speak for themselves. This is best achieved by a democratic membership organisation 
which voices the needs of its members. None of the NGOs in Ghana performs this 
kind of representational role. Neither the think-tanks nor Abantu have a membership 
at all, whereas ISODEC’s membership does not include the people they aim to 
represent. Instead of directly representing the voice of members, both Abantu and 
ISODEC perform a different kind of representational role, which can be characterised 
as trusteeship. Their mode of representation is indirect; they speak for those who do 
not speak for themselves. Therefore, we divide the aspect of ‘voice’ into direct and 
indirect forms of representation. An important strategy for (indirectly) representing 
your constituency is campaigning. In a survey on the relationships of Ghanaian 
NGOs with issue-based advocacy coalitions, Davies (2007) found that ISODEC 
belongs to seventeen, Abantu to eight, CDD and IDEG to three, and IEA to only one 
advocacy coalition. This finding confirms that Abantu and ISODEC are more active at 
contributing a voice to the public sphere than the think-tanks. It also shows that voice 
without membership is possible, but without solving the underlying question of 
legitimacy.
The cooperative role in theory and practice
To perform this role, theory stresses the importance of having resources and 
capacities that are useful for the state. This accurately describes what we have found 
in Ghana. In addition, we found that having a good relation with the state is a 
prerequisite for fulfilling this role. In terms of subsidiarity, the cooperative role is only 
performed by ISODEC. Their experience in the field of service delivery resulted in 
joint programmes with some ministries. The think-tanks and Abantu are weaker in 
terms of subsidiarity because they do not possess the capacity to take over or 
complement state functions. Within the cooperative role, the main strength of the 
think-tanks lies in providing coordination. The research capacity of the think-tanks is 
not matched within the state. Therefore, their papers and policy-briefs often serve as 
input for national policy discussions. Informal relations with state-officials facilitate 
this cooperation. Abantu and ISODEC do not possess a similar research capacity. 
Their strength lies in network resources which are mainly used for representation or 
resistance.
Towards a new Framework
The findings of Ghana suggest that we should alter the democratic roles of our 
theoretical framework in three ways: (1) divide the educational role into an internal 
and an external role; (2) separate the communicative role into distinct state-oriented 
and society-oriented channels; and (3) split the aspect of ‘voice’ into direct and 
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indirect forms of representation. With these adaptations the model better explains 
what is going on in Ghana. As Ghana is often considered a good case, these 
theoretical adaptations, which acknowledge shortcomings in practice, are likely to be 
applicable to other African countries as well. Table 5.4 summarises the new framework 
(see appendix 5.2 for the complete version, including organisational characteristics). 
5.9 Conclusion
Democracy-promoting NGOs have been frequently criticised for not practicing what 
they preach. While promoting democracy, they often have an urban elite bias, are 
co-opted by the state and donors and lack societal accountability structures. As our 
analysis showed, the NGOs in Ghana are no exception to this criticism. If we take the 
four theoretical roles as a benchmark, we can conclude that they do not deliver what 
is expected from them. They do not perform an educational role in the sense of a 
Tocquevillian “school of democracy”; none of them has strong channels of 
communication with the state and the citizens simultaneously; and perhaps most 
importantly, none of them directly represents the voice of ordinary citizens. While this 
critique is justified, our analysis revealed that this is only one part of a bigger picture.
 We found that Ghanaian NGOs perform different versions of the theoretical roles, 
with different organisational characteristics. We also found that none of them performs 
each role simultaneously, because different roles require different and sometimes 
contradictory organisational characteristics. Based on these findings, we show why 
the NGOs are so vulnerable to criticism, and that avoiding it requires careful 
manoeuvring both within and between roles. Finally, our findings help to understand 
Table 5.4  Adapted theoretical framework of democratic roles
Democratic role
Educational Internal Information, Civic virtues, Political skills
External Educating state officials
Educating citizens
Communicative Channels of communication with state
Channels of communication with society
Representational Voice Direct
Indirect
Resistance
Cooperative Coordination 
Subsidiarity
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why NGOs do not necessarily need to practise what they preach for being able to 
contribute to democracy. To substantiate this claim we first assess how democratic 
the NGOs in our sample are, before turning to the question of how this affects their 
ability to perform democratic roles.
 In its most ideal form, we could define “being democratic” as having an 
independent organisation where the leadership is elected by, and accountable to, its 
members, where the process of decision-making is transparent and open to 
membership participation, and where membership is open to all kinds of citizens. If 
this is the standard, then the think-tanks are particularly susceptible to the charge of 
being undemocratic. They have hierarchical organisational structures, an urban elite 
profile, and are neither accountable to citizens nor open to their participation. ISODEC 
comes closest to this ideal, but because there is no direct participation of the poor 
and marginalised, they lack a direct link between voice, constituency, and 
accountability. Finally, as an Accra-based non-membership organisation with an 
extensive countrywide network, Abantu seems to occupy a middle position between 
the think-tanks and ISODEC. So although all of the NGOs are promoting (aspects of) 
democracy and good governance, none of them are themselves fully democratic.
 In contrast to the ‘practise what you preach’ argument, we argue that contributing 
to democracy does not necessarily depend on being democratic yourself. Rather 
than it being a question of whether or not you can make a contribution, it is a question 
of what kind of contribution you can make. Only a ‘Tocquevillian’ educational role and 
a direct representational role require organisations with a membership and internally 
democratic structures. The other roles can be performed with different organisational 
setups. Representation without direct membership participation is possible by 
mobilizing one’s constituency and building networks with other NGOs. Education of 
state officials depends more on expertise and access to the state than on 
accountability to a membership. Similarly, legitimacy can be derived from sources 
other than direct membership participation, like from coalitions, from expertise, from 
independence, and from transparency.48 Judgements concerning the democratic 
nature of an NGO therefore require careful consideration.
 Finally, we found that donor funding affected all the NGOs in our sample, so we 
now turn to discussing the practical use of our findings for donor agencies wishing to 
improve their support to civil society and democracy. By breaking it down to the level 
of organisational characteristics, our analysis makes the relation between civil society 
and democracy more tangible. It provides insight into which factors enable and limit 
48 This does not however mean that legitimacy derived from these alternative sources automatically 
translates into legitimacy in the eyes of state officials. In day-to-day politics, not having a membership 
and not being democratic yourself still renders NGOs vulnerable to criticism, because, on any 
occasion, it provides state officials with ammunition to question their credibility as “genuine” 
democracy promoters.
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NGOs in performing certain democratic roles. Because of this tangibility, donor 
agencies can use the adapted framework (see appendix 5.2) as a tool for rethinking 
their civil society and democracy promotion strategies. First, by identifying the 
repertoire of democratic roles for NGOs, it enables donors to identify blind spots 
in their funding strategy. Second, by linking the roles to specific organisational 
 characteristics, it enables donors to specifically target their activities as it shows what 
kind of NGOs they should sponsor for each role and where NGOs could complement 
each other. For instance, if donors want to overcome the blind spots identified in this 
study, they could alter their funding in two ways. First, they could stimulate cooperation 
between the NGOs they support, as existing funding schemes have often led to 
competition and distrust. Providing ISODEC and the think-tanks with incentives to 
cooperate in certain areas could strengthen the link between state and society as 
one has close relations with the people and the other with the state. Second, to 
promote genuine ‘schools of democracy’ and direct forms of representation, they 
could loosen their conditions and expand funding to less professional democratic 
membership organisations at the grassroots level. The question remains, however, 
whether this is feasible for donors and desirable for grassroots organisations, 
because as chapter 4 showed, being included in the aid-system might very well 
change the essence of these more informal types of organisation.
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Appendix 5.1: Overview of interview data
Organisation Type Respondents / 
interviews
Date(s)
Center for Democratic Development (CDD) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
11/30/2007
12/03/2007
12/11/2008
Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) NGO 3 persons / 
3 interviews
12/04/2007
12/05/2007
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/11/2007
11/06/2008
12/12/2008
Integrated Social Development Center  
(ISODEC)
NGO 3 persons / 
5 interviews
12/06/2007
11/05/2008
11/10/2008
12/12/2008
Abantu for development NGO 2 persons / 
3 interviews
12/13/2007
11/06/2008
11/11/2008
IBIS Ghana International 
NGO
1 person / 
1 interview
12/14/2007
Netherlands Embassy Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/28/2007
Ghana Research and Advocacy Program 
(G-RAP)
Donor 1 person / 
1 interview
11/19/2007
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER)  – University of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/19/2007
Department of Political Science – University 
of Ghana 
University 2 persons / 
2 interviews
11/26/2007
11/27/2007
African Peer Review Mechanism Ghana 
(APRM)
Government 
agency
1 person / 
1 interview
11/20/2007
Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) Government 
agency
1 person / 
1 interview
12/12/2007
Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment 
- NGO office (MMYE)
Governmental 
ministry
1 person / 
1 interview
11/29/2007
Note: a total of 27 interviews with 21 respondents (one respondent works for both university and for one of 
the selected NGOs)
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Appendix 5.2: Combining theory and practice
Democratic role Organisational characteristics
Educational Internal Information
Civic virtues
Political skills
- Large voluntary membership among 
common citizens
- Democratic decision making structure
External Educating state 
officials
- Research as input
- Non-confrontational advocacy strategy
- Close relations with state
- Relations with universities
- Professional staff (expert knowledge / 
research capacity)
Educating citizens - Close relations with grassroots 
- Network with other NGOs
- Ability to translate complex issues into 
simple messages
Communicative Channels of communication 
with state
- Close relations with state
- Informal contacts with state officials
- Non-confrontational strategies
Channels of communication 
with society
- Close relations with grassroots 
(membership)
- Network with other NGOs
- Presence throughout the country
Representational Voice Direct - Large voluntary membership among 
common citizens
- Democratic decision making structure
- Advocacy strategy (confrontational or 
non-confrontational)
Indirect - Demarcated constituency
- Close relations with constituency
- Network with other NGOs
- Advocacy strategy (confrontational or 
non-confrontational)
Resistance - Confrontational advocacy strategy
- Independence from state 
- Mobilisation capacity (membership, 
constituency, coalitions with other NGOs)
Cooperative Coordination - Close relations with state
- Relations with universities 
- Organizing seminars and roundtables 
- Not representing any group (‘neutrality’)
- Professional staff (expert knowledge / 
research capacity)
Subsidiarity - Close relations with state
- Service delivery capacity
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6.1 Introduction
Based on the idea that a critical and vibrant civil society is essential for the development 
and consolidation of young democracies, many bi- and multilateral donor agencies 
have funding programmes aimed at strengthening civil society sectors in developing 
countries around the world. Among the desirable effects of a strong civil society are 
that it serves as a check on state power, that it promotes a plural society, and that it 
protects a democratic public sphere (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; 
G. White, 1994). Within civil society, donors direct most of their funding to NGOs for 
bringing about all the merits of civil society. NGOs are believed to be able to do so by 
being flexible, closely connected to citizens, fostering public deliberation, helping 
include the poor and marginalised, educating citizens on the norms and values of 
democracy, and by being able to cater to local circumstances and local needs. What 
began to emerge from many studies, however, was that this positive image of NGOs 
did not correspond with the actual roles, forms and contributions of donor-funded 
NGOs in developing countries (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; 
Hendriks, 2006; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Warren, 2001). The aim of this thesis was 
to contribute to understanding why this is the case. 
 All the studies relate to the central question of how policy assumptions regarding 
civil society and democracy development turn out in practice and what explains the 
discrepancies between them. The focus on policy assumptions is a strategic choice. 
Aside from donors, civil society researchers are also criticised for letting ideals 
obscure reality (Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; Mitlin et al., 2007; Robins et al., 2008; 
Tvedt, 2007). The debate on civil society and democracy is dominated by Western 
conceptions of liberal democracy, and the language of the debate “betrays a 
normative view on how democratic development should be ‘done’” (Mercer, 2002, p. 
20). The focus on policy assumptions bypasses this problem because by using the 
assumption as a benchmark, and by analysing how this benchmark relates to the 
empirical practice, the research becomes concrete, contextualised and less value- 
laden. Furthermore, the underlying policy assumptions are key to understanding the 
complexity of success and failure in the field of civil society and democracy aid. For 
instance, if policy assumptions do not relate to the local setting of associational life, 
then it is they themselves that are problematic rather than the way they are implemented.
 The theoretical section in chapter 1 discussed several interpretations of the 
concepts of civil society and democracy, and the various ways in which the two 
concepts relate to each other. An important conclusion from this section was that 
there is a wide range of ideas, interpretations and conceptualisations of civil society 
and democracy, many of which are contradicting. Instead of choosing one of these 
theoretical views, the studies in this thesis use the policy assumptions as a starting 
point for defining civil society and democracy. In this way, the research stays closest 
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to the way the concepts are actually being applied. Following Blair (1997), this means 
looking at the enabling environment of civil society, and looking at NGOs, as support 
to these two entities are the two basic donor-strategies in the field of civil society and 
democracy promotion. 
 The studies in this thesis look at the assumptions underlying these two basic 
donor strategies. First, chapter 2 looks at the strategy of supporting civil society’s 
enabling environment and at the underlying assumption that civil society needs an 
enabling environment to flourish. This is an important subject because it has received 
less attention than the more popular strategy of direct funding to NGOs. The main 
reason for this neglect is that it is far more difficult to conceptualise (Anheier, 2005; 
Blair, 1997; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). Chapter 2 contributed to the debate by 
exploring the relation between national environmental factors, such as the level of 
economic development of a country, and the level of civil society development. The 
study analyses data on national environmental factors and membership levels in civil 
society organisations for 53 countries around the world. 
 The rest of the empirical studies (chapters 3, 4 and 5) focus on the main 
assumptions underlying the strategy of direct funding to NGOs. Chapter 3 looked at 
the assumption that NGOs are locally embedded democracy promoters. This study 
explores the meaning of embeddedness and analyses to what extent donor-funded 
democracy promoting NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia live up to the image of being 
context-specific. The comparison of NGOs from such different countries as Ghana 
and Indonesia increases the chance of finding context-specific differences between 
NGOs. Chapter 4 looked at the assumption that donor-funding to NGOs is a good 
instrument to promote ‘home-grown’ civil society and democracy. It analyses how 
the organisational configuration of Ghanaian and Indonesian NGOs is influenced by 
their dependence on donor-funding. Chapter 5 looked at the assumption that 
donor-funded NGOs fulfil various democratic roles. This study analyses how the 
organisational form of an NGO impacts on the kind of democratic roles it can fulfil. 
The analysis uses Ghanaian democracy promoting NGOs because Ghana is often 
seen as a textbook example for democratisation in developing countries. Finally, it 
must be noted that the NGOs are the starting point of the analysis of these three 
studies, rather than their donors. However, while the donors themselves are not the 
object of study, the ideas on which donor-policies are based are. The use of the term 
‘donor’ mainly relates to bi- and multilateral donor agencies, such as the UNDP, 
USAID, SIDA, DFID and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, as these are the most 
prominent donors behind the selected NGOs. 
 The following two sections present an answer to the central research question. 
First, section 6.2 summarises the main empirical findings of each of the studies, 
answering the question of how policy theories of civil society and democracy 
development turn out in practice. Second, section 6.3 discusses the theoretical 
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implications of the findings. Here the several parts are linked, thereby offering a 
comprehensive explanation for the discrepancies that were found between policy 
assumption and practice. Third, section 6.4 deals with the policy implications of the 
research. Finally, section 6.5 outlines the limitations of the analysis and its implications 
for future research.
6.2 Main findings
The importance of an enabling environment for civil society 
development
The idea that civil society needs an enabling environment in order to thrive is a deeply 
rooted one. One of the available measures of the strength of civil society worldwide, 
Civicus’ Civil Society Index, for instance, even includes civil society’s enabling 
environment as one of four key dimensions for determining the strength of civil society 
(Clarke, 2011). Nevertheless, the actual relation between an ‘enabling’ environment 
and civil society development remains difficult to grasp. This is due to the combination 
of the fact that defining and measuring the context of civil society is a difficult and 
multi-interpretable topic which has received little attention with the fact that concrete 
indicators for cross-national empirical measurement of the strength of civil society 
are scarce (Anheier, 2005; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). Therefore, this chapter 
aims to contribute to the debate by posing the following question:
1) What national contextual factors explain for differences in civil society development 
in countries around the world?
 Associational membership was used as a proxy for measuring the strength of 
civil society. Particularly in the field of sociology, many studies have been conducted 
on the relation between national contextual variables and associational membership. 
These studies mostly focused on post-communist transition countries and Western 
democracies. Therefore it was not certain whether their findings would apply in a 
similar way to developing countries. To overcome this omission, the analysis explicitly 
starts from a development perspective. It does so in three ways: first, by including 
developing countries in the analysis; second, by including contextual variables which 
are particularly relevant for developing countries (political stability and rule of law), 
besides the more generally applied contextual variables (level of democracy and 
economic development); and third, by examining alternative explanations for 
membership levels in developing countries.
 The analysis, which covers data from 53 countries, resulted in some counter- 
intuitive findings. Contrary to theoretical assumptions, democratic rights and political 
160 | Chapter 6
stability do not appear critically important for civil society affiliation. Two main factors 
affecting associational membership emerge from the multilevel regression models: 
the rule of law and economic development. However, unlike previous studies, this 
study shows that both relations are quadratic (u-shaped) instead of linear (see figure 
2.1 and 2.2). This means that whereas existing theories predict a drop in membership 
levels in situations of low economic development and a weak rule of law, the analysis 
shows that the opposite is the case. Improvement in both the rule of law and the 
economic situation in a country first ‘causes’ associational membership to drop and 
after a certain threshold to rise again. Because of the use of cross-sectional data, it 
is difficult to predict whether individual countries will actually follow this path. Howard 
(2003), for instance, argues that low numbers of membership in the post-communist 
countries, which are located at the bottom of the u-shape, are actually related to the 
communist legacy, rather than to GDP or rule of law. Testing for this option, however, 
showed that this group of countries (while having a significantly lower number of 
memberships) does not affect the quadratic explanation.
 To explain these findings, it is argued that reasons for membership are essentially 
different in the developed and in the developing world. A descriptive analysis of the 
data supports the idea that in highly developed countries, motives for membership 
seem to be more connected to self-actualisation and self-esteem, whereas in 
developing countries they seem to be more connected to physiological and safety 
needs. In both developed and developing countries, high membership scores are 
mainly based on membership of religious organisations. In developing countries 
however, churches are very often involved in the provision of basic needs, and often 
play a developmental role (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Grier, 1997). When looking at the 
kind of organisational memberships asides from religious organisations, there is a 
clear difference between both groups of countries. In developing countries the 
memberships are more connected to the basic needs in life (health and peace 
groups) or to fighting for rights which are not yet incorporated into the legal 
environment (local political initiatives and women’s rights). Western countries, on the 
other hand, score a lot higher on membership of labour unions and the residual 
category of ‘other groups’. In this group of countries, where basic rights are 
safeguarded by law and basic needs are covered by social welfare regimes and high 
income levels, existing theories seem to apply. 
 The misfit between current theories of civil society and democracy and the actual 
situation in developing countries can be partly explained by the observation that they 
are mainly geared towards the middle-classes. Whereas “virtuous citizenship may 
seem plausible to middle class ‘civil society’ actors, it is less likely to hold for poor 
and working class people who tend to have mixed motives for participating, i.e. they 
desperately need services and whatever other resources they can get to improve 
their lives” (Robins et al., 2008, p. 1078).
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The principle of context-specificity and the practice of  
donor-funded NGOs
The importance of context is often stressed in the debate on promoting civil society 
and democracy in developing countries. Context is here not only used in the sense of 
an enabling environment for civil society organisations, but also the other way around. 
That is, in order to be successful promoters of democracy, civil society organisations 
should be embedded in their national context. This premise is based on the idea that 
“civil societies in any context have a history and must develop in tune with their 
particular historical, cultural and political rhythms” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 121). 
This is a strong and compelling idea, but it does not offer any guidance on what it 
means for individual NGOs. When is an NGO ‘in tune’ with its environment, for 
instance? And what is meant by ‘historical, cultural and political rhythms’? In order to 
make these matters more tangible, the following question aims at exploring the 
meaning of context-specificity at the level of organisational characteristics:
2) What are the similarities and differences between Ghanaian and Indonesian 
 democracy-promoting NGOs in terms of their organisational characteristics and 
to what extent do these similarities and differences indicate context-specificity?
The comparison between such different countries as Ghana and Indonesia serves a 
specific purpose, namely to maximise the possibility of finding context-specific differences 
between the NGOs. 
 The exploration of the meaning of context-specificity resulted in a framework for 
judging the extent to which an NGO can be classified as context-specific for each of 
the selected organisational characteristics, namely: mission, strategy, structure and 
resources. First, based on the idea that each country has its own path to democracy, 
a mission statement is context-specific when it focuses on a problem which is relevant 
for the given context. While some countries struggle with their electoral system, 
others struggle with decentralisation. NGOs should be sensitive to these differences. 
Second, an NGO’s strategy is context-specific when it fits with the range of most 
appropriate strategies given the kind of political culture or state-society relations in a 
country (i.e. confrontational or non-confrontational). Third, an organisational structure 
is context-specific when it is open to societal input. In its most ideal form this is a 
democratic structure which is open to membership participation of all kinds of 
citizens. Fourth, human resources are context-specific when an NGO not only works 
with professionals, but also has some staff with whom to maintain a link with society 
(broadly defined as volunteers and activists). Fifth, financial resources are context- 
specific when an NGO is able to raise its own (domestic) income independent from 
international donors. To this principle a ‘reality check’ is added which looks at various 
economic indicators, representing the potential for raising an income locally. 
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 Compared to this framework, NGOs in Ghana show a somewhat higher degree 
of context-specificity than the ones in Indonesia. A more striking finding however is 
that the fieldwork data from Accra and Jakarta only partly confirm the expectation of 
finding differences between NGOs. At a first glance the NGOs seem to be very 
different as their mission statements focus on very different topics in Ghana and 
Indonesia. But delving deeper into their organisational setup, one finds remarkable 
similarities in terms of strategies, structures and financial and human resources. 
Regardless of the context, the dominant organisational configuration is that of a 
hierarchic non-membership organisation, which is dependent on donors for its 
finances and owned and run by an academic elite with a bias for doing research and 
non-confrontational advocacy. So despite the pledge of donors to adapt their funding 
strategies to the local context and to promote local participation and ownership, such 
commitments have not yet resulted in context-specific partner organisations. 
 The fact that none of the NGOs is context-specific in terms of financial resources 
is used as a tentative explanation for why they are so similar across such different 
contexts. Financial resources are such an important element because they directly 
relate to an NGOs’ autonomy. It has been argued that donor-dependence and 
upward accountability can cause mission to follow money, structures and human 
resources to conform to particular Western organisational paradigms, and strategies 
to become less confrontational. Although the analysis does not permit one to draw 
firm conclusions on this matter, the findings from Ghana and Indonesia do seem to 
indicate a high degree of ‘donor-specificity’ instead of ‘context-specificity’. To investigate 
this claim, chapter 4 analysed the relation between donor-funding and organisational 
form.
The relation between donor-funding and the organisational form  
of an NGO
This chapter confronts the assumption that donor-funding to NGOs is a good 
instrument for promoting ‘home-grown’ civil society and democracy in developing 
countries. NGOs are believed to promote plurality and inclusion (Biekart, 1999; 
Clarke, 1998). It is also believed that NGOs have the capacity to cater to local 
circumstances and local needs because they are flexible and closely connected to 
people’s life-worlds (Diamond, 1999; G. White, 1994). As such, NGOs are the perfect 
vehicles to ensure that democracy becomes locally rooted and widely accepted by 
different segments of a population (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). At the same time, the 
aid system has been identified as an important factor in causing NGOs to homogenise. 
It is “a powerful structural force, impacting organisational landscapes and civil 
societies all over the world in complex ways we do not yet understand” (Tvedt, 2002, 
p. 363). This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of why NGOs are 
so similar by looking at how donor-funding affects the concrete organisational 
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 characteristics of NGOs (i.e. their mission, staff, strategy and structure). These processes 
are analysed for donor-sponsored NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia. The previous 
chapter concluded that they are strikingly similar in their organisational characteristics 
despite major contextual differences. This chapter builds on the outcomes of that 
analysis and focuses on finding an explanation for such similarities with the following 
sub-question:
3) How does donor-funding affect the concrete organisational characteristics of 
Ghanaian and Indonesian democracy-promoting NGOs?
To uncover the processes stimulating the homogenisation of organisations, the 
concepts of institutional isomorphism and organisational fields are used (Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995, 
2008). According to institutional theory, groups of organisations in the same 
organisational field tend to become isomorphic over time. The main reason for this 
process of organisational adaptation is survival. Actors adapt themselves in order to 
gain legitimacy and resources from the actors on which they depend for their survival. 
Therefore, it is important to pinpoint the kind of actor which is most important for NGO 
survival. 
 The first part of the analysis reveals a shifting importance from national to 
international actors for NGO survival. In the past, during the military regimes in Ghana 
and Indonesia, NGOs were largely suppressed. The ones that did exist were mainly 
dependent on the state for their survival. Non-adaptation to state requirements 
brought the risk of prosecution. During the time of reform, both countries opened up 
their political space to NGOs. In Indonesia especially, many citizens were involved in 
NGOs during this transition from military rule to a democratic system. During this time 
citizens were important actors for NGO survival. Currently, however, as the previous 
chapter concluded, international donors are the single most important actor for their 
survival. In both the Ghanaian and Indonesian organisational fields international 
actors (donors) have thus become more important than national actors (the state and 
citizens). Although the observation that they depend on the same type of actor for 
their survival offers an explanation for why they are so similar, it does not explain the 
process of homogenisation.
 The analysis therefore illustrates how the process of homogenisation works at 
the level of organisational characteristics (i.e. mission, staff, strategy and structure). 
Four findings stand out. First, the analysis shows that donor-funding indeed directly 
interferes with how NGOs organise themselves. It influences mission statements 
through agenda setting and earmarking, it influences staff by stimulating and 
sometimes forcing NGOs to hire professionals, and it influences strategy by approving 
non-confrontational strategies while disapproving confrontational ones. Donor-funding 
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has no direct influence on the organisational structure of an NGO. It can however be 
concluded that, as a democracy promoting NGO, having a membership-based 
structure is not a condition for getting access to funding. Second, the analysis also 
shows that homogenisation is not only a matter of imposition. Besides the more 
commonly identified unequal power relation between donor and recipient, 
homogenisation also stems from the NGOs themselves. They frame their mission 
statements in donor language and use professional staff to get access to and 
account for funding, and the use of non-confrontational strategies safeguards this 
access. Third, the analysis shows that homogenisation is also caused by the interre-
latedness of the organisational characteristics of the NGOs. The fact that they are all 
run by academics, for instance, produces a bias with regard to the type of problems 
being tackled and with regard to how they are tackled. While activists might seek to 
mobilise the community, academics would probably prefer to organise a seminar 
with government officials. This bias reinforces itself because it also works the other 
way around. When an NGO’s mission is to promote good governance and attain this 
by doing research and advocating the results at high level seminars and roundtables 
with government officials, it needs a highly educated staff. Finally, the analysis reveals 
that the combination of these three processes produces multiple series of 
feedback-loops which reinforce the process of homogenisation. A detailed visual 
summary of the various forces at work can be found in figure 4.1.
 Although donor-funding catalyses the process of homogenisation, it is the 
dependence on donors which is the driving force behind these feedback-loops. 
The coercive power of donors stems not from their own power per se, but from the 
lack of alternative resources for NGOs. This is especially due to the process of 
 professionalisation. This process can be characterised as the institutionalisation of 
trust between donor and recipient. It means that the more an NGO conforms to the 
professional organisational model which is promoted by donors, the more it can be 
trusted with grant money. This is where the feedback-loop starts, because having a 
professional organisation also makes an NGO more dependent on funding. Working 
from modern offices with an academic staff costs a lot of money, which, at present, only 
donors are willing to provide. The result is a self-reinforcing process which stimulates 
dependency rather than ownership and sustainability. This situation is difficult to 
change because donor agencies are themselves also bound by conditionalities.
The democratic roles of donor-funded NGOs
The NGOs which have been studied in this book, receive donor-funding with the aim 
of stimulating the democratisation processes in Ghana and Indonesia. This strategy 
is firmly rooted in a normative conception of the merits of civil society: “In the eyes of 
many donors and recipients, and even of many democratic theorists, the idea that 
civil society is always a positive force for democracy, indeed even the most important 
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one, is unassailable” (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000a, p. 4). Despite having positive 
connotations, there is no consensus on the role civil society should play (Robinson & 
Friedman, 2007). Its wide range of desirable functions include serving as a check on 
state power, helping include the poor and marginalised, and educating citizens on 
the norms and values of democracy (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2004; Fowler, 2000; 
G. White, 1994). 
 The analysis focuses on NGOs in Ghana and uses four democratic roles which 
can be commonly found in the existing literature as a benchmark: (1) an educational 
role; (2) a communicative role; (3) a representational role and; (4) a cooperative role. 
In describing these roles, many authors use metaphors like, civil society “acts as an 
antidote to state expansion” (Fowler, 2000, p. 7) or that “associations can be seen as 
the seedbeds of democracy” (Sørensen, 1993, p. 57). Such claims remain abstract 
and provide few clues for what it means for individual organisations. Therefore, this 
study explores the importance of organisational characteristics such as structure, 
strategy, resources and relations with the environment for performing democratic 
roles. It poses the following question:
4) What kind of democratic roles do Ghanaian donor-sponsored NGOs perform, 
and what organisational characteristics enable them to perform these roles?
 The analysis demonstrates that the NGOs do not contribute to democracy as 
predicted by theory. Theory accurately describes the empirical findings in Ghana 
only in terms of the cooperative role, namely, that NGOs indeed complement the 
state in various ways. But when looking at the other roles, it could be concluded that 
they do not deliver what is expected from them. None of the NGOs performs an 
educational role in the sense of acting as a Tocquevillian ‘school of democracy’, none 
of the NGOs has strong channels of communication towards both the state and the 
citizens simultaneously, and finally, none of them directly represents the voice of 
citizens. Furthermore, as Ghana is considered to be a ‘good case’ in terms of 
democratic development, NGOs probably fulfil these roles to an even lesser extent in 
other developing countries. 
 Nevertheless, as stated in the introduction, focusing too much on idealised 
theoretical notions obscures what is going on in reality. The empirical analysis shows 
that NGOs perform a different kind of educational, communicative and representa-
tional role, and explains what organisational characteristics enable them to do so. 
First, instead of being shaped by processes of membership participation, the 
educational role takes the form of organising training sessions, seminars, radio 
programmes, workshops and research presentations, with different NGOs targeting 
different audiences (e.g. policymakers, women, urban poor). Second, instead of 
providing a ‘two-way transmission belt’ between citizens and the political system, the 
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NGOs in this study mainly focus on one end of the belt: either on communication with 
citizens or on communication with state officials. Finally, instead of directly 
representing the voice of members, representation is indirect and is achieved by 
mobilising one’s constituency and by building networks with other NGOs. 
 The analysis also revealed that conflicting organisational demands make it 
difficult for one NGO to perform all of the roles simultaneously. Performing each 
democratic role requires different and sometimes contradictory characteristics, 
which are difficult to combine within one organisation. For instance, the NGOs in 
Ghana illustrate that providing channels of communication with the state is difficult to 
combine with performing a critical watchdog function towards the same state. 
Refraining from confrontational advocacy tactics safeguards or improves access to 
state officials, while a confrontational approaches result in a loss of access. Similarly, 
performing a representational role is difficult to combine with performing a cooperative 
role in the sense of coordinating national policy debates with the state. While NGOs 
which do not represent a certain constituency can bring different stakeholders 
together in policy debates, NGOs which represent the voice of their constituency are 
more likely to be one of the stakeholders in such debates. Thus, each NGO 
understandably occupies its own niche. 
 These conflicting demands also explain why democracy promoting NGOs are so 
susceptible to criticism. In fact, they are often criticised in terms of roles they do not 
perform. The characteristics which make an organisation strong in one role potentially 
weaken them in other roles. For instance, a confrontational approach enables an 
NGO to independently voice the needs of their constituency, but being too confron-
tational provokes the criticism of being anti-government. This undermines their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the government, which also undermines their access to 
government. Similarly, having a professional staff and close (informal) relations with 
the state enables an NGO to educate and influence state officials, while provoking 
the criticisms of having an urban elite bias, being co-opted by political parties and 
not representing ordinary citizens. So, getting too close to the government undermines 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. This shows how NGOs have to 
perform a balancing act to prevent an asset becoming a liability.
6.3  Civil society and democracy aid:  
a crash of assumptions 
The optimistic view that civil society is always a positive force for democracy and 
must therefore be supported by international donors, conceals an ever more difficult 
reality. The simple idea that civil society and democracy should be home-grown 
entities is basically very complex. As each country embarks on its own path to 
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democracy, each country will need a different kind of civil society to support or 
complement this development. As the chapter on the enabling environment showed, 
different national settings seem to correspond with different types of civil society 
memberships. Chapter 3 has shown that the NGOs in Ghana and Indonesia are 
confronted with very different socio-political and economic environments. 
Nevertheless, the only organisational aspect mirroring this environment was the 
organisational mission, and even this was formulated in donor-terminology. The 
subsequent chapter has shown that donor-funding is central to this homogenisation 
of organisational form. Here too the idea that donors one-sidedly impose a certain 
organisational paradigm has proven to be an overly simplistic explanation. The 
relation is instead a tangled web in which donors and NGOs are bound up with one 
another and donors themselves are also part of a system of upward accountability. 
While claiming to promote such inherently good things as local ownership, 
sustainability, diversity, inclusion and participation, this situation causes the opposite 
outcomes. Chapter 5 has shown that the consequence of this outcome is that due to 
their particular organisational configuration the NGOs can only perform a limited set 
of democratic roles, which are far less ideal than the ones described in theory. It can 
thus be concluded that the main assumptions underlying civil society and democracy 
aid need serious rethinking in light of the findings of this thesis. Table 6.1 summarises 
the discrepancies by comparing the policy assumptions to the practices.
 So what explains these discrepancies between policy assumptions and 
practices? The short answer to the central question would be that the empirical reality 
is more complex and does not behave as straightforwardly as would have been 
expected by the assumptions underpinning civil society and democracy aid. While 
true, this observation does not offer a deeper understanding of why these 
discrepancies occur. To gain this understanding, the answer to the central question 
has to be put in a much broader perspective. The introduction of this thesis offers this 
perspective by discussing various theories about the meaning of civil society and 
democracy. It shows some of the complexities and contradictions involved in this 
theoretical field. By putting our findings in this broader theoretical perspective it 
becomes clear that the discrepancies are caused by the several steps which are 
taken to translate theory into policy practice. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical 
representation of the argument. It depicts the idea that there is a vast difference 
between, on the one hand, the complexity of civil society and democracy, both in 
theory and in practice, and, on the other hand, how it is promoted within the aid 
system. To understand how this works it is necessary to zoom in on the translation 
process which consists of roughly three steps, which are depicted by the three 
arrows.
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 The first step consists of the translation of theories and ideologies of civil society and 
democracy into policy assumptions. This step entails the selection of both positive 
and abstract ideas from the theoretical debate. There is a striking difference in the 
level of complexity between, on the one hand, the full range of theories on civil society 
and democracy and, on the other hand, the rather simplistic and one-dimensional 
policy assumptions which seem to be taken from this debate almost at random. In 
figure 6.1 this difference is depicted by a wide range of theories and a much smaller 
range of policy assumptions. In theory there is no consensus on what civil society is, 
how it contributes to democracy and whether it is essentially a good thing or not. 
Similarly, there are many contesting ideas about what democracy is or should be, 
and how the process of democratisation does or does not work. In contrast, donor 
strategies are based on a firm belief that civil society is always a positive force for 
democracy and good governance (Brown et al., 2008; Hendriks, 2006; Roy, 2008; 
Sabet, 2008). The underlying policy assumptions mainly portray an optimistic outlook 
and are straightforward in their explanations. One of the reasons for this discrepancy 
is that policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast body of academic 
Table 6.1  The discrepancies between policy assumptions and practices
Policy assumption Practice
1 Civil society organisations 
need an enabling 
environment to flourish (i.e. 
the better the environmental 
factors, the more 
associational memberships).
The relation between environmental factors and 
associational membership is not linear, but u-shaped. 
When environmental factors improve, there is no simple 
growth of the number of associational memberships. 
It is rather a transformation of civil society affiliation 
as improvements in environmental factors change the 
necessity and type of civil society affiliations. 
2 NGOs are locally-embedded 
democracy promoters.
Donor-funded NGOs are not very well embedded in their 
context as they are not open to membership participation, 
almost exclusively run by an academic elite and almost 
totally dependent on donor-funding. This is a pattern 
which repeats itself across very different contexts 
(countries).
3 Donor-funding to NGOs 
is a good instrument to 
promote ‘home-grown’ civil 
society and democracy in 
developing countries.
Donor-funding catalyses a process of homogenisation 
which is reinforced by the NGOs themselves. This 
process tends to move them towards donors and away 
from local priorities, local constituencies and local 
accountability.
4 Donor-funded NGOs 
fulfil democratic roles 
(educational, communicative, 
representational and 
cooperative).
Donor-funded NGOs do not perform the roles which 
are commonly found in literature, but perform different 
versions of these roles.
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knowledge, while scholars invest little in producing policy-relevant knowledge (Walt, 
2005). The result is that theory is used as a grab bag from which some ideas are 
picked and others are conveniently left out. The ideas of Tocqueville have been 
picked because they portray civil society positively as a school of democracy, while 
the ideas of Gramsci have been mainly left out because they see civil society as a 
representation of the conflicts and cleavages in wider society. Furthermore, the 
positive idea of democratisation as a process of several progressive stages, as 
presented by theorists of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, is much more appealing 
than Carothers’ analysis of messy democratisation processes which do not 
necessarily end in democracy. 
 As Walt (2005) concludes, this is not the sole responsibility of policy makers, but 
also of scholars. The theoretical field of civil society and democracy is a highly 
normative one where theory can sometimes be equated with hopes and dreams and 
where it has remained rather abstract. This can be both a strength and a weakness 
for policymakers. By being ‘positive-minded’, so to speak, theories of civil society 
and democracy development provide an inspiring and hopeful ground for action in 
developing countries. Furthermore, by being abstract, they are applicable to very 
Figure 6.1  From theory to policy practice
NGOs
Democratic
roles
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different socio-political settings around the world. At the same time these points have 
also proven to be the main analytical weakness. The notion that civil society is 
something which is inherently good for the development of democracy obscures civil 
society’s actual role. The downside of being abstract is that that it offers few concrete 
starting points for donor agencies wishing to support civil society and democracy 
development. 
 This brings us to the next step in the translation process, namely the translation 
of policy assumptions into a concrete policy strategy. Like the first step, this step 
again entails a simplification of matters. Supporting civil society and democracy is 
reduced to supporting NGOs, and within NGOs it has been reduced to a particular 
professional organisational form. The first box with the dotted line in figure 6.1 
symbolises the broad range of civil society organisations which could be supported 
to stimulate various aspects of democratisation. Besides professional NGOs, civil 
society can consist of a multitude of formal and informal organisations and networks, 
such as social movements, community-based organisations, labour unions, and so 
on. Out of this range donors have picked a rather small segment of professional 
NGOs as their primary policy target, represented by the small box in the middle of 
figure 6.1. This means that essentially non-political associations such as sport clubs 
and choral societies are left out. According to Putnam (2000; 1994) these are the kind 
of organisations which prove to be so important for the generation of social capital. 
Nevertheless, many donor policies are still based on a neo-Tocquevillian argument, 
which presupposes that supporting NGOs also fosters the accumulation of social 
capital. It is believed that a growing number of NGOs will bring about the horizontal 
linkages, generalised trust and collective action which are necessary for making 
democracy work (Brown et al., 2008). The reason for the continued prominence of 
NGOs seems to be two-sided. On the one hand, professional NGOs are suitable 
partners because they can comply with the conditionalities which accompany 
donor-funding. On the other hand, as chapter 4 revealed, organisations which 
become part of the aid-system tend over time to be transformed into professionalised 
NGOs. This situation is difficult to change because donors themselves are often also 
stuck in a system of upward accountability.
 While the first step in the translation process can be described as a normative 
one (selecting ‘the good’), the second step loses this normative content by reducing 
the norm to an organisational form. At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the choice 
of supporting NGOs was a highly ideological one. Nowadays, it seems to have 
become a more practical one for the accountability reasons just mentioned. There 
seems to be a dominance of form over content. NGOs which comply with a 
professional organisational form almost automatically become legitimate democracy 
promoters. Again this relates to the tendency of donors to “think of NGOs as the heart 
of Civil Society”, which is “part and parcel of their ahistorical approach in this domain” 
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(Ottaway & Carothers, 2000b, p. 295). As such the issue of civil society and 
democracy promotion has been stripped of its ideological content and reduced to a 
rather empty organisational shell. This is exactly the kind of “one-size-fits-all 
development recipe” which has contributed to the term civil society becoming an 
apolitical and empty buzzword (Cornwall & Brock, 2005, p. 1043).
 The last step in the translation process from theory to practice is the actual 
application of a strategy. The bottom part of figure 6.1 depicts the idea that, as a 
result of their organisational form (that of a professional NGO), the NGOs only 
manage to contribute a rather narrow set of democratic roles within the range of 
possible democratic contributions. At the same time these roles are depicted as 
being somewhat wider than one would expect. The reason for this is that ideas which 
seem pretty straightforward prove to be very complex when implemented in various 
developing countries around the world. Here, the dominance of form over content 
leads to a paradoxical outcome. On the one hand, focussing on professional NGOs 
reduces the range of possible democratic contributions. As chapter 5 showed, the 
kind of democratic contribution an organisation can make directly relates to its form. 
Policy assumptions which are derived from a Tocquevillian perspective are, for 
instance, difficult to implement with professional NGOs, simply because their 
organisational characteristics (lack of members) do not allow them to. Similarly, many 
advocacy NGOs are good at serving as watchdogs, but are not the type of 
organisation which brings citizens together and builds bridges across societal groups 
(Fung, 2003). Considering the broad range of possible organisational forms of CSOs, 
an equally broad range of possible democratic contributions can be conceived. By 
only focussing on professional NGOs, more radical and less predictable organisational 
forms such as social movements are left out. This can be considered a loss, as many 
theories stress the importance of their democratic role as watchdogs and as the 
voices of marginalised groups. The result is a range of democratic roles which is far 
less ideal and less comprehensive than those described in theory. Thus, as 
Encarnación (2012, p. 474) rightly notes, “much appears to have been sacrificed by 
reducing civil society almost exclusively to NGOs”.
 At the same time, the dominance of form over content creates room for ideological 
variation, hence the somewhat wider box of democratic roles in figure 6.1. Within 
critical approaches to the concept of development, NGOs are often seen as an 
externally imposed phenomenon that represents a new form of imperialism (Tandon, 
1991). Therefore, the extent to which NGOs can really be agents for alternative 
approaches to democracy is open to question (Mitlin et al., 2007). In terms of democ-
ratisation especially, development is dominated by a particularly Western discourse 
which promotes the current hegemony of neo-liberal democracy (Escobar, 2007; 
Wright, 2012). Nonetheless, the Ghanaian and Indonesian NGOs which have been 
researched in this thesis only partly conform to this image. Although the constraints 
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of their organisational form allow for only a slim chance of radical outcomes that 
would create discomfort for the donor, the focus of their work actually relates to very 
different views on democracy. Besides NGOs which do convey a neo-liberal 
interpretation of democracy (i.e. CDD and IEA), there are also NGOs which adhere to 
the more comprehensive interpretations of democracy, like deliberative democracy 
(i.e. KID) and social democracy (i.e. Yappika and ISODEC). Hegemony, as such, 
does not manifest itself in the imposition of a dominant ideology, but rather in the 
imposition of a professionalised organisational form. The contradictory outcome is 
thus that the focus on organisational form creates room for diversification in ideology. 
This diversity seems to be less a product of neatly interpreted and imposed ideologies 
by donor-agencies, and more an unintended by-product of the dominance of 
form over content. As such, democratic diversity as a by-product of a process of 
organisational homogenisation is perhaps the best example of a complex reality 
which is difficult to grasp in theory, let alone to influence in practice. 
6.4  Mind the gap: realism as the next stop in  
civil society and democracy promotion
The question remains whether there is a way of making civil society and democracy 
aid more context-specific. As argued in the introduction, each of the policy 
assumptions in this research embodies a rationale for overcoming the tension 
between, on the one hand, the fact that external aid by definition represents the 
mingling in internal affairs, and, on the other hand, the goal of promoting context- 
specific civil society and democracy. So will context-specific civil society and 
democracy aid remain a ‘contradictio in terminis’ or is there a way out? The findings 
of this thesis suggest two types of solutions, namely, a change in the way donors act 
and a change in the way donors think. As explained in the introduction of this thesis, 
these solutions are mainly geared towards bi- and multilateral donor agencies.
A change in the way of acting
One strategy available to donors to make their actions more context-specific is to 
redirect funding to different types of organisations. The findings of the empirical study 
in chapter 5 help donors to better guide their actions. The analysis delivered a 
framework which provides insight into factors that both enable and limit NGOs in 
performing certain democratic roles. Donor agencies can use this framework as a 
tool for making their civil society and democracy promotion strategies more context- 
specific. First, identifying the repertoire of democratic roles of NGOs enables donors to 
pinpoint blind spots in their funding strategy. This analysis showed that their funding 
mainly goes to professional NGOs which are led by a Western educated elite and that 
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this limits the kind of representational and educational role they perform. Second, linking 
these roles to specific organisational characteristics enables donors to specifically 
target their activities, as it shows what kind of NGOs they should sponsor for each 
role. They can use this information to overcome their blind spots by expanding 
funding to less professional democratic membership organisations at the grassroots 
level, as these are the kind of organisations which are more likely promote genuine 
‘schools of democracy’ and direct forms of representation of the poor and vulnerable.
 This strategy however has its limitations, as chapter 4 clearly pointed out. To 
improve the context-specificity of their approach, donors could indeed expand 
funding to these less professional organisations. The question remains, however, 
whether this is feasible for donors and desirable for grassroots organisations. For 
donors, this would have fundamental implications for the way they organise 
themselves. To be able to extend their funding to less professional and less predictable 
partner organisations requires flexible funding schemes with less technical 
accountability requirements. It is questionable whether this is feasible as these bi- 
and multilateral donors usually depend on the consent of (supra)national parliaments. 
Therefore, a change in the way they operate would require a more fundamental 
change in upward accountability to the parliaments of donor countries. This is unlikely 
to happen in a time of economic crisis with shrinking budgets for development aid, 
combined with rising scepticism and demands for showing ‘tangible’ results. In other 
words, in the short term we cannot expect donors to go beyond their current type of 
partners as their room to manoeuvre is also bound by conditionalities. 
 It is also questionable whether being including is desirable for these locally- 
embedded grassroots organisations. The findings of chapter 4 indicate that being 
included in the aid-system might very well change the essence of these more informal 
types of organisation. Unless donors are able to fundamentally change their funding 
schemes, the mechanisms and incentives which drive the current schemes inhibit 
the danger of slowly transforming a locally embedded grassroots organisation into a 
professional NGO. This implies that while including grassroots organisations might 
improve the context-specificity of donor strategies in the short term, in the long term 
it will be undermined by the process of homogenisation. Given the fact that we cannot 
expect donors to be able to fundamentally change funding conditions in the short 
term, it is not currently advisable to extend funding directly to grassroots organisations.
 So are there any alternatives left to improve the context-specificity of their 
approach? There are three more options which could be considered. First of all, 
instead of directly transferring money to grassroots organisations, donors have the 
option of sponsoring intermediary NGOs which support their partners at the 
grassroots. This strategy should be applied with care. On the one hand, it could turn 
out positively in cases where the intermediary NGO acts as a buffer against the 
pressure to professionalise. On the other hand, it could turn out negatively in cases 
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where the intermediary NGO channels funding conditions downwards to their 
partners at the grassroots. To prevent this from happening, the intermediary NGO 
should not become a donor itself by channelling money. Instead it should be more of 
a service delivery organisation focusing on activities like capacity building of their 
partners at the grassroots and acting as their channel to the national political system. 
This strategy is already being implemented by the bilateral donor-consortium 
STAR-Ghana (formerly G-RAP), which recently broadened funding to NGOs with 
many connections to community based organisations. 
 Second, the analysis in chapter 2 confirmed that country-level factors, namely 
the rule of law and economic growth, have a significant influence on civil society 
development. So in addition to the more popular strategy of funding NGOs in 
developing countries, the alternative of a more structural approach focusing on the 
creation of ‘enabling conditions’ deserves serious attention. However, the analysis 
suggests that improving these factors could actually lead to a drop in civil society 
affiliation.  As argued in chapter 2, this drop in the amount of memberships can be 
interpreted as a good thing. As the situation in a country improves and more rights 
and basic needs are covered by a good rule of law and a good economic climate, 
people have less reason to be members of CSOs which are providing such things for 
them. It is only after a certain level of wealth and rule of law is reached that 
memberships start rising again, but this is probably due to different reasons, related 
to self-actualisation and self-esteem. 
 Finally, it should be considered that including a different type of partner might be 
best left to a different type of donor. It is important to note that different types of 
donors are bound by different types of conditionalities. Bi- and multilateral donors are 
tied to more rigid requirements because they have to account for taxpayers' money, 
whereas foundations which are in charge of their own money can make their own 
rules. Therefore it may be better for bi- and multilateral donors to leave supporting 
grassroots organisations to those who already are more flexible. They could also 
leave this kind of work to private aid agencies, which are already working at the local 
level, and might therefore be better suited to doing this kind of work.
 
A change in the way of thinking
More fundamentally, donor agencies can make their strategies more context-specific 
by changing their way of thinking. To explain this approach, we need to go back to the 
observation that there is a gap between what is assumed and what actually is. The 
options for changing the way donors act are all based on insights into how things 
work and on why things go wrong. This knowledge helps them in the sense that as 
long as one minds the gap, one is less likely to fall into it. To reduce the gap more 
fundamentally, however, the assumptions behind their policies need to become more 
realistic. Although this sounds simple, it can be quite difficult because policy 
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assumptions often contain a mix of both theoretical arguments of how things work 
(let us call this ‘theory’ for now) and normative arguments about how things should 
work. Separating norms from theory is important, nevertheless, because adding this 
normative element to policy assumptions can cause the paradoxical situation of 
ending up further away from the desired situation. Policy assumptions guide concrete 
actions, and they therefore need to be very clear concerning what is actually 
happening and about how things actually work. In cases where policy actions are 
based on norms rather than on how things actually work, there is a big chance that 
they will not have the desired results or that they will even be counterproductive. The 
reason for this is that what is does not necessarily comply with what ought to be, or, 
as argued previously, mixing ideals with reality blurs what is actually happening. 
 This does not mean that we should do away with norms. First of all, this would 
not be very realistic for a field which has a strong normative component as a result of 
the intermingling of science and activism. Second, normativity is not necessarily a 
problem, just as long as one is explicit about it. In the end, all development aid is 
directed with a certain kind of ‘ought’-ness. Even technical solutions such as drilling 
a well or providing electricity are based on ideas of what development should be, and 
administering them can have profound social consequences. It is not wrong to have 
norms and ideals, it is wrong to confuse them with how things work. 
 The ideal situation would therefore be one where theory shapes assumptions, 
where norms guide actions and where monitoring and evaluation is used to constantly 
fine-tune both aspects with regard to what is actually happening on the ground. A 
change in the way of thinking along these lines has a great potential for making the 
policies of donor agencies more context-specific, as goals and expectations will 
automatically become less grand and more down to earth. Instead of having overly 
ambitious visions of turning nascent democracies into ideal democratic societies, it 
is much more productive to analyse the actual social, political and economic situation 
in a country and pinpoint some key areas where intervention might be helpful. This 
requires being modest about what one might achieve. Development aid has often 
collapsed under its own pretentions. If even a relatively simple development strategy 
such as drilling wells has often not had the intended long term effects at community 
level, then what could one expect from strategies which aim at fundamentally 
changing whole socio-political systems of a country? Being realistic about what one 
can achieve with a limited budget probably is therefore the best way of making civil 
society and democracy aid more context-specific. 
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6.5 Limitations and implications for future research
While presenting many interesting findings, the studies in this thesis also suffer from 
some limitations, which relate to specific methodological choices. The main limitation 
of the quantitative method in chapter 2 has to do with the measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables, while the qualitative methods of chapters 3, 4 
and 5 are mainly limited by choices concerning the qualitative sample of organisations 
and interview candidates. 
 In the study on civil society’s enabling environment, the dependence on 
secondary data determines the way both civil society and its environment are being 
measured. While these large scale secondary data sources are positive in terms of 
the external validity of the research, this comes at the cost of internal validity. As a 
researcher you have no control over how these variables are being constructed. 
While the environmental variable of economic development is relatively straightfor-
ward, variables such as rule of law, political stability and level of democracy are much 
more complicated. They are composed of many different elements, both objective 
and subjective, quantitative and qualitative. Interpreting these variables therefore 
requires extreme caution. The introduction of this thesis, for instance, drew attention 
to the many different definitions of democracy, which implies that each definition 
would end up with a different ‘score’ on the variable of ‘level of democracy’. 
 The dependent variable has a similar problem, but in the opposite direction. 
While the independent environmental variables are large and complicated constructs, 
the dependent variable of measuring civil society affiliation is relatively small and 
straightforward as compared to the concept it is supposed to measure. The strength 
of this variable is that it is measured at the level of individuals. This enables us to 
control for many composition effects and make a more ‘fair’ comparison of civil 
society membership between countries around the world. Nevertheless, civil society 
as a concept is very broad, and the use of civil society membership as a proxy for 
measuring its strength therefore is far from comprehensive. Measuring the strength 
of civil society in this way only covers the breadth of citizen participation in civil society 
organisations. This variable therefore does not include aspects such as civil society’s 
political, economic and social roles, its functioning as a public sphere, or any of the 
other interpretations of civil society. This is basically a choice of availability; for the 
most part we must make do with what we have. 
 Although progress has been made in operationalising the abstract notion of civil 
society into tangible indicators, its empirical measurement remains problematic. In 
the past few years, various research projects have attempted to measure civil society 
empirically in a cross-national manner (see: Anheier, 2004; Howard, 2003; Hyden et 
al., 2004; Sokolowski & Salamon, 2005; Thindwa, Monico, & Reuben, 2003). Most of 
these projects suffer from several conceptual and/or methodological weaknesses 
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(see: Anheier, 2005; Heinrich, 2005; Howard, 2005). These shortcomings relate to the 
Eurocentric nature and limited ‘travelling capacity’ of civil society definitions, the 
failure to include the political, economic and socio-cultural context sufficiently in the 
analysis, the use of typologies of civil society organisations that do not adequately 
reflect reality, the inconsistent nature of the data used (qualitative vs. quantitative 
data) and the way this data has been collected. Considering these shortcomings, 
maybe the way forward is not to refine existing measurements, but to first ask a 
question about the assumption behind these measurements, namely, “can a single 
and valid index be constructed to assess the strength of civil societies in various 
 regions?”(Biekart, 2008, p. 1171). 
  When looking at the qualitative studies, the limitations are of a different nature. 
Here the specific choices which were made in the selection of organisations and the 
selection of respondents resulted in a limitation of the findings. First of all, in terms of 
qualitative research, the sample of organisations was relatively large. The choice to 
compare five Ghanaian NGOs with six Indonesian NGOs was strong in the sense that 
it enabled the inclusion of a cross-section of donor-sponsored democracy promoting 
NGOs in both countries. This makes finding similarities between NGOs from Ghana 
and Indonesia remarkable, instead of it being the result of a biased sample. The 
relatively wide selection of NGOs was also necessary to be able to analyse how 
different organisational setups of NGOs result in the performance of different types 
of democratic roles in Ghana. This, however, is the level at which the analysis ends. 
Its strength is that it has been able to cover a wide range of NGOs, but this is at the 
cost of a detailed analysis of the daily operation of such NGOs. While having talked 
a lot about concrete projects the NGOs implemented, there has hardly been any time 
to actually visit these projects, let alone to evaluate their impact. The conclusion of 
this thesis already noted that despite the fact that these NGOs share some very 
similar organisational characteristics, they manage to promote different interpreta-
tions of democracy. It would therefore be interesting to see how the findings of this 
thesis apply at the level of project implementation. Are NGOs implementing very 
similar projects, something which has been stressed by several of the respondents, 
or do they manage to go their own way? Maybe at this level there will be more context- 
specific differences between Ghana and Indonesia.
 Related to the decision to include a large group of NGOs, is the decision to 
conduct most interviews with respondents from these NGOs. To ensure triangulation, 
interviews were also held at other NGOs, state (related) institutions, universities and 
donor agencies. Nevertheless, respondents from the selected NGOs clearly dominate 
the sample of interview candidates. This was a deliberate choice because the 
research aimed to focus the analysis on the NGOs themselves, on who they are, how 
they are organised and what they do. This delivered a lot of information, for example, 
on how they perceive their relation with their donors and on the complications of 
178 | Chapter 6
donor-funding for their daily operation. More specific information on NGO-donor 
relations would require interviewing more respondents at donor agencies. This could 
be done by matching NGOs to their most important donors, and interviewing both 
sides. By including more donor agencies in the analysis, it also becomes possible to 
see whether different types of donors exert different types of pressures on NGOs, 
namely, whether the funding-conditions of private aid agencies have a similar 
homogenising effect as the funding conditions of bi- and multilateral donor agencies. 
A similar situation is the case with state institutions. To be better able to evaluate how 
they interact with NGOs, more of them would need to be included in the sample. Here 
many distinctions can be researched, for instance, between interaction with local or 
central government agencies, with legislative or executive bodies, between different 
ministries or different political parties. Last but certainly not least, research on civil 
society and democracy could also include more citizens. As the selected NGOs had 
no membership among common citizens, this type of respondent has not been 
included in the selection of interview candidates. This does not, however, make this 
rather diffuse group, which would include almost everybody, less important. In the 
end it is for them that the NGOs claim to work and it is they who form the basis of both 
civil society and democracy.
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Epilogue
After having completed the conclusion of this PhD thesis, I once again opened my 
copy of Tocqueville’s study of democracy in America. To my surprise, I stumbled 
upon the following quote (my emphasis):
 “Those who having read this book should imagine that my intention in writing it was 
to propose the laws and customs of the Anglo-Americans for the imitation of all 
democratic communities would make a great mistake; they must have paid more 
attention to the form than to the substance of my thought. My aim has been to show, 
by the example of America, that laws, and especially customs, may allow a democratic 
people to remain free. But I am very far from thinking that we ought to follow the 
example of the American democracy and copy the means it has employed to attain 
this end” (Tocqueville, 1998 [1835-1840]: XII).
The great philosopher appears to have been rightly concerned about the mis - 
inter pretations of his work. As the conclusion of this thesis has shown, the rich 
tapestry of thoughts and ideas of Tocqueville have also been translated into 
universally applicable policy assumptions and applied to NGOs. Alas, many have 
indeed seemed to pay more attention to the form than to the substance of his thought.
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Het promoten van het maatschappelijk middenveld en democratie: 
Op zoek naar idealen in de praktijk.
Hoofdstuk 1: Inleiding
Dit proefschrift gaat over het bevorderen van het maatschappelijk middenveld en 
democratie in ontwikkelingslanden. Er worden vele positieve eigenschappen 
toegedicht aan een sterk en actief maatschappelijk middenveld bestaande uit 
organisaties en netwerken van kritische burgers. Het centrale idee hierachter is dat 
een sterk en actief maatschappelijk middenveld een natuurlijk tegenwicht kan bieden 
tegen een dominante staat. Wanneer een staat niet gecontroleerd wordt door haar 
burgers, dan kan een prille democratie in korte tijd weer ten onder gaan aan corruptie 
of andere vormen van machtsmisbruik. Door deel te nemen aan burgerinitiatieven of 
door zich te verenigen achter een gemeenschappelijk belang kunnen burgers hun 
stem laten horen. Op die manier wordt het democratische systeem constant gevoed 
door een pluriformiteit aan maatschappelijke wensen en belangen, wat een essentieel 
onderdeel van het democratisch proces is. Tevens worden maatschappelijke 
organisaties vaak aangeduid als ‘democratiescholen’ waar burgers leren om 
vreedzaam met elkaar te overleggen, te debatteren en te stemmen over voorstellen. 
Anders gezegd leren burgers door te participeren in maatschappelijke organisaties 
de spelregels van een democratie.
 Formele en informele organisaties die niet onder de noemer van een bedrijf of de 
overheid vallen kunnen tot het maatschappelijk middenveld worden gerekend. Enkele 
voorbeelden zijn vakbonden, sportclubs, natuur- en milieuorganisaties en sociale 
bewegingen zoals de ‘occupy’ beweging. Binnen dit scala aan organisatievormen 
hebben donoren zich vooral gericht op het ondersteunen van Niet-Gouvernementele 
Organisaties (NGOs). De reden hiervoor is dat er van NGOs wordt verondersteld 
dat ze lokaal geworteld en flexibel zijn, het vermogen hebben om de stem van 
 gemarginaliseerde groepen te vertegenwoordigen, dat ze het publieke debat 
stimuleren en dat ze burgers de normen en waarden van een democratie bijbrengen. 
 De afgelopen jaren zijn er steeds meer studies verschenen die kritiek uiten op 
deze positieve voorstelling van zaken. Zoals in het theoretisch kader van dit 
proefschrift wordt omschreven, bestaat er in de theoretische literatuur geen overeen-
stemming over wat het maatschappelijk middenveld precies is, wat democratie is 
en hoe beiden met elkaar samenhangen. Zo is lang niet iedereen het er over eens 
dat het maatschappelijk middenveld altijd een positieve bijdrage levert aan democra-
tiseringsprocessen. Daarnaast hebben auteurs die wel een positieve bijdrage zien 
uiteenlopende meningen over de manier waarop. Een achterliggend probleem is dat 
er een bepaalde hoop en verwachtingen meespelen, waardoor het debat een sterke 
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normatieve lading heeft. In de praktijk blijken de NGOs vaak niet te kunnen voldoen 
aan deze verwachtingen. Het doel van dit proefschrift is bijdragen aan het begrip van 
waarom dit het geval is, door een antwoord te geven op de volgende centrale vraag:
Hoe pakken beleidsaannames op het gebied van maatschappelijk middenveld en 
democratie bevordering uit in de praktijk, en wat verklaart eventuele verschillen tussen 
aannames en praktijk?
Op het gebied van het promoten van het maatschappelijk middenveld en democratie 
zijn er twee belangrijke strategieën die donoren kunnen hanteren. Ten eerste is er 
de strategie van het creëren van een gunstige institutionele omgeving voor de 
ontwikkeling van een sterk maatschappelijk middenveld, en ten tweede is er de 
strategie van de rechtstreekse steun aan NGOs. Het zijn de aannames die aan deze 
strategieën ten grondslag liggen, die het vertrekpunt vormen van de studies in dit 
proefschrift.
 Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de beleidsaanname dat een gunstige institutionele 
omgeving nodig is voor het opbloeien van een sterk maatschappelijk middenveld. 
Vervolgens wordt er gekeken naar de aannames achter de strategie van het financieel 
ondersteunen van NGOs. Deze strategie wordt het meest toegepast door donoren, 
en komt daarom ook uitgebreid aan bod. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de aanname dat 
NGOs goed zijn voor het promoten van contextspecifieke democratie. In het 
verlengde hiervan gaat hoofdstuk 4 in op de aanname dat het financieel ondersteunen 
van deze NGOs dus een goede strategie is om contextspecifieke democratie te 
bevorderen. Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 5 gekeken naar de aanname dat NGOs 
goed zijn voor het bevorderen van democratie omdat ze bepaalde democratische 
rollen vervullen. 
 Wat de bovengenoemde aannames verbindt, is dat ze allen zijn gebaseerd op 
het idee dat het maatschappelijk middenveld lokaal geworteld moet zijn om een 
nuttige bijdrage te kunnen leveren aan het bevorderen van de democratie in een 
land. Veel studies hebben echter aangetoond dat juist bemoeienis van buitenaf deze 
lokale geworteldheid in de weg staat. Donoren hebben dus de bijna onmogelijke 
opgave om hulp zo contextspecifiek mogelijk te maken, terwijl internationale hulp per 
definitie een inmenging van buitenaf betekent. De studies in dit proefschrift brengen 
dit spanningsveld in kaart.
 Voor hoofdstuk 2 wordt er gebruik gemaakt van kwantitatief onderzoek met 
behulp van secundaire data. Hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 5 zijn gebaseerd op uitgebreid 
kwalitatief veldonderzoek bij NGOs in Ghana en Indonesië. De geselecteerde 
NGOs werken allemaal aan het bevorderen van democratie in hun land, krijgen 
hiervoor financiële steun van internationale donoren, en worden door lokale experts 
omschreven als belangrijke spelers op het gebied van democratiebevordering. 
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Er is gekozen voor een vergelijking tussen Ghana en Indonesië omdat het twee erg 
verschillende landen zijn. Hierdoor is variatie in de context een expliciet onderdeel 
van de onderzoeksopzet. Op deze manier wordt het makkelijker om context-
specificiteit zichtbaar te maken. De bevindingen zullen nu per studie kort worden 
samengevat. Tenslotte zal in de conclusie de hoofdvraag beantwoord worden.
Hoofdstuk 2: Het belang van een gunstige institutionele omgeving 
Hoewel er veel waarde wordt gehecht aan gunstige omgevingsfactoren voor het 
ontwikkelen van een sterk maatschappelijk middenveld, blijft het moeilijk om vast te 
stellen hoe deze twee zaken met elkaar samenhangen. Om hier meer inzicht in te 
krijgen, staat in deze studie de volgende deelvraag centraal:
Welke nationale contextuele factoren verklaren verschillen in de ontwikkeling van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld in landen over de gehele wereld?
Het beantwoorden van deze vraag is lastig omdat zowel de omgeving als de sterkte 
van het maatschappelijk middenveld moeilijk te definiëren en te meten zijn. In 
navolging van veel sociologische studies, is ervoor gekozen om de sterkte van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld in een land te meten aan de hand van het aantal lid-
maatschappen dat burgers hebben bij maatschappelijke organisaties. Het gaat hier 
niet alleen om lidmaatschappen van NGOs, maar om het hele spectrum aan maat-
schappelijke organisaties. In dezelfde studies wordt het aantal lidmaatschappen 
vaak gekoppeld aan nationale contextuele factoren zoals de mate van economische 
en democratische ontwikkeling van een land.
 Deze studie gebruikt dezelfde methode, maar voegt hier enkele zaken aan toe. 
Bestaande studies kijken namelijk vooral naar postcommunistische en Westerse 
landen. Het is echter maar de vraag of bestaande theorieën over de invloed van 
 omgevingsfactoren op lidmaatschap ook gelden voor ontwikkelingslanden. Deze 
studie neemt daarom ontwikkelingslanden mee in de analyse en voegt daarnaast 
contextuele factoren toe die extra van belang zouden kunnen zijn in ontwikkelingslanden, 
namelijk de mate waarin de wet wordt nageleefd (rule of law) en de mate van politieke 
stabiliteit.
 Het gangbare idee is dat burgers vaker lid zijn van maatschappelijke organisaties 
naarmate de bovengenoemde omgevingsfactoren gunstiger worden. In een politiek 
stabiel land waar de wetten worden nageleefd, waar het recht op organiseren stevig 
is verankerd in het democratische systeem en waar burgers voldoende geld verdienen 
om in hun bestaan te voorzien, is het makkelijker om maatschappelijke organisaties 
op te richten en om er lid van te zijn. Deze redenering gaat uit van een rechtlijnig 
stijgend verband tussen omgevingsfactoren en het aantal lidmaatschappen. Als men 
alleen kijkt naar postcommunistische en Westerse landen dan klopt deze redenering 
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grotendeels. Het plaatje verandert echter als er ontwikkelingslanden aan de analyse 
worden toegevoegd.
 Uit de multilevel regressie analyse met data uit 53 landen van over de hele 
wereld, blijkt dat er nauwelijks een rechtlijnig verband bestaat tussen het aantal 
 lidmaatschappen en de vier omgevingsfactoren (economie, democratie, naleving van de 
wet en politieke stabiliteit). Opvallend is echter dat de economische situatie en het 
naleven van de wet een non-lineair (U-vormig) verband vertonen (zie figuur 2.1 en 
2.2). Oftewel, daar waar bestaande theorieën een verdere daling voorspellen in het 
aantal lidmaatschappen in ontwikkelingslanden, laat de data juist een stijging zien. 
 De verklaring voor deze bevindingen wordt gezocht in de notie dat de situatie in 
ontwikkelingslanden wezenlijk anders is. Ten eerste is er in ontwikkelingslanden een 
veel grotere informele sector die ook zonder een goed wettelijk kader functioneert. 
Een slechte naleving van de wet hoeft dus niet te betekenen dat er ook daadwerkelijk 
minder maatschappelijke organisaties zijn waar mensen lid van kunnen worden. Ten 
tweede lijkt het erop dat er andere motieven meespelen bij het al dan niet lid worden. 
Daar waar vaak wordt gesteld dat mensen in rijke landen vooral lid worden vanwege 
zelfontplooiing, heeft dit in ontwikkelingslanden wellicht meer te maken met het 
voorzien in eerste levensbehoeften. Wanneer er geen sprake is van een goed wettelijk 
kader en de naleving ervan, is het voor burgers nodig om zich te beschermen tegen 
willekeur of om juist te gaan strijden voor het verbeteren van deze situatie. 
Lidmaatschap van een maatschappelijke organisatie kan hierbij helpen. Hetzelfde 
geldt voor een slechte economische situatie. Wanneer burgers een te laag inkomen 
hebben en niet kunnen terugvallen op een goed ontwikkeld sociaal zekerheidsstelsel, 
kan de hulp van een maatschappelijke organisatie van doorslaggevend belang zijn. 
Kortom, wanneer omgevingsfactoren erg verslechteren is er juist een grotere behoefte 
aan lidmaatschap.
Hoofdstuk 3: De contextspecificiteit van NGOs in Ghana en Indonesië 
In het debat over het ondersteunen van het maatschappelijk middenveld en 
democratie wordt het belang van contextspecificiteit vaak onderstreept. Om een 
zinvolle bijdrage te kunnen leveren aan het bevorderen van lokaal gewortelde 
democratie zouden NGOs zelf goed ingebed moeten zijn in hun nationale context. 
Dit idee is goed te volgen, maar tegelijkertijd erg moeilijk tastbaar te maken. Het is 
namelijk niet duidelijk wanneer er sprake is van een goede inbedding en wanneer 
niet. Het is ook niet helder welke elementen uit de context van belang zijn en hoe een 
organisatie zich hierop kan aanpassen. Om hier inzicht in te verschaffen, kijkt deze 
studie naar wat het idee van contextspecificiteit concreet inhoudt voor NGOs. Er 
wordt hier een vergelijking gemaakt tussen NGOs uit Ghana en Indonesië om de 
kans te vergroten op het vinden van contextspecifieke verschillen. Dit heeft 
geresulteerd in de volgende deelvraag:
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Wat zijn de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen democratie bevorderende NGOs in 
Ghana en Indonesië, en in hoeverre duidt dit op contextspecificiteit?
 De studie heeft geresulteerd in een raamwerk waarmee de mate van context-
specificiteit van NGOs kan worden beoordeeld op basis van enkele organisatie-
kenmerken, namelijk hun missie, strategie, structuur, financiële middelen en personeel. 
Wanneer de NGOs uit Ghana en Indonesië worden afgezet tegen dit raamwerk dan 
scoren de NGOs uit Ghana iets hoger op contextspecificiteit dan de NGOs uit 
Indonesië. Een interessantere bevinding is echter dat de NGOs uit beide landen erg 
op elkaar lijken. Wat betreft hun missie hebben ze nog wel een andere focus, die 
goed aansluit bij de context in Ghana en Indonesië. Zo houden de NGOs in Ghana 
zich (onder meer) bezig met decentralisatie, het ondersteunen van het parlement en 
het ervoor zorgen dat achtergestelde groepen ook worden betrokken bij het 
democratische proces, terwijl in Indonesië de nadruk ligt op de thema’s corruptie en 
mensenrechten. 
 Wanneer we echter verder kijken dan alleen de missie van de organisatie dan 
zien we veel overeenkomsten. In beide landen vinden we vooral NGOs met een 
hiërarchische organisatiestructuur die met hoogopgeleide professionals werken. Ze 
worden namelijk top-down geregeerd door een academische elite die vaak in het 
Westen is opgeleid. Ze hebben nauwelijks leden onder het gewone volk, en al 
helemaal niet onder de armen en gemarginaliseerden. Veel van de NGOs hebben 
dan ook moeite met het benoemen van hun achterban. Daarnaast hanteren ze vooral 
non-confronterende lobby strategieën richting de staat. De meer activistische strategieën 
waarbij het nodig is om grote delen van het volk te mobiliseren, zoals demonstreren, 
komen weinig voor. Ten slotte worden ze financieel gezien niet, of maar voor een klein 
deel lokaal ondersteund, waardoor ze afhankelijk zijn van internationale donoren.
 In tegenstelling tot wat er van NGOs wordt verwacht, blijken ze dus geen lokaal 
gewortelde organisaties te zijn die dicht bij het volk staan. Dit is een opmerkelijke 
constatering omdat veel van deze organisaties juist pleiten voor een betere 
democratie, vaak in naam van het volk. Daarnaast is het opmerkelijk dat ondanks 
het feit dat donoren al vele declaraties hebben ondertekend om hulp meer af te 
stemmen op de lokale context, dit zich niet heeft vertaald in contextspecifieke 
partner organisaties. 
Hoofdstuk 4: De homogenisering van NGOs in Ghana en Indonesië 
Het vorige hoofdstuk heeft laten zien dat NGOs uit Ghana en Indonesië erg op elkaar 
lijken. Het is echter nog niet duidelijk hoe dit komt. Deze studie zoekt naar een 
mogelijke verklaring door te kijken naar de invloed van donorfinanciering op de 
missie, strategie, structuur en het personeel van NGOs. Hierbij staat de volgende 
deelvraag centraal:
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Op welke manier beïnvloedt de financiële steun van donoren de manier waarop 
Ghanese en Indonesische democratiebevorderende NGOs zich organiseren?
 Om grip te krijgen op het proces van homogenisering is gebruikt gemaakt van 
de theorie van het institutionele isomorfisme. Deze theorie stelt dat organisaties die 
zich in hetzelfde veld bevinden na verloop van tijd op elkaar gaan lijken. De hoofdreden 
voor dit proces van organisationele adaptatie is overleven. Door zich aan te passen 
aan de normen van de actoren van wie ze afhankelijk zijn, hopen organisaties 
legitimiteit te winnen en daarmee ook toegang te krijgen tot (financiële) middelen. 
Voor de NGOs in Ghana en Indonesië heeft er wat dat betreft een vergelijkbare 
ontwikkeling plaatsgevonden, waarbij nationale actoren zoals de staat en burgers 
steeds minder belangrijk zijn geworden voor hun voortbestaan en internationale 
donoren steeds belangrijker. Omdat ze van de staat geen geld krijgen en omdat ze 
geen leden hebben waar ze contributies aan kunnen vragen zijn de NGOs momenteel 
volledig afhankelijk van internationale donoren. Dit is een eerste verklaring waarom 
NGOs in Ghana en Indonesië zo op elkaar lijken, namelijk omdat ze afhankelijk zijn 
van hetzelfde type actor voor hun voortbestaan. Dit verklaart echter nog niet hoe het 
proces van homogenisering in zijn werk gaat. 
 De analyse levert vier belangrijke inzichten op. Ten eerste wordt duidelijk dat 
steun van donoren een directe invloed uitoefent op de organisatiekenmerken van 
NGOs. Door hulp aan bepaalde thema’s te verbinden, beïnvloeden donoren de 
missies van NGOs. Door activistische methoden af te keuren, beïnvloeden ze de 
strategieën van NGOs. Door ze te stimuleren om professionals in dienst te nemen, 
beïnvloeden ze het personeel van NGOs. Alleen op het gebied van organisatie-
structuur is er geen directe invloed waarneembaar. 
 Ten tweede laat de analyse zien dat het proces van homogenisering niet alleen 
een kwestie is van een ongelijke machtsverhouding tussen donor en ontvanger, 
maar ook het gevolg is van strategisch gedrag van de NGOs zelf. Zo framen ze hun 
missie in donortaal en gebruiken ze hun professionele staf om toegang te krijgen tot 
donorfinanciering. Door non-confronterende strategieën te hanteren stellen ze deze 
toegang veilig. 
 Ten derde laat de analyse zien dat het proces van homogenisering ook voortkomt 
uit de onderlinge samenhang tussen de organisatiekenmerken van de NGOs. Het feit 
dat ze worden gerund door een academische elite (personeel) beïnvloedt bijvoorbeeld 
het type problemen dat ze aanpakken (missie) en de manier waarop (strategie). Daar 
waar activisten er eerder voor zullen kiezen om de gemeenschap te mobiliseren, 
organiseren academici eerder seminars en overlegcommissies met de overheid. 
Hierbij speelt ook mee dat het voor organisaties zonder leden (structuur) sowieso 
moeilijker is om strategieën te hanteren waarbij het nodig is om de achterban te 
mobiliseren.
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 Ten slotte laat de analyse zien dat dit proces zichzelf versterkt omdat het twee 
kanten op werkt. Als de NGOs in hun missie streven naar zaken als democratie en goed 
bestuur, en ze dit willen bereiken door het doen van onderzoek en het rapporteren van de 
resultaten hiervan op conferenties en seminars met overheidsfunctionarissen, dan 
hebben ze een academische staf nodig. Op deze manier ontstaan er verscheidene 
feedback-loops die het proces van homogenisering versterken. Figuur 4.1 laat dit in 
detail zien.
 Het is moeilijk voor NGOs om uit deze feedback-loops te ontsnappen omdat ze 
momenteel, qua financiering, geen alternatief hebben. Hoewel financiële steun van 
donoren het proces van homogenisering in gang zet, is de afhankelijkheid van deze 
steun de drijvende kracht achter het homogeniseringproces. Daar komt bij dat deze 
 afhankelijkheid groter wordt naarmate het homogeniseringproces vordert. Om toegang te 
krijgen tot donorgelden conformeren NGOs zich aan het door donoren gepromote 
professionele organisatiemodel. Tegelijkertijd maakt het hebben van een professionele 
organisatie een NGO meer afhankelijk van financiële steun. Het werken vanuit een modern 
kantoor met een academische staf kost veel geld, en momenteel zijn alleen internationale 
donoren bereid om dit te betalen. Dit zichzelf versterkende proces bevordert zo 
internationale afhankelijkheid in plaats van lokaal eigenaarschap en geworteldheid. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Democratische rollen van NGOs in Ghana
De vraag die nu nog rest is op welke wijze de NGOs een bijdrage leveren aan het 
democratiseringsproces. Zoals in de inleiding is aangegeven wordt er veel van NGOs 
verwacht. In de literatuur worden er vier democratische rollen genoemd, te weten: 
een educatieve, een communicatieve, een representatieve en een coöperatieve rol. 
Deze vier rollen worden als ideaaltypen omschreven en gebruikt om de praktijk tegen 
af te zetten. Er wordt hier gefocust op Ghana omdat dit vaak wordt genoemd 
als voorbeeldland op het gebied van maatschappelijk middenveld en democratie-
bevordering. Dit heeft geleid tot de volgende deelvraag:
Welke democratische rollen vervullen Ghanese NGOs en welke organisatiekenmerken 
stellen hen in staat om deze rollen te vervullen?
 De educatieve rol omvat het idee van de democratiescholen waar burgers door te 
participeren democratische normen, waarden en praktijken leren. De communicatieve 
rol gaat in op het idee dat NGOs een communicatiekanaal vormen tussen staat en 
maatschappij. Bij de representatieve rol staan aspecten als burgers een stem geven, 
het opkomen voor hun belangen en het bieden van een tegenwicht aan de staat 
centraal. Bij de coöperatieve rol gaat het daarentegen juist om de toegevoegde 
waarde die NGOs kunnen hebben wanneer ze met de staat samenwerken om 
problemen in het land op te lossen.
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 De analyse laat zien dat Ghanese democratiebevorderende NGOs alleen de 
coöperatieve rol vervullen zoals die in de literatuur is omschreven. Als naar de overige 
rollen wordt gekeken, dan kan er worden geconcludeerd dat de NGOs niet leveren 
wat er van hun wordt verwacht. Omdat ze geen leden hebben kunnen burgers niet 
participeren en gaat het idee van de democratiescholen niet op. Hierdoor zijn NGOs 
ook niet in staat om de stem van het volk rechtstreeks te vertegenwoordigen. 
Daarnaast heeft geen van de NGOs zowel een goede toegang tot de staat als een 
sterke link met de maatschappij, waardoor de schakelfunctie tussen staat en 
maatschappij niet goed van de grond komt. 
 De analyse laat echter ook zien dat de NGOs deze ideaaltypische rollen op een 
andere manier invullen, alsmede welke organisatiekenmerken hen in staat stellen om 
dit te doen. Zo vervullen ze ook zonder leden een educatieve rol. In plaats van leren 
door participeren, heeft het leren meer de vorm van kennisoverdracht via het 
organiseren van conferenties, trainingen en seminars. Hierbij richten verschillende 
NGOs zich op verschillende groepen zoals overheidsfunctionarissen, vrouwen of 
 gemarginaliseerde groepen. Verder richten NGOs zich met name op het onderhouden 
van goede communicatiekanalen met ofwel de staat, ofwel de maatschappij. 
De representatieve rol, ten slotte, wordt vervuld op een indirecte manier. NGOs doen 
dit door hun achterban te mobiliseren en door het opbouwen van netwerken met 
andere NGOs. Zo spreken ze toch in naam van hun achterban, zonder dat die 
daadwerkelijk lid is.
 De analyse laat tevens zien dat het moeilijk is voor NGOs om alle rollen 
tegelijkertijd te vervullen vanwege conflicterende organisatievereisten. Zo is het voor 
NGOs moeilijk om een goed communicatiekanaal met de overheid te onderhouden 
en zich tegelijkertijd als een kritische waakhond op te stellen richting dezelfde 
overheid. Confronterende tactieken zoals demonstraties bemoeilijken de toegang 
terwijl lobbyen met een zachte hand deze toegang veilig stelt. Ook is het moeilijk om 
tegelijkertijd op te treden als coördinator van beleidsdebatten met de staat 
(coöperatieve rol), en als vertegenwoordiger van een achterban (representatieve rol). 
NGOs die een goede relatie hebben met de staat en die zelf geen duidelijke achterban 
vertegenwoordigen zijn goed in het samenbrengen van verschillende partijen voor 
overleg, terwijl NGOs die wel een achterban vertegenwoordigen juist eerder zullen 
deelnemen aan zo’n overleg als een van de belanghebbende partijen. Het is dus 
logisch dat iedere NGO zich specialiseert in zijn eigen niche.
 Het gegeven dat NGOs niet alle rollen kunnen vervullen vanwege conflicterende 
organisatievereisten verklaart waarom ze zo vatbaar zijn voor kritiek. Ze worden 
namelijk vaak bekritiseerd vanwege de rol die ze niet vervullen. De kenmerken die ze 
sterk maken in de ene rol zijn vaak precies de kenmerken die ze zwak maken in de 
andere. Bijvoorbeeld, door zich kritisch op te stellen richting de overheid kunnen 
NGOs opkomen voor de belangen van hun achterban. Wanneer ze echter te kritisch 
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zijn, lopen ze het gevaar om aan legitimiteit te verliezen in de ogen van de overheid. 
Op de zelfde manier is het hebben van een hoog opgeleide staf en goede informele 
relaties met overheidsfunctionarissen van essentieel belang om een educatieve rol 
richting de staat te kunnen vervullen. Tegelijkertijd roept dit echter de kritiek op dat de 
NGOs te elitair zijn, te dicht op de overheid zitten en het volk niet vertegenwoordigen. 
Op deze manier verliezen ze legitimiteit in de ogen van de maatschappij. Dit laat zien 
hoe NGOs op een dun koord moeten balanceren om ervoor te zorgen dat een kracht 
niet verandert in een zwakte.
Hoofdstuk 6: Conclusie
Achter het optimistische idee dat het maatschappelijk middenveld, en daarbinnen 
NGOs, altijd een positieve bijdrage leveren aan het proces van democratisering in 
ontwikkelingslanden, gaat een zeer complexe werkelijkheid schuil. Dit proefschrift 
laat zien dat op elk van de onderzochte beleidsaannames veel is aan te merken. 
Nu de discrepanties tussen de aannames en de praktijk in kaart zijn gebracht rest 
nog het beantwoorden van de hoofdvraag, namelijk: wat verklaart deze discrepanties? 
De verklaring moet worden gezocht in een drietal vertaalslagen waarbij er telkens iets 
verloren gaat, waardoor er uiteindelijk nauwelijks meer iets van de idealen is terug te 
vinden in de praktijk. 
 Ten eerste is er de vertaalslag van theorie naar beleidsaanname, waarbij er 
selectief wordt geput uit de theorie. Hoewel er in de literatuur een grote diversiteit aan 
opvattingen bestaat, gaan beleidsaannames allemaal uit van een positieve relatie 
tussen maatschappelijk middenveld en democratie. Het lijkt erop dat de theorie 
wordt gebruikt als grabbelton waarbij met name de positieve ideeën er uitgepikt 
worden. Zo wordt het positieve idee van Tocqueville’s democratiescholen vaak 
genoemd en niet Gramsci’s idee over het maatschappelijk middenveld als een 
‘slagveld’ waar maatschappelijke conflicten worden uitgevochten. 
 Dit selectieve gebruik wordt mede veroorzaakt door de hoge mate van normativiteit 
en het hoge abstractieniveau van het theoretische debat. Dat deze kenmerken van het 
debat verleidelijk kunnen zijn voor beleidsmakers is op zich begrijpelijk. Normativiteit 
is namelijk positief in de zin dat het mensen kan inspireren tot actie. Daarnaast zorgt 
abstractie ervoor dat de ideeën op bijna elke context van toepassing zijn. Tegelijkertijd zijn 
dit ook de twee grootste valkuilen. De focus op idealen kan het zicht op de werkelijkheid 
vertroebelen en er kunnen hooggespannen verwachtingen door ontstaan. Tegelijkertijd 
zijn de ideeën zo abstract dat ze weinig handvatten bieden voor daadwerkelijk 
handelen in de praktijk.
 Dit brengt ons bij de tweede vertaalslag, namelijk het vertalen van beleids-
assumpties in een concrete beleidsstrategie. Ook in deze stap worden de zaken 
versimpeld. Het opbouwen van een kritisch maatschappelijk middenveld wordt 
teruggebracht tot het ondersteunen van NGOs, terwijl dit maar een klein onderdeel 
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van het hele scala aan organisatievormen binnen het maatschappelijk middenveld 
betreft. Dit betekent dat veel organisaties die in de theorie als belangrijk worden 
omschreven niet aan bod komen. Men kan hierbij denken aan meer activistische 
sociale bewegingen, en zelfs aan niet politiek georiënteerde organisaties zoals 
sportclubs of cultuurgerelateerde organisaties. De reden voor de focus op NGOs lijkt 
tweeledig. Enerzijds zijn professionele NGOs het type organisatie dat kan voldoen 
aan de strenge verantwoordingseisen die donoren verbinden aan hun financiële 
steun. Anderzijds is er de tendens dat organisaties langzaam transformeren in de 
richting van een professionele NGO vanaf het moment dat ze financieel afhankelijk 
worden van donoren.
 Daar waar de eerste vertaalslag een normatieve keuze betreft (het positieve 
selecteren), verdwijnt deze normatieve lading in de tweede vertaalslag. Normativiteit 
wordt hier namelijk teruggebracht tot organisatievorm. Daar waar het vroeger een 
ideologische keuze was om NGOs te ondersteunen lijkt het vandaag de dag meer 
een praktische keuze vanwege de hiervoor genoemde verantwoordingseisen. NGOs 
die de juiste professionele organisatievorm aannemen worden bijna automatisch 
legitieme democratiebevorderaars in de ogen van donoren. Op deze manier verdwijnt 
de ideologische lading en blijft er een relatief lege huls over in de vorm van de 
voorkeur voor bepaalde organisatiekenmerken. Dit heeft ook zijn weerslag op de 
volgende vertaalslag.
 De laatste vertaalslag is die van het daadwerkelijk implementeren van het beleid. 
Hier blijkt dat de focus op organisatievorm boven een focus op ideologische inhoud 
leidt tot een paradoxale uitkomst. Enerzijds worden NGOs door hun organisatievorm 
beperkt in de democratische rollen die ze kunnen vervullen. Anderzijds biedt de 
focus van donoren op organisatievorm de NGOs ook ruimte om zich ideologisch te 
onderscheiden. Er wordt vaak gezegd dat NGOs een van buitenaf opgelegd 
fenomeen zijn die de neo-liberale agenda promoten. Ondanks dat sommige van de 
NGOs uit dit onderzoek inderdaad het neo-liberale model aanhangen, promoten 
andere NGOs juist hele andere interpretaties van democratie, zoals de overleg-
democratie (deliberative democracy) en de sociaaldemocratie. Het lijkt er op dat 
deze ideologische differentiatie eerder een onbedoeld bijeffect is van de focus op 
vorm boven inhoud, dan een van tevoren uitgedachte strategie. Deze onbedoelde 
democratische diversiteit als bijproduct van een proces van homogenisering is 
misschien wel het beste voorbeeld van een complexe realiteit die zich moeilijk laat 
vatten in theorieën, laat staan zich laat beïnvloeden in de praktijk. 
Beleidsaanbevelingen
Donoren zeggen veel waarde te hechten aan het afstemmen van hun hulp op de 
lokale context. Dit streven is terug te zien in de assumpties die aan hun beleid ten 
grondslag liggen. In de praktijk blijken deze assumpties echter nauwelijks uit te 
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komen, waardoor externe hulp nog steeds op gespannen voet staat met context-
specificiteit. Het is de vraag of contextspecifieke democratiebevordering een 
‘contradictio in terminis’ zal blijven, of dat het voor donoren mogelijk is om uit dit 
spanningsveld te ontsnappen. De bevindingen van dit proefschrift suggereren twee 
oplossingsrichtingen, namelijk een verandering in hun manier van handelen, en een 
verandering in hun manier van denken. 
Een andere manier van handelen
Een manier waarop donoren hun democratiehulp meer contextspecifiek kunnen 
maken is door andere organisatietypes te ondersteunen. Hoofdstuk 5 heeft een 
raamwerk opgeleverd dat laat zien welk type organisatie nodig is voor het vervullen 
van welk type rol. Hiermee kunnen donoren hun werk meer toespitsen op de rollen 
die nu minder aan bod komen. Hulp kan dan vooral worden gericht op minder 
professionele democratische lidmaatschapsorganisaties die dichter bij het volk 
staan. Tegelijkertijd heeft de studie over het homogeniseringproces van NGOs laten 
zien dat er ook een gevaar schuilt in deze strategie. Wanneer deze lokaal gewortelde 
organisaties deel uit gaan maken van de hulpwereld bestaat er namelijk de kans dat 
ze zich langzaam zullen transformeren richting een professionele NGO en zo een 
vergroot risico lopen om ontworteld te raken. Dit gevaar kan alleen doorbroken 
worden als het donoren lukt om flexibelere voorwaarden en minder strenge 
 verantwoordingscriteria te hanteren. Aangezien donoren zichzelf vaak ook weer 
moeten verantwoorden aan (supra)nationale parlementen, is dit niet waarschijnlijk 
op de korte termijn.
 Er blijven dan nog drie opties over. Ten eerste kunnen donoren zich richten op 
NGOs in een tussenpositie. Deze vormen dan zowel de schakel als de buffer tussen 
de donor en de lokaal gewortelde organisaties. Hierbij is het van belang dat de 
tussenliggende NGO zelf niet ook een donor wordt voor haar lokale partners. Dit kan 
worden voorkomen door deze tussenliggende NGOs geen geld over te laten maken 
naar lokale partners. In plaats hiervan kunnen zij hun lokale partners helpen op het 
gebied van capaciteitsopbouw en het zorgen voor een betere verbinding met het 
nationale politieke systeem. Deze strategie wordt momenteel in Ghana al toegepast. 
 Ten tweede is het een optie om werk te maken van het ondersteunen van een 
gunstige institutionele omgeving. Deze strategie wordt nog weinig toegepast. Uit de 
studie van hoofdstuk 2 blijkt echter dat economische ontwikkeling en het verbeteren 
van de rechtstaat een positieve bijdrage kunnen leveren aan de ontwikkeling van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld. Er moet hierbij wel rekening worden gehouden dat 
naarmate deze factoren verbeteren, er wellicht juist een afname kan optreden in het 
aantal lidmaatschappen van maatschappelijke organisaties. Dit kan echter als een 
positief signaal worden beschouwd, omdat dit zou betekenen dat mensen minder 
afhankelijk worden van lidmaatschap om in hun eerste levensbehoeften te voorzien. 
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De verwachting is dat wanneer de omgevingsfactoren nog verder verbeteren er weer 
meer mensen lid zullen worden, maar dan om redenen van zelfontplooiing. Dit behelst 
dus een transformatie naar een ander type maatschappelijk middenveld.
 Ten slotte is het wellicht een beter idee om een ander type partnerorganisatie te 
koppelen aan een ander type donor. Niet elk type donor is namelijk gebonden aan 
dezelfde spelregels. Voor de grotere bi- en multilaterale donoren is het bijvoorbeeld 
moeilijk om af te wijken van protocollen. Dit komt onder andere omdat zij zich ook weer 
voor hun uitgaven moeten verantwoorden aan derden. Donoren die aan minder strikte 
verantwoordingseisen gebonden zijn kunnen wat dat betreft meer hun eigen koers 
varen. Het is dus het overwegen waard om het ondersteunen van minder professionele 
en meer lokaal gewortelde organisaties over te laten aan flexibelere donoren.
Een andere manier van denken
De bovenstaande aanbevelingen hebben allemaal te maken met het verkleinen van 
de discrepantie tussen beleidsassumptie en praktijk door de praktijk te verbeteren. 
Het is echter ook mogelijk om de discrepantie op een fundamenteler niveau te 
verkleinen door beleidsassumpties realistischer te maken. Dit klinkt makkelijker dan 
het is. Beleidsassumpties bestaan namelijk vaak uit een mix van theoretische 
argumenten over hoe dingen werken en normatieve argumenten over hoe dingen 
zouden moeten zijn. De normatieve elementen van beleidsassumpties belemmeren 
nogal eens het zicht op hoe het er daadwerkelijk aan toe gaat in ontwikkelingslanden, 
terwijl beleidsimplementatie vooral gebaat is bij hele concrete informatie over hoe 
dingen werken in de praktijk. Het opnemen van normatieve elementen in beleids-
assumpties veroorzaakt zo een paradoxale situatie. Beleid sluit hierdoor namelijk 
minder goed aan op de situatie in een land en leidt daardoor juist tot verwijdering van 
de nagestreefde idealen. 
 De oplossing hiervoor ligt in het beter scheiden van hoe dingen werken en hoe 
dingen zouden moeten zijn. Idealiter zouden beleidsassumpties gebaseerd moeten 
zijn op theorieën over hoe zaken werken, vervolgens kan men op basis van normen 
en waarden een handelingsrichting kiezen en ten slotte kan de beleidsimplementatie 
steeds beter worden afgestemd op de lokale context door een constant proces van 
monitoren en evalueren. Op deze manier zullen beleidsdoelen automatisch 
realistischer worden. In plaats van het nastreven van het ambitieuze doel om prille 
democratieën om te vormen tot ideale democratische staten, is het veel productiever 
om de bestaande situatie te analyseren en enkele kernpunten te benoemen waar 
men als externe donor een bijdrage aan zou kunnen leveren. Dit betekent wel dat 
donoren bescheiden moeten zijn over wat ze kunnen bereiken. Het stellen van 
realistische doelen is daarom waarschijnlijk de beste manier om ontwikkelingshulp 
op het gebied van maatschappelijk middenveld en democratiebevordering meer 
contextspecifiek te maken.
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The optimistic view that civil society is always a positive force for democracy and 
must therefore be supported by international donors, has been the subject of 
intense debate. Not only do scholars disagree about civil society’s contribution 
to democracy, the debate is also driven by a normative agenda which projects 
 particular hopes and dreams onto civil society organizations. ‘Promoting Civil 
Society and Democracy’ unravels these issues by tracing what is left of ideals 
in reality. Based on extensive fieldwork involving democracy promoting NGOs 
in Ghana and Indonesia, this study uncovers why policy assumptions in the field 
of civil society and democracy promotion often do not yield the expected results.
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